Intersubject correlations in reward and mentalizing brain circuits separately predict persuasiveness of two types of ISIS video propaganda.

The Islamist group ISIS has been particularly successful at recruiting Westerners as terrorists. A hypothesized explanation is their simultaneous use of two types of propaganda: Heroic narratives, emphasizing individual glory, alongside Social narratives, which emphasize oppression against Islamic communities. In the current study, functional MRI was used to measure brain responses to short ISIS propaganda videos distributed online. Participants were shown 4 Heroic and 4 Social videos categorized as such by another independent group of subjects. Persuasiveness was measured using post-scan predictions of recruitment effectiveness. Inter-subject correlation (ISC) was used to measure commonality of brain activity time courses across individuals. ISCs in ventral striatum predicted rated persuasiveness for Heroic videos, while ISCs in mentalizing and default networks, especially in dmPFC, predicted rated persuasiveness for Social videos. This work builds on past findings that engagement of the reward circuit and of mentalizing brain regions predicts preferences and persuasion. The observed dissociation as a function of stimulus type is novel, as is the finding that intersubject synchrony in ventral striatum predicts rated persuasiveness. These exploratory results identify possible neural mechanisms by which political extremists successfully recruit prospective members and specifically support the hypothesized distinction between Heroic and Social narratives for ISIS propaganda.

Network and state specificity in connectivity-based predictions of individual behavior.

Predicting individual behavior from brain functional connectivity (FC) patterns can contribute to our understanding of human brain functioning. This may apply in particular if predictions are based on features derived from circumscribed, a priori defined functional networks, which improves interpretability. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that task-based FC data may yield more successful predictions of behavior than resting-state FC data. Here, we comprehensively examined to what extent the correspondence of functional network priors and task states with behavioral target domains influences the predictability of individual performance in cognitive, social, and affective tasks. To this end, we used data from the Human Connectome Project for large-scale out-of-sample predictions of individual abilities in working memory (WM), theory-of-mind cognition (SOCIAL), and emotion processing (EMO) from FC of corresponding and non-corresponding states (WM/SOCIAL/EMO/resting-state) and networks (WM/SOCIAL/EMO/whole-brain connectome). Using root mean squared error and coefficient of determination to evaluate model fit revealed that predictive performance was rather poor overall. Predictions from whole-brain FC were slightly better than those from FC in task-specific networks, and a slight benefit of predictions based on FC from task versus resting state was observed for performance in the WM domain. Beyond that, we did not find any significant effects of a correspondence of network, task state, and performance domains. Together, these results suggest that multivariate FC patterns during both task and resting states contain rather little information on individual performance levels, calling for a reconsideration of how the brain mediates individual differences in mental abilities.

Multidimensional neural representations of social features during movie viewing.

The social world is dynamic and contextually embedded. Yet, most studies utilize simple stimuli that do not capture the complexity of everyday social episodes. To address this, we implemented a movie viewing paradigm and investigated how everyday social episodes are processed in the brain. Participants watched one of two movies during an MRI scan. Neural patterns from brain regions involved in social perception, mentalization, action observation and sensory processing were extracted. Representational similarity analysis results revealed that several labeled social features (including social interaction, mentalization, the actions of others, characters talking about themselves, talking about others and talking about objects) were represented in the superior temporal gyrus (STG) and middle temporal gyrus (MTG). The mentalization feature was also represented throughout the theory of mind network, and characters talking about others engaged the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), suggesting that listeners may spontaneously infer the mental state of those being talked about. In contrast, we did not observe the action representations in the frontoparietal regions of the action observation network. The current findings indicate that STG and MTG serve as key regions for social processing, and that listening to characters talk about others elicits spontaneous mental state inference in TPJ during natural movie viewing.

Overlapping neural correlates underpin theory of mind and semantic cognition: Evidence from a meta-analysis of 344 functional neuroimaging studies.

