ABSTRACT
La muerte siempre ha generado desconcierto, por lo que acompañar en este proceso de final de vida conlleva un alto compromiso existencial. Si a esta difícil tarea se le agregan los condicionantes hospitalarios o legales que sufren los enfermos en su agonía, estamos ante una muerte aterradora, muy distante de una partida que pueda ser considerada amorosa. Como sabemos, la palabra "clínica" hace referencia a la práctica de atender al pie de la cama del paciente, aliviando el dolor del que está por partir; sin embargo, el "corsé legal" de la muerte está alejando al médico de aquel que debiera recibir toda su atención y sus cuidados, atándole el brazo para acompañarlo en el buen morir. Deberíamos debatir y acordar una estrategia que enriquezca la experiencia del momento final de la vida, de modo que ese conjunto acotado de pacientes pueda elegir su forma de partir. Es de un valor incalculable despertar la compasión en este tema tan importante que preocupa al ser humano desde los inicios de la civilización. Sería muy fructífero que aprovechemos la transmisión de sabiduría de siglos de antiguas culturas que han sabido cuidar con humildad la vida hasta el instante de morir. (AU)
Death has always implied confusion, so accompanying this end-of-life process entails a highexistential commitment. If we add to this difficult task the hospital or legal constraints suffered bypatients in their agony, we are facing a terrifying death, very far from a departure that can be considered a loving one. As we know, the word "clinical" refers to the practice of caring for the patient very close to the bed, alleviating the pain of whom is about to leave; however, the "legal corset" of death is separating the doctor from the one who should receive all his attention and care, preventing him from accompanying the pacient in his/her good dying. We should discuss and agree on a strategy that enriches the experience of the end of life, so that patients could choose the way to leave. It is of incalculable value to awaken compassion on this important issue that has concerned human since the beggining of civilization. It would be very fruitful if we take advantage of the enormous wisdom of ancient cultures that have humbly cared for life until the moment of death. (AU)
Subject(s)
Humans , Palliative Care/legislation & jurisprudence , Terminal Care/legislation & jurisprudence , Right to Die/legislation & jurisprudence , Attitude to Death , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Death , Palliative Care/psychology , Argentina , Terminal Care/psychology , Terminally Ill/psychology , Patient Preference/psychologyABSTRACT
This paper reviews the sentences dictated between 1993 and 2002 by the Supreme Courts of Canada and the Unites States, the House of Lords and Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the European Human Rights Court, about the validity of the legal prohibition of assistance for suicide. These sentences constituted a judicial consensus about the right to die. This consensus recognized the legal right of patients to reject medical treatments but did not recognize the right to be assisted by a physician to commit suicide. This exclusion is changing in the recent case law of Canada and the United Kingdom, which accepts the fundamental right of terminal patients to medically assisted suicide.
Subject(s)
Jurisprudence , Right to Die/legislation & jurisprudence , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudence , Canada , Euthanasia/legislation & jurisprudence , Humans , Personal Autonomy , Supreme Court Decisions , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Treatment Refusal/legislation & jurisprudence , United Kingdom , United StatesABSTRACT
This paper reviews the sentences dictated between 1993 and 2002 by the Supreme Courts of Canada and the Unites States, the House of Lords and Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the European Human Rights Court, about the validity of the legal prohibition of assistance for suicide. These sentences constituted a judicial consensus about the right to die. This consensus recognized the legal right of patients to reject medical treatments but did not recognize the right to be assisted by a physician to commit suicide. This exclusion is changing in the recent case law of Canada and the United Kingdom, which accepts the fundamental right of terminal patients to medically assisted suicide.
Subject(s)
Humans , Right to Die/legislation & jurisprudence , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudence , Jurisprudence , United States , Canada , Euthanasia/legislation & jurisprudence , Treatment Refusal/legislation & jurisprudence , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Personal Autonomy , Supreme Court Decisions , United KingdomABSTRACT
Even among advocates of legalising physician-assisted death, many argue that this should be done only once palliative care has become widely available. Meanwhile, according to them, physician-assisted death should be banned. Four arguments are often presented to support this claim, which we call the argument of lack of autonomy, the argument of existing alternatives, the argument of unfair inequalities and the argument of the antagonism between physician-assisted death and palliative care. We argue that although these arguments provide strong reasons to take appropriate measures to guarantee access to good quality palliative care to everyone who needs it, they do not justify a ban on physician-assisted death until we have achieved this goal.
Subject(s)
Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary , Health Services Accessibility/standards , Palliative Care , Physician's Role , Suicide, Assisted , Terminally Ill/psychology , Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/ethics , Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary/legislation & jurisprudence , Health Services Accessibility/ethics , Health Status Disparities , Humans , Palliative Care/ethics , Personal Autonomy , Philosophy, Medical , Physicians/ethics , Physicians/psychology , Suicide, Assisted/ethics , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudence , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudenceABSTRACT
The recent enactment of a law that allows infant euthanasia in Belgium raises questions with varied answers. To contribute to a better understanding of the topic, euthanasia and legislation concepts are described. After a bioethical analysis, we propose as conclusion that children euthanasia could only be acceptable in very exceptional situations in which palliative measures have failed. The answer should be that it is not acceptable in our setting, not until we have public policies, protocols and palliative care services for terminally ill children.
