Availability and Accessibility of Live Nonreplicating Smallpox/Mpox Vaccine.

This cross-sectional study compares the availability and accessibility of mpox vaccine sites with the number of reported cases and allocated vaccines.

Smallpox in the Post-Eradication Era.

Widespread vaccination programmes led to the global eradication of smallpox, which was certified by the World Health Organisation (WHO), and, since 1978, there has been no case of smallpox anywhere in the world. However, the viable variola virus (VARV), the causative agent of smallpox, is still kept in two maximum security laboratories in Russia and the USA. Despite the eradication of the disease smallpox, clandestine stocks of VARV may exist. In a rapidly changing world, the impact of an intentional VARV release in the human population would nowadays result in a public health emergency of global concern: vaccination programmes were abolished, the percentage of immunosuppressed individuals in the human population is higher, and an increased intercontinental air travel allows for the rapid viral spread of diseases around the world. The WHO has authorised the temporary retention of VARV to enable essential research for public health benefit to take place. This work aims to develop diagnostic tests, antiviral drugs, and safer vaccines. Advances in synthetic biology have made it possible to produce infectious poxvirus particles from chemicals in vitro so that it is now possible to reconstruct VARV. The status of smallpox in the post-eradication era is reviewed.

The origins of the vaccine cold chain and a glimpse of the future.

International efforts to eradicate smallpox in the 1960s and 1970s provided the foundation for efforts to expand immunization programmes, including work to develop immunization supply chains. The need to create a reliable system to keep vaccines cold during the lengthy journey from the manufacturer to the point of use, even in remote areas, was a crucial concern during the early days of the Expanded Programme on Immunization. The vaccine cold chain was deliberately separated from other medical distribution systems to assure timely access to and control of vaccines and injection materials. The story of the early development of the vaccine cold chain shows how a number of challenges were overcome with technological and human resource solutions. For example, the lack of methods to monitor exposure of vaccines to heat during transport and storage led to many innovations, including temperature-sensitive vaccine vial monitors and better methods to record and communicate temperatures in vaccine stores. The need for appropriate equipment to store and transport vaccines in tropical developing countries led to innovations in refrigeration equipment as well as the introduction and widespread adoption of novel high performance vaccine cold-boxes and carriers. New technologies also helped to make injection safer. Underlying this work on technologies and equipment was a major effort to develop the human resources required to manage and implement the immunization supply chain. This included creating foundational policies and a management infrastructure; providing training for managers, health workers, technicians, and others. The vaccine cold chain has contributed to one of the world's public health success stories and provides three priority lessons for future: the vaccine supply chain needs to be integrated with other public health supplies, re-designed for efficiency and effectiveness and work is needed in the longer term to eliminate the need for refrigeration in the supply chain.

The French Armed Forces Virology Unit: A Chronological Record of Ongoing Research on Orthopoxvirus.

Since the official declaration of smallpox eradication in 1980, the general population vaccination has ceased worldwide. Therefore, people under 40 year old are generally not vaccinated against smallpox and have no cross protection against orthopoxvirus infections. This naïve population may be exposed to natural or intentional orthopoxvirus emergences. The virology unit of the Institut de Recherche Biomédicale des Armées (France) has developed research programs on orthopoxviruses since 2000. Its missions were conceived to improve the diagnosis capabilities, to foster vaccine development, and to develop antivirals targeting specific viral proteins. The role of the virology unit was asserted in 2012 when the responsibility of the National Reference Center for the Orthopoxviruses was given to the unit. This article presents the evolution of the unit activity since 2000, and the past and current research focusing on orthopoxviruses.

Modernizing stockpiles of medical countermeasures against smallpox: Benefits, risks, and knowledge gaps.

OBJECTIVE: New smallpox medical countermeasures are entering the marketplace, offering the opportunity to modernize existing stockpiles. However, new smallpox countermeasures are developed under the animal rule, meaning that human efficacy data are lacking, and human safety data may be limited. Also, stockpile modernization would require prioritization of increasingly limited public funds. Approaches to address these issues are needed. METHODS: Smallpox vaccine data were gathered by literature search. The financial value of vaccination in the face of an outbreak was evaluated using a threatbased cost/benefit analysis model, involving i) estimation of the efficacy of new smallpox vaccines based on available clinical data on virus-neutralizing seroconversion in vaccinees, ii) estimation of the likelihood for a smallpox outbreak in Denmark, and iii) estimation of the expected life-saving effects of postevent vaccination. RESULTS: The authors estimated that i) the likelihood of a smallpox outbreak in Denmark is very low (one event in 200,000 years), ii) the expected efficacy of currently available and new vaccines is 95 and 75 percent, respectively, iii) the expected frequency of serious side effects from vaccination is between 100 and 10,000 fold lower for new than for existing vaccines, depending on modes of action. CONCLUSIONS: Despite the very low likelihood for a smallpox outbreak, the potentially large consequences combined with the protective effect of vaccination make maintenance of the smallpox vaccine stockpile justified and valuable. For vaccination in the face of a smallpox outbreak, a high efficacy rather than a lowered rate of adverse effects would maximize the number of lives saved.