Key unanswered questions for cognitive neuroscience include whether social cognition is underpinned by specialised brain regions and to what extent it simultaneously depends on more domain-general systems. Until we glean a better understanding of the full set of contributions made by various systems, theories of social cognition will remain fundamentally limited. In the present study, we evaluate a recent proposal that semantic cognition plays a crucial role in supporting social cognition. While previous brain-based investigations have focused on dissociating these two systems, our primary aim was to assess the degree to which the neural correlates are overlapping, particularly within two key regions, the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). We focus on activation associated with theory of mind (ToM) and adopt a meta-analytic activation likelihood approach to synthesise a large set of functional neuroimaging studies and compare their results with studies of semantic cognition. As a key consideration, we sought to account for methodological differences across the two sets of studies, including the fact that ToM studies tend to use nonverbal stimuli while the semantics literature is dominated by language-based tasks. Overall, we observed consistent overlap between the two sets of brain regions, especially in the ATL and TPJ. This supports the claim that tasks involving ToM draw upon more general semantic retrieval processes. We also identified activation specific to ToM in the right TPJ, bilateral anterior mPFC, and right precuneus. This is consistent with the view that, nested amongst more domain-general systems, there is specialised circuitry that is tuned to social processes.

The medium modulates the medusa effect: Perceived mind in analogue and digital images.

We effortlessly attribute mental states to other people. We also attribute minds to people depicted in pictures, albeit at a reduced strength. Intriguingly, this reduction in intensity continues for images of people within a photograph itself-a phenomenon known as the Medusa effect. The present study replicates the Medusa effect for images shown digitally and on paper. Crucially, we demonstrate that we can reduce the magnitude of the Medusa effect by depicting people digitally within a computer screen (e.g., as if one were interacting with a person on a Zoom call). As well as modulating the quantity of the Medusa effect, changes in pictorial medium can affect the quality of the perceived mind. Specifically, the dimension of Experience-what a depicted person can feel-reflected participants' observations that they could interact with an onscreen person embedded in a digital image. This combination of a robust Medusa effect and the ability to control it both quantitatively and qualitatively opens many avenues for its future application, such as manipulating and measuring mind in immersive media.

Flexible social monitoring as revealed by eye movements: Spontaneous mental state updating triggered by others' unexpected actions.

Successful interactions require not only representing others' mental states but also flexibly updating them, whenever one's original inferences may no longer hold. Such situations arise, for instance, when a partner's behavior is incongruent with one's expectations. Although these situations are rather common, the question whether people update others' mental states spontaneously upon encountering unexpected behaviors and whether they use the updated mental states in novel contexts, has been largely unexplored. We addressed these issues in two experiments. In each experiment participants first performed an anticipatory looking task, reacting to a virtual 'partner', who categorized pictures based on their ambiguous or non-ambiguous color. Importantly, to perform the task participants did not have to track their partner's perspective. Following a correct categorization phase, the 'partner' started to systematically miscategorize one of the ambiguous colors (e.g., as if she would now believe that the greenish blue is green). We measured how participants' anticipatory looking preceding the partner's categorization changed across trials. Afterward, we asked whether participants implicitly transferred their knowledge about the partner's updated perspective to a new task. Finally, they performed an explicit perspective-taking task, to test whether they selectively updated the partner's perspective, but not their own. Results revealed that correct anticipations started to emerge only after a few miscategorizations, indicating the spontaneous updating of the other's perspective regarding the miscategorized color. Signatures of updating emerged somewhat earlier when the partner made similarity judgments (Experiment 2), highlighting the subjective nature of her decisions, compared to when following an explicit color-categorization rule (Experiment 1). In the explicit perspective-taking task of both experiments, roughly half of the participants could categorize items according to the partner's (spontaneously updated) perspective and also used their partner's updated perspective in the implicit transfer task to some degree, while they were the ones who displayed more pronounced anticipatory patterns as well. Such data provides strong evidence that the observed changes in anticipatory looking reflect spontaneous and flexible mental state updating. In addition, the findings also point to a high individual variability both in the updating of attributed mental states and the use of the updated mental state content.

The relationship between the resting state functional connectivity and social cognition in schizophrenia: Results from the Italian Network for Research on Psychoses.