La reciente promulgación de una ley que permite la eutanasia infantil en Bélgica plantea interrogantes que admiten respuestas diversas. Para contribuir a una mejor comprensión del tema se describen los conceptos de eutanasia y la legislación pertinente. Después de hacer un análisis bioético, se plantea como conclusión que la eutanasia de niños podría ser aceptable sólo de manera muy excepcional ante situaciones en las cuales hubiesen fracasado las medidas de cuidado paliativo. Para nuestro medio la respuesta debería ser que no es aceptable, al menos mientras no existan políticas públicas, protocolos y servicios de cuidados paliativos para niños con enfermedades terminales.
Subject(s)
Humans , Infant , Euthanasia/legislation & jurisprudence , Health Policy , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Belgium , Bioethical Issues , Euthanasia , Palliative Care/methodsABSTRACT
The recent enactment of a law that allows infant euthanasia in Belgium raises questions with varied answers. To contribute to a better understanding of the topic, euthanasia and legislation concepts are described. After a bioethical analysis, we propose as conclusion that children euthanasia could only be acceptable in very exceptional situations in which palliative measures have failed. The answer should be that it is not acceptable in our setting, not until we have public policies, protocols and palliative care services for terminally ill children.
Subject(s)
Euthanasia/legislation & jurisprudence , Health Policy , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Belgium , Bioethical Issues , Euthanasia/ethics , Humans , Infant , Palliative Care/methodsSubject(s)
Humans , Male , Female , Bioethics , Patient Rights/ethics , Patient Rights/legislation & jurisprudence , Legislation as Topic , Medical Futility/ethics , Medical Futility/legislation & jurisprudence , Living Wills , Living Wills/ethics , Argentina , Terminal Care/ethics , Terminal Care/standards , Ethics, Medical , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Intensive Care Units/ethicsABSTRACT
La Corte Constitucional colombiana determinó declarar ajustado a la Constitución Política el artículo 326 del Código Penal, bajo la condición de que en el caso de los enfermos terminales que hayan expresado libremente su consentimiento no podrá derivarse responsabilidad penal para el médico que lleve a cabo la conducta eutanásica. Este artículo resume la posición de tres magistrados que salvaron su voto y la de uno que hizo una aclaración especial de voto motivada en su convicción de que el contenido de la sentencia no reflejó lo decidido por la Sala Plena de la Corporación Judicial en la sesión correspondiente. Los magistrados discrepantes comparten con la mayoría de la Sala la decisión en cuanto a la constitucionalidad de la norma que consagra como delito la eutanasia, pero disienten en lo relativo al condicionamiento que agregó la mayoría de la corte
Subject(s)
Humans , Euthanasia/legislation & jurisprudence , Bioethics , Colombia , Human Rights , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudenceSubject(s)
Humans , Bioethics , Informed Consent/legislation & jurisprudence , Advance Directives , Patient Advocacy/standards , Patient Participation/methods , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Respiration, Artificial/standards , Dialysis/standards , Confidentiality/legislation & jurisprudence , Palliative Care/standards , World Health OrganizationSubject(s)
Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary , Euthanasia, Active , Euthanasia/legislation & jurisprudence , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Female , Guidelines as Topic/standards , Humans , Internationality , Male , Netherlands , Right to Die/legislation & jurisprudence , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudence , United States , Wedge ArgumentSubject(s)
Humans , Male , Female , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Euthanasia, Active , Euthanasia, Active, Voluntary , Euthanasia/legislation & jurisprudence , Wedge Argument , Right to Die/legislation & jurisprudence , Guidelines as Topic/standards , United States , Internationality , Netherlands , Suicide, Assisted/legislation & jurisprudenceABSTRACT
La imposibilidad de dar el consentimiento personalmente plantea el que se requiera personas que tomem decisiones por ellos. Una forma alternativa es el uso de instrumentos escritos de validez juridica representados por los testamentos vitales y los poderes legales, llamados genericamente de directivas de futuro.
Subject(s)
Informed Consent/legislation & jurisprudence , Patient Advocacy , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , Decision Making , Delivery of Health Care/legislation & jurisprudenceABSTRACT
AIDS: The European Court of Human Rights ruled that a man approaching death from AIDS-related complications cannot be deported to St. Kitts. The man, identified as D, was convicted of possessing large quantities of cocaine, and after a six-year sentence was ordered deported from the U.K. He argued that his removal to St. Kitts would deprive him of access to medical care and would, in effect, be a death sentence. The Immigration Department argued that policy did not give persons with AIDS an automatic right to remain in the country. The court found that the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms protected the man's right to remain.^ieng
Subject(s)
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome , Emigration and Immigration/legislation & jurisprudence , Human Rights/legislation & jurisprudence , Humans , Male , Terminally Ill/legislation & jurisprudence , United Kingdom , West IndiesABSTRACT
Focaliza a questäo dos direitos e deveres do paciente terminal por meio dos três grandes princípios da bioética: autonomia, beneficência e justiça. A singularidade da situaçäo terminal faz aparecer de forma mais nítida a substância ética da relaçäo médico-paciente. Na situaçäo-limite vivida pelo paciente como pessoa, devem ser vistos como básicos e incontornáveis os direitos de saber a verdade, dialogar, decidir e näo sofrer inutilmente