[The late media emergency of smallpox vaccine, news coverage of Spanish press (1999-2004)]. / La tardía emergencia mediática de la vacuna contra la viruela, cobertura de noticias en prensa española (1999-2004).

INTRODUCTION: Discussions on the need for smallpox virus preservation in 1999 focused attention on an eradicated disease 20 years ago. Smallpox was replaced as a potential candidate to be used as a bioterrorist weapon because of the international alarm scenario produced after the 11/9 events in USA. The reactivation of a vaccine which remained forgotten was the direct consequence. The initial target groups were the security forces of America. Spain was also among the countries that were interested in acquiring the smallpox vaccine. The aim of this study is to analyze the considerable media coverage of smallpox obtained in our country. METHODS: Systematic review of published news in the four largest national daily newspapers (ABC, El Mundo, El País and La Vanguardia) for the period 1999-2004 of the Dow Jones Factiva document database. "Smallpox" were used as a key word. From the obtained data, a qualitative and quantitative analysis was done. RESULTS: 416 reviews were analyzed; the newspaper El Mundo was the most interested in these news (158 citations, 37.98%). Most of the news were published in 2003 (152, 36.5%) The year with more news about smallpox (2003) coincides with the purchase of vaccines in Spain. The type of messages in the news was highly changeable over this six-year period. Those related to "politics and diplomacy", "epidemiological risk", "bioterrorism" and "vaccine" were predominant. CONCLUSIONS: The alarm raised around the smallpox vaccination was a media phenomenon due to political strategy issues rather than a real public health problem.

Poxvirus countermeasures during an emergency in the United States.

Although smallpox was eradicated worldwide by 1980, national security experts remain concerned that it could be used in a deliberate attack. The United States and other governments have given priority to developing and stockpiling vaccines and antivirals to protect their populations from the potential reintroduction of this deadly disease. Public health officials are also concerned about the spread of related zoonotic orthopoxviruses such as monkeypox and cowpox, against which smallpox vaccine provides protection. This report analyzes how medical countermeasures available in the US Strategic National Stockpile will be given priority and used in the event of an intentional or accidental release of smallpox in the United States.

Preparedness for a smallpox pandemic in Japan: public health perspectives.

Smallpox is an acute, febrile, contagious disease caused by the Variola virus, which is a member of the Poxviridae family. Until the 1970s, smallpox had been a pandemic disease for more than 3000 years, endemic in tropical and developing areas and periodically epidemic worldwide. The World Health Organization declared smallpox to be completely eradicated in 1980 as the result of global vaccination efforts. At that time, all routine vaccination programs were terminated, given the success of thismonumental eradication. Although smallpox remains fully eradicated, uncertainty exists regarding the possibility of recurrent smallpox outbreaks. At the end of the Cold War, concerns regarding unstable international security and the feasibility of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction have been highlighted. The potential threat of intentional release of smallpox has forced regional health authorities to reconsider their political landscape and create preparedness plans to protect the community in the event of biological attacks. Here we present current countermeasures to this biological threat in Japan and discuss methods for strengthening public health preparedness both domestically and internationally. These methods include infection control, vaccination policy, and international partnerships to help deter or contain a contagious smallpox pandemic.

[History of Smallpox Vaccination and of the Vaccine Supply in Hungary, up to 1890]. / A MAGYARORSZÁGI HIMLO ELLENI OLTÓINTÉZETEK ÉS AZ OLTÓANYAGGAL VALÓ ELLÁTÁS TÖRTÉNETE 1890-IG.

One of the preconditions for the spread of vaccination against pox diseases was making vaccination available. The first vaccinations were carried out using original cowpox lymph sent by Jenner. For further vaccinations the vaccine was extracted from the blisters of those who had been successfully inoculated. In order to provide vaccine continuously six vaccine centres were set up in 1804 in the following cities: Pest, Buda, Kassa, Gyula, Pozsony and Zágráb (Croatia). Detailed information is available only about the centre in Pest which operated in Rókus Hospital under the leadership of the hospital director András Bossányi. Besides regular vaccination they also provided vaccine for the countryside. From 1824 the vaccine was relocated to the medical faculty of the university in Pest and Ferenc Gebhardt, an instructor of surgeons, became its head. The centre operated in the building of the medical faculty and vaccinations were given on Thursdays and Sundays. After the retirement of Gebhardt in 1860, the centre was taken over by the dermatologist Ferenc Poor for a short time, then by Ignác Semmelweis. From 1863 Gergely Patrubány was responsible for managing the centre. In 1874 the central vaccine institution moved to the Hospital for Poor Children in Pest where it was led first by Lázár Wittman, then by Géza Hainiss. In the 1880s private institutions appeared, the best known were Dani Pécsi's centre in Pest and Béla Intze's one in Tirgu Lapus (Romania). Between 1873 an 1889 András Kreichel ran a vaccine centre in Nálepkovo (Slovakia).

