An Anticipatory Approach to Ethico-Legal Implications of Future Neurotechnology.

This paper provides a justificatory rationale for recommending the inclusion of imagined future use cases in neurotechnology development processes, specifically for legal and policy ends. Including detailed imaginative engagement with future applications of neurotechnology can serve to connect ethical, legal, and policy issues potentially arising from the translation of brain stimulation research to the public consumer domain. Futurist scholars have for some time recommended approaches that merge creative arts with scientific development in order to theorise possible futures toward which current trends in technology development might be steered. Taking a creative, imaginative approach like this in the neurotechnology context can help move development processes beyond considerations of device functioning, safety, and compliance with existing regulation, and into an active engagement with potential future dynamics brought about by the emergence of the neurotechnology itself. Imagined scenarios can engage with potential consumer uses of devices that might come to challenge legal or policy contexts. An anticipatory, creative approach can imagine what such uses might consist in, and what they might imply. Justifying this approach also prompts a co-responsibility perspective for policymaking in technology contexts. Overall, this furnishes a mode of neurotechnology's emergence that can avoid crises of confidence in terms of ethico-legal issues, and promote policy responses balanced between knowledge, values, protected innovation potential, and regulatory safeguards.

Neuroderechos: Ser o no ser. Una propuesta de adscripción sistemática en el ordenamiento jurídico español / Neurorights: To be or not to be. A proposal for systematic ascription to the Spanish legal system

Nuestro cerebro es lo que nos define. Estamos pasando de lasmuy desarrolladas tecnologías para la información y la comunicación (conocidas porsu acrónimo TIC) a las nuevas tecnologías sobre la información y para la comunicacióncon el cerebro. Estos avances neurocientíficos se traducen en notables mejoras parala salud de las personas, pero también en bienes de consumo. Dichas tecnologíascombinadas con la Inteligencia Artificial (IA), podrían usarse para descifrar y manipularprocesos mentales y para aumentar las capacidades cognitivas de las personasconectándolas a las interfaces cerebro-computadora, alterando lo que significaser humano. En lo que sigue, expondremos el estado actual de la neurociencia, suimpacto jurídico, el examen de las escasas iniciativas legislativas sobre el particularcon especial estudio de la propuesta de reforma constitucional chilena de 2020,concluyendo si se hace necesario realizar cambios o adaptar las reglas existentes a lassituaciones nuevas. Se trata en definitiva de modular dogmáticamente la respuesta jurídica ante el imparable avance de la neurociencia y cuestionarse si articular unanueva categoría de derechos como los denominados neuroderechos puede ser o no ser la mejor solución. (AU)

Our brain is what defines us. We are moving from highly developed informationand communication technologies (known by its acronym ICT) to new informationand communication technologies with the brain. These neuroscientific advancestranslate into remarkable improvements for people’s health, but also consumergoods. Such technologies, combined with Artificial Intelligence (AI), could beused to decipher and manipulate mental processes and to increase people’scognitive abilities by connecting them to brain-computer interfaces, alteringwhat it means to be human. In what follows, we will present the current state ofneuroscience, its legal impact, the examination of the few legislative initiativeson the subject with special study of the Chilean constitutional reform proposal of2020, concluding if it is necessary to make changes or adapt the existing rules tonew situations. Ultimately, it is about dogmatically modulating the legal responseto the unstoppable advance of neuroscience and questioning whether articulatinga new category of rights such as the so-called neuro-rights may or may not be the best solution. (AU)

International primate neuroscience research regulation, public engagement and transparency opportunities.

Scientific excellence is a necessity for progress in biomedical research. As research becomes ever more international, establishing international collaborations will be key to advancing our scientific knowledge. Understanding the similarities in standards applied by different nations to animal research, and where the differences might lie, is crucial. Cultural differences and societal values will also contribute to these similarities and differences between countries and continents. Our overview is not comprehensive for all species, but rather focuses on non-human primate (NHP) research, involving New World marmosets and Old World macaques, conducted in countries where NHPs are involved in neuroimaging research. Here, an overview of the ethics and regulations is provided to help assess welfare standards amongst primate research institutions. A comparative examination of these standards was conducted to provide a basis for establishing a common set of standards for animal welfare. These criteria may serve to develop international guidelines, which can be managed by an International Animal Welfare and Use Committee (IAWUC). Internationally, scientists have a moral responsibility to ensure excellent care and welfare of their animals, which in turn, influences the quality of their research. When working with animal models, maintaining a high quality of care ("culture of care") and welfare is essential. The transparent promotion of this level of care and welfare, along with the results of the research and its impact, may reduce public concerns associated with animal experiments in neuroscience research.