Deficits in social cognition (SC) interfere with recovery in schizophrenia (SZ) and may be related to resting state brain connectivity. This study aimed at assessing the alterations in the relationship between resting state functional connectivity and the social-cognitive abilities of patients with SZ compared to healthy subjects. We divided the brain into 246 regions of interest (ROI) following the Human Healthy Volunteers Brainnetome Atlas. For each participant, we calculated the resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) in terms of degree centrality (DC), which evaluates the total strength of the most powerful coactivations of every ROI with all other ROIs during rest. The rs-DC of the ROIs was correlated with five measures of SC assessing emotion processing and mentalizing in 45 healthy volunteers (HVs) chosen as a normative sample. Then, controlling for symptoms severity, we verified whether these significant associations were altered, i.e., absent or of opposite sign, in 55 patients with SZ. We found five significant differences between SZ patients and HVs: in the patients' group, the correlations between emotion recognition tasks and rsFC of the right entorhinal cortex (R-EC), left superior parietal lobule (L-SPL), right caudal hippocampus (R-c-Hipp), and the right caudal (R-c) and left rostral (L-r) middle temporal gyri (MTG) were lost. An altered resting state functional connectivity of the L-SPL, R-EC, R-c-Hipp, and bilateral MTG in patients with SZ may be associated with impaired emotion recognition. If confirmed, these results may enhance the development of non-invasive brain stimulation interventions targeting those cerebral regions to reduce SC deficit in SZ.

Decreased oxytocin levels related to social cognition impairment in borderline personality disorder.

INTRODUCTION: Dysfunctions in the oxytocin system have been reported in patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD). Deficits could be related to interpersonal hypersensitivity, which has been previously associated with failures in social cognition (SC) in this disorder, especially in Theory of Mind (ToM) skills. The aim of this work is to study the links between the oxytocin system and SC impairments in patients with BPD. METHOD: Plasma oxytocin levels (OXT) and protein expression of oxytocin receptors in blood mononuclear cells (OXTR) were examined in 33 patients with a diagnosis of BPD (age: M 28.85, DT = 8.83). Social cognition was assessed using the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC). Statistical associations between biochemical factors and different response errors in MASC were analyzed through generalized linear regression controlling for relevant clinical factors. RESULTS: Generalized linear regression showed a significant relationship between lower OXTR and overmentalization in BPD patients (OR = 0.90). CONCLUSIONS: This work supports the relationship between alterations in the oxytocin system and ToM impairments observed in BPD patients, enhancing the search for endophenotypes related to the phenotypic features of the disorder to improve current clinical knowledge and address more specific therapeutic targets.

When "more for others, less for self" leads to co-benefits: A tri-MRI dyad-hyperscanning study.

Unselfishness is admired, especially when collaborations between groups of various scales are urgently needed. However, its neural mechanisms remain elusive. In a tri-MRI dyad-hyperscanning experiment involving 26 groups, each containing 4 participants as two rotating pairs in a coordination game, we sought to achieve reciprocity, or "winning in turn by the two interacting players," as the precursor to unselfishness. Due to its critical role in social processing, the right temporal-parietal junction (rTPJ) was the seed for both time domain (connectivity) and frequency domain (i.e., coherence) analyses. For the former, negative connectivity between the rTPJ and the mentalizing network areas (e.g., the right inferior parietal lobule, rIPL) was identified, and such connectivity was further negatively correlated with the individual's final gain, supporting our task design that "rewarded" the reciprocal participants. For the latter, cerebral coherences of the rTPJs emerged between the interacting pairs (i.e., within-group interacting pairs), and the coupling between the rTPJ and the right superior temporal gyrus (rSTG) between the players who were not interacting with each other (i.e., within-group noninteracting pairs). These coherences reinforce the hypotheses that the rTPJ-rTPJ coupling tracks the collaboration processes and the rTPJ-rSTG coupling for the emergence of decontextualized shared meaning. Our results underpin two social roles (inferring others' behavior and interpreting social outcomes) subserved by the rTPJ-related network and highlight its interaction with other-self/other-concerning brain areas in reaching co-benefits among unselfish players.

Are Communication Skills, Emotion Regulation and Theory of Mind Skills Impaired in Adolescents with Developmental Dyslexia?

This study investigates pragmatic language impairment, Theory of Mind (ToM), and emotion regulation in adolescents with Developmental Dyslexia(DD). The Social Responsiveness Scale-2(SRS) and Children's Communication Checklist-2(CCC-2) scores were found to be statistically significantly higher in the DD group than in healthy controls. DD group had lower performance in ToM skills and they have more difficulties in emotion regulation. We also found that CCC-2 and ToM scores were significantly correlated in adolescents with DD. These results may be important in understanding the difficulties experienced in social functioning and interpersonal relationships in adolescents with DD.