Modeling the Effect of Herd Immunity and Contagiousness in Mitigating a Smallpox Outbreak.

The smallpox antiviral tecovirimat has recently been purchased by the U.S. Strategic National Stockpile. Given significant uncertainty regarding both the contagiousness of smallpox in a contemporary outbreak and the efficiency of a mass vaccination campaign, vaccine prophylaxis alone may be unable to control a smallpox outbreak following a bioterror attack. Here, we present the results of a compartmental epidemiological model that identifies conditions under which tecovirimat is required to curtail the epidemic by exploring how the interaction between contagiousness and prophylaxis coverage of the affected population affects the ability of the public health response to control a large-scale smallpox outbreak. Each parameter value in the model is based on published empirical data. We describe contagiousness parametrically using a novel method of distributing an assumed R-value over the disease course based on the relative rates of daily viral shedding from human and animal studies of cognate orthopoxvirus infections. Our results suggest that vaccination prophylaxis is sufficient to control the outbreak when caused either by a minimally contagious virus or when a very high percentage of the population receives prophylaxis. As vaccination coverage of the affected population decreases below 70%, vaccine prophylaxis alone is progressively less capable of controlling outbreaks, even those caused by a less contagious virus (R0 less than 4). In these scenarios, tecovirimat treatment is required to control the outbreak (total number of cases under an order of magnitude more than the number of initial infections). The first study to determine the relative importance of smallpox prophylaxis and treatment under a range of highly uncertain epidemiological parameters, this work provides public health decision-makers with an evidence-based guide for responding to a large-scale smallpox outbreak.

[A study on the 1946 smallpox epidemic in Japan and measures taken against it].

In early 1946, immediately after World War II, there was a smallpox epidemic in Japan. In this paper we investigated trends in the occurrence of smallpox by week and region using official documents of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), which are stored in the National Diet Library Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, and summarized the measures taken against this epidemic. The following two points were clarified: 1) The 1946 smallpox epidemic peaked in Week 13 (March 24-30; 1,405 new patients), and the highest morbidity during this epidemic was seen in Hyogo Prefecture, followed by Osaka Prefecture, Aichi Prefecture, Tokyo Prefecture, and Hokkaido Prefecture. 2) Measures taken against this epidemic were classified into the following three stages: 1. "Vaccine shortage/Manufacture acceleration stage," 2. "Vaccine sufficiency/Smallpox vaccination program implementation stage," and 3. "Detection of defects in vaccination technique/Reimplementation of the smallpox vaccination program stage".

Remaining questions about clinical variola major.

After the recent summary of World Health Organization-authorized research on smallpox, several clinical issues remain. This policy review addresses whether early hemorrhagic smallpox is disseminated intravascular coagulation and speculates about the cause of the high mortality rate among pregnant women and whether ocular smallpox is partly the result of trachoma or vitamin A deficiency. The joint destruction common in children with smallpox might be prevented by antiviral drugs, but intraarticular infusion of antiviral drugs is unprecedented. Development of highly effective antiviral drugs against smallpox raises the issue of whether postexposure vaccination can be performed without interference by an antiviral drug. Clinicians should consider whether patients with smallpox should be admitted to general hospitals. Although an adequate supply of second-generation smallpox vaccine exists in the United States, its use is unclear. Finally, political and ethical forces suggest that destruction of the remaining stocks of live smallpox virus is now appropriate.

Should remaining stockpiles of smallpox virus (variola) be destroyed?

In 2011, the World Health Organization will recommend the fate of existing smallpox stockpiles, but circumstances have changed since the complete destruction of these cultures was first proposed. Recent studies suggest that variola and its experimental surrogate, vaccinia, have a remarkable ability to modify the human immune response through complex mechanisms that scientists are only just beginning to unravel. Further study that might require intact virus is essential. Moreover, modern science now has the capability to recreate smallpox or a smallpox-like organism in the laboratory in addition to the risk of nature re-creating it as it did once before. These factors strongly suggest that relegating smallpox to the autoclave of extinction would be ill advised.