Neuroimaging-based prediction of mental traits: Road to utopia or Orwell?

Predicting individual mental traits and behavioral dispositions from brain imaging data through machine-learning approaches is becoming a rapidly evolving field in neuroscience. Beyond scientific and clinical applications, such approaches also hold the potential to gain substantial influence in fields such as human resource management, education, or criminal law. Although several challenges render real-life applications of such tools difficult, future conflicts of individual, economic, and public interests are preprogrammed, given the prospect of improved personalized predictions across many domains. In this Perspective paper, we thus argue for the need to engage in a discussion on the ethical, legal, and societal implications of the emergent possibilities for brain-based predictions and outline some of the aspects for this discourse.

Neuroscience and mental state issues in forensic assessment.

Neuroscience has already changed how the law understands an individual's cognitive processes, how those processes shape behavior, and how bio-psychosocial history and neurodevelopmental approaches provide information, which is critical to understanding mental states underlying behavior, including criminal behavior. In this paper, we briefly review the state of forensic assessment of mental conditions in the relative culpability of criminal defendants, focused primarily on the weaknesses of current approaches. We then turn to focus on neuroscience approaches and how they have the potential to improve assessment, but with significant risks and limitations.

In defense of free will: Neuroscience and criminal responsibility.

Is neuroscience the death of free will and if so, does this mean the imminent demise of the psycho-legal practices related to insanity and criminal responsibility? For many scholars of neuro-jurisprudence, recent advances in brain sciences suggesting that the perception of free will is merely illusory, an epiphenomenon of unconscious brain activity, do indeed undermine our traditional understandings of moral and legal responsibility. In this paper, however, we reject this radical claim and argue that neuroscientific evidence can indeed reveal how free will actually works and how its underlying neural and perceptual machinery gives rise to our sense of responsibility for our actions. First, the experience of free will is recast in terms of neuroscientific studies of agency and willed action. Second, evidence is presented of a neural network model linking agency to widely-distributed brain areas encompassing frontal motor and parietal monitoring sites. We then apply these findings to criminal responsibility practices by demonstrating (a) how the experience of intentionality and agency is generated by specific interactions of this discrete frontal-parietal network, (b) how mental disease/defect may compromise this network, and (c) how such pathologies may lead to disturbances in the sense of agency that often are central to the phenomenological experience of psychosis. The paper concludes by examining criminal responsibility practices through the lens of cultural evolution of fairness and cooperation.

Neuroimaging in criminal trials and the role of psychiatrists expert witnesses: A case study.

Various neuroscientific techniques are increasingly being used in criminal courts causing a vivid debate on the way that this kind of techniques will and should be used as scientific evidence. The role of experts in this context is important, since it is them that analyse, present, interpret and communicate the results of these techniques to the judges and the jury. In an attempt to contribute to the discussion about the role of the experts in criminal cases where neuroimaging evidence was introduced, we examined twenty seven cases from the US and Europe. Focusing on the role of experts and their presentation of neuroscientific evidence, we aimed to examine the extent to which neuroimaging data can contribute to the construction of a solid and more objective, "scientifically - based" case. We found that neurobiological information introduced through experts' testimony is generally used in order to demonstrate some physical, organic base of a psychiatric condition, or/and in order to make visible some brain lesion, (structural or functional), susceptible to have affected the capacity to reason and to control one's impulses. While neuroimaging evidence is often presented by the defence as a scientific method able to offer a precise diagnosis of the pathology in question, our case analysis shows that the very same neurobiological evidence can be interpreted in different - sometimes diametrically opposed - ways by defence and State experts. Conflicting testimony about the same empirical evidence goes against the hypothesis of neuroscientific techniques constituting "objective and hard evidence", able to reach solid, scientific and objective conclusions. Frequent conflicts between neuroimaging experts require the courts to deal with the resulting uncertainty. As the law changes with technology, it is necessary for legal professionals to train and be prepared for the new issues they may encounter in light of new developments in neuroscience, so that they become more vigilant as to the interpretation of neuroscientific data.

Forensic psychiatry and neurolaw: Description, developments, and debates.

Neuroscience produces a wealth of data on the relationship between brain and behavior, including criminal behavior. The research field studying the possible and actual impact of neuroscience on the law and legal practices, is called neurolaw. It is a new and rapidly developing domain of interdisciplinary research. Since forensic psychiatry has to do with both neuroscience and the law, neurolaw is of specific relevance for this psychiatric specialty. In this contribution, I will discuss three main research areas in neurolaw - revision, assessment, and intervention - and explore their relevance for forensic psychiatry. I will identify some valuable possibilities as well as some notable challenges - both technical and ethical - for forensic psychiatry regarding neurolaw developments.