Adverse childhood experiences differently affect Theory of Mind brain networks in schizophrenia and healthy controls.

Patients with schizophrenia (SZ) show impairments in both affective and cognitive dimensions of theory of mind (ToM). SZ are also particularly vulnerable to detrimental effect of adverse childhood experiences (ACE), influencing the overall course of the disorder and fostering poor social functioning. ACE associate with long-lasting detrimental effects on brain structure, function, and connectivity in regions involved in ToM. Here, we investigated whether ToM networks are differentially affected by ACEs in healthy controls (HC) and SZ, and if these effects can predict the disorder clinical outcome. 26 HC and 33 SZ performed a ToM task during an fMRI session. Whole-brain functional response and connectivity (FC) were extracted, investigating the interaction between ACEs and diagnosis. FC values significantly affected by ACEs were entered in a cross-validated LASSO regression predicting Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), and task performance. ACEs and diagnosis showed a widespread interaction at both affective and cognitive tasks, including connectivity between vmPFC, ACC, precentral and postcentral gyri, insula, PCC, precuneus, parahippocampal gyrus, temporal pole, thalamus, and cerebellum, and functional response in the ACC, thalamus, parahippocampal gyrus and putamen. FC predicted the PANSS score, the fantasy dimension of IRI, and the AToM response latency. Our results highlight the crucial role of early stress in differentially shaping ToM related brain networks in HC and SZ. These effects can also partially explain the clinical and behavioral outcomes of the disorder, extending our knowledge of the effects of ACEs.

Pragmatic Skills in Late Adulthood.

Research investigating pragmatic abilities in healthy aging suggests that both production and comprehension might be compromised; however, it is not clear how pragmatic abilities evolve in late adulthood, as well as when difficulties are more likely to arise. The aim of this study is to investigate the decline of pragmatic skills in aging, and to explore what cognitive and demographic factors support pragmatic competence. We assessed pragmatic production skills, including discourse abilities such as speech, informativeness, information flow, paralinguistic aspects, as well as the ability to produce informative descriptions of pictures, and pragmatic comprehension skills, which encompassed the ability to understand discourse and the main aspects of a narrative text, to infer non-literal meanings and to comprehend verbal humor in a group of elderly individuals and in a sample of younger participants. Moreover, specific cognitive functions (short-term memory, verbal and visuospatial working memory, inhibition Theory of Mind, and Cognitive Reserve) were assessed in both groups. Pragmatic difficulties seem to occur in late adulthood, likely around 70 years, and emerge more prominently when participants are asked to understand verbal humor. Age was the only predictor of general pragmatic performance in a sample of cognitively unimpaired older adults; conversely, when elderly individuals with less intact inhibitory control are considered, a general role of inhibition emerged, in addition to working memory and ToM in specific tasks.

Social cognition in women with borderline personality disorder based on an exhaustive analysis of the Movie for Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) categories.

A significant number of borderline personality disorder (BPD) symptoms are manifested in the interpersonal context. This can be explained by the difficulties in attributing the mental states of oneself and others, which constitutes social cognition. Errors in social cognition are interrelated with the affective, cognitive, impulsive, and interpersonal areas of the person with BPD. The aims of this study was to analyze social cognition in women with BPD compared with a control group and to analyze social cognition in BPD based on BPD symptoms and its severity. To assess social cognition, we used a full range of social cognition categories provided by the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC): correct theory of mind (ToM); attribution of mental states (thoughts, emotions, or intentions); errors of mentalization; types of ToM; and attribution of mental states through perceptive or cognitive cues and through hot or cold emotions. The MASC has high ecological validity and has been validated in Spanish. The sample comprised 79 women, including 47 women with BPD and 32 healthy women. Worse social cognition performance was observed in women with BPD. More severe borderline symptoms were related to worse functioning in the correct ToM and to errors of no mentalization. Involvement of the cognitive area in borderline symptoms was associated with worse functioning in correct ToM and worse social cognition in cognitive areas as well as with hypermentalization. This is the first study that uses all the MASC categories and considers BPD heterogeneity and its severity to study social cognition.

Agreeableness modulates mental state decoding: Electrophysiological evidence.

Agreeableness is one of the five personality traits which is associated with theory of mind (ToM) abilities. One of the critical processes involved in ToM is the decoding of emotional cues. In the present study, we investigated whether this process is modulated by agreeableness using electroencephalography (EEG) while taking into account task complexity and sex differences that are expected to moderate the relationship between emotional decoding and agreeableness. This approach allowed us to identify at which stage of the neural processing agreeableness kicks in, in order to distinguish the impact on early, perceptual processes from slower, inferential processing. Two tasks were employed and submitted to 62 participants during EEG recording: the reading the mind in the eyes (RME) task, requiring the decoding of complex mental states from eye expressions, and the biological (e)motion task, involving the perception of basic emotional actions through point-light body stimuli. Event-related potential (ERP) results showed a significant correlation between agreeableness and the contrast for emotional and non-emotional trials in a late time window only during the RME task. Specifically, higher levels of agreeableness were associated with a deeper neural processing of emotional versus non-emotional trials within the whole and male samples. In contrast, the modulation in females was negligible. The source analysis highlighted that this ERP-agreeableness association engages the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our findings expand previous research on personality and social processing and confirm that sex modulates this relationship.

Risk factors for internalizing symptoms: The influence of empathy, theory of mind, and negative thinking processes.

Internalizing symptoms such as elevated stress and sustained negative affect can be important warning signs for developing mental disorders. A recent theoretical framework suggests a complex interplay of empathy, theory of mind (ToM), and negative thinking processes as a crucial risk combination for internalizing symptoms. To disentangle these relationships, this study utilizes neural, behavioral, and self-report data to examine how the interplay between empathy, ToM, and negative thinking processes relates to stress and negative affect. We reanalyzed the baseline data of N = 302 healthy participants (57% female, Mage = 40.52, SDage = 9.30) who participated in a large-scale mental training study, the ReSource project. Empathy and ToM were assessed using a validated fMRI paradigm featuring naturalistic video stimuli and via self-report. Additional self-report scales were employed to measure internalizing symptoms (perceived stress, negative affect) and negative thinking processes (rumination and self-blame). Our results revealed linear associations of self-reported ToM and empathic distress with stress and negative affect. Also, both lower and higher, compared to average, activation in the anterior insula during empathic processing and in the middle temporal gyrus during ToM performance was significantly associated with internalizing symptoms. These associations were dependent on rumination and self-blame. Our findings indicate specific risk constellations for internalizing symptoms. Especially people with lower self-reported ToM and higher empathic distress may be at risk for more internalizing symptoms. Quadratic associations of empathy- and ToM-related brain activation with internalizing symptoms depended on negative thinking processes, suggesting differential effects of cognitive and affective functioning on internalizing symptoms. Using a multi-method approach, these findings advance current research by shedding light on which complex risk combinations of cognitive and affective functioning are relevant for internalizing symptoms.

Reading the mind in the eyes in patients with idiopathic REM sleep behavior disorder.

OBJECTIVES: Idiopathic rapid eye movement (REM) sleep behavior disorder (iRBD) is characterized by vocalizations, jerks, and motor behaviors during REM sleep, often associated with REM-related dream content, which is considered a prodromal stage of α-synucleinopathy. The results of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) reflecting affective Theory of Mind (ToM) are inconsistent in α-synucleinopathy. The present study tried to investigate the RME in patients with iRBD. METHODS: A total of 35 patients with iRBD and 26 healthy controls were included in the study. All participants were administered the RME and the cognitive assessments according to a standard procedure. The patients with iRBD were further divided into two groups (high or low RME) according to the scores of the RME (> 21, or ≤ 20). RESULTS: The patients with iRBD had worse scores on cognitive tests compared with healthy controls involving global cognitive screening, memory, and visuospatial abilities (p < 0.05), but the scores of the RME were similar between the two groups (20.83 ± 3.38, 20.58 ± 3.43) (p ˃ 0.05). Patients with low RME had more obvious cognitive impairments than healthy controls. After applying Bonferroni correction for multiple tests, the low REM group only performed worse on the Sum of trials 1 to 5 and delayed recall of the RAVLT compared with the healthy control group (p < 0.001, = 0.002). The RME correlated with the scores of cognitive tests involving executive function, attention, memory, and visuospatial function. CONCLUSIONS: The changes in RME had a relationship with cognitive impairments, especially memory, in patients with iRBD.