Issues pertaining to expert evidence and the reasoning about punishment in a neuroscience-based sentencing appeal.

In this paper, we focus on, a significant Australian sentencing appeal in which, after hearing expert evidence pertaining to cognitive function, brain scans, and neuropsychological testing, the Court imposed a less severe sentence than that originally imposed. Our aim is to produce an interdisciplinary critical analysis of the decision, and we approach this by analysing the judicial comments on the evidence pertaining to the offender's mental condition, and the reasoning about punishment. We conclude that the Court's inferences about frontal lobe damage and likely dementia are contestable, and the reasoning about mitigation of punishment based on these questionable inferences could have been improved by a focus on sentencing's retributive aim.

Judges' perceptions of expert reports: The effect of neuroscience evidence.

This article explores the impact of neuroscience evidence on how expert reports are perceived and their effects on the decisions made by trial judges. Experimental psychology has demonstrated a number of cognitive effects arising from exposure to neuroimaging data which may bias judgments and lead to (mis)interpretations that can affect decisions. We conducted a study on a sample of 62 Swiss and French judges in order to determine whether their perceptions of the credibility, quality and scientific basis of a psychiatric evaluation of a criminal defendant vary according to whether or not the evaluation includes neuroscientific data. Quantitative analyses were conducted in order to evaluate significant differences between the two conditions (one-way analyses of variance) and moderation and conditional analyses to examine whether the participants' sex and length of professional experience moderated the effect of the conditions. Terminological and thematic analyses were carried out on open questions. Quantitative and qualitative results suggest that the presence of neuroscience data in an expert report affects judges' perceptions of the quality, credibility, and scientificity (reliability, objectivity, scientific basis) of the report, and the persuasiveness of the evidence it provided. Moreover, this phenomenon was stronger in more experienced judges than in less experienced judges.

From Healthcare to Warfare and Reverse: How Should We Regulate Dual-Use Neurotechnology?

Recent advances in military-funded neurotechnology and novel opportunities for misusing neurodevices show that the problem of dual use is inherent to neuroscience. This paper discusses how the neuroscience community should respond to these dilemmas and delineates a neuroscience-specific biosecurity framework. This neurosecurity framework involves calibrated regulation, (neuro)ethical guidelines, and awareness-raising activities within the scientific community.

Neurolaw and Neuroethics.

This short article proposes a conceptual structure for "neurolaw," modeled loosely on the bipartite division of the sister field of neuroethics by Adina Roskies into the "ethics of neuroscience" and the "neuroscience of ethics." As normative fields addressing the implications of scientific discoveries and expanding technological capacities affecting the brain, "neurolaw" and neuroethics have followed parallel paths. Similar foundational questions arise for both about the validity and utility of recognizing them as distinct subfields of law and ethics, respectively. In both, a useful distinction can be drawn between a self-reflexive inquiry (the neuroscience of ethics and law) and an inquiry into the development and use of brain science and technologies (the ethics and law of neuroscience). In both fields, these two forms of inquiry interact in interesting ways. In addition to a proposed conceptual structure for neurolaw, the article also addresses the neurolegal versions of the critiques made against neuroethics, including charges of reductionism, fact/value confusion, and biological essentialism.

Ethical and Legal Implications of the Methodological Crisis in Neuroimaging.

Currently, many scientific fields such as psychology or biomedicine face a methodological crisis concerning the reproducibility, replicability, and validity of their research. In neuroimaging, similar methodological concerns have taken hold of the field, and researchers are working frantically toward finding solutions for the methodological problems specific to neuroimaging. This article examines some ethical and legal implications of this methodological crisis in neuroimaging. With respect to ethical challenges, the article discusses the impact of flawed methods in neuroimaging research in cognitive and clinical neuroscience, particularly with respect to faulty brain-based models of human cognition, behavior, and personality. Specifically examined is whether such faulty models, when they are applied to neurological or psychiatric diseases, could put patients at risk, and whether this places special obligations on researchers using neuroimaging. In the legal domain, the actual use of neuroimaging as evidence in United States courtrooms is surveyed, followed by an examination of ways that the methodological problems may create challenges for the criminal justice system. Finally, the article reviews and promotes some promising ideas and initiatives from within the neuroimaging community for addressing the methodological problems.