Moving on with (social) cognition in idiopathic cervical dystonia.

OBJECTIVE: Cervical dystonia (CD) is a movement disorder characterized by involuntary muscle contractions causing sustained twisting movements and abnormal postures of the neck and head. Assumed affected neuronal regions are the cortico-striatal-thalamo-cortical circuits, which are also involved in cognitive functioning. Indeed, impairments in different cognitive domains have been found in CD patients. However, to date studies have only investigated a limited range of cognitive functions within the same sample. In particular, social cognition (SC) is often missing from study designs. Hence, we aimed to evaluate a broad range of cognitive functions including SC in CD patients. METHOD: In the present study 20 idiopathic CD patients and 40 age-, gender-, and IQ-matched healthy controls (HCs) were assessed with tests for non-SC (verbal memory, psychomotor speed, and executive functions) as well as for SC (emotion recognition, Theory of Mind (ToM), and empathy). RESULTS: CD patients scored on average significantly lower than HC on tests for non-SC, but did not show impairments on any of the tests for SC. CONCLUSIONS: The current study showed impairments in non-SC in CD, but intact social cognitive functions. These results underline the importance of recognizing non-motor symptoms in idiopathic CD patients, but emphasize a focus on identifying strengths and weaknesses in cognitive functioning as these influence daily life activities.

Linearly integrating speed and accuracy to measure individual differences in theory of mind: Evidence from autistic and neurotypical adults.

It has long been theorised that there is a direct link between individual differences in social cognition and behaviour. One of the most popular tests of this theory has involved examination of Theory of Mind (ToM) difficulties in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). However, evidence for associations between ToM and social behaviour is mixed, both when testing the ToM explanation of ASD and when investigating individual differences in ToM in the general population. We argue that this is due to methodological limitations of many ToM measures, such as a lack of variability in task performance, inappropriate non-ToM control tasks, and a failure to account for general mental ability. To overcome these issues, we designed a novel task, which probed individual differences in ToM fluency through mental state attribution in response to cartoons (Cartoons Theory of Mind [CarToM] task). This task, enabling the linear combination of speed and accuracy, was used to quantify ToM ability and its association with self-reported (a)typical social behaviour in adults with and without ASD. In a large sample (N = 237), we found that having an ASD diagnosis and higher autistic traits predicted lower ToM ability, even after accounting for performance on a well-matched non-ToM condition and general mental ability. Overall, our findings provide fresh support for the existence of a link between individual differences in social cognition (specifically, ToM) and behaviour (specifically, autism). This has implications for social-cognitive theory and research, allowing large-scale, online assessment of individual differences in ToM in clinical groups and the general population.

Interpreting the results of explicit and applied theory of mind collectively in autistic children: A solution from Rasch analysis.

LAY ABSTRACT: Theory of mind is an ability to infer others' mental states, which is a foundation for generating appropriate social responses. Theory of mind can be conceptually divided into two related but distinguishable constructs: explicit theory of mind (conceptual knowledge/information about others' mental states) and applied theory of mind (the ability to use theory of mind skills in real-life contexts). Although these two theory of mind scores can be described by the percentages of children in the early, basic, and advanced developmental stages, the resulting information may not be sufficient to determine the corresponding relationships between these two theory of mind constructs or identify children with mismatched theory of mind abilities (e.g. children who have difficulty in effectively applying their theory of mind knowledge in real-life contexts). To resolve these limitations, methods for simultaneously interpreting the relationships between the two theory of mind scores are proposed. Based on the findings, each applied theory of mind score can reflect multiple scores of explicit theory of mind. In particular, the results do not take measurement error into consideration, which would make them more ambiguous. Therefore, the scores of applied theory of mind should be interpreted carefully, given that children who have the same applied theory of mind score may actually have high or low explicit theory of mind. Regarding the method for joint interpretation, cutoff scores were selected to identify children who have mismatched theory of mind abilities (high explicit theory of mind with low applied theory of mind or low explicit theory of mind with high applied theory of mind) and determine the priority for interventions.

Rethinking egocentric bias: A computer mouse-tracking study of adult belief processing.

Several theories of belief processing assume that processing another's false belief requires overcoming an egocentric bias toward one's current knowledge. The current evidence in support of this claim, however, is limited. In order to investigate the presence of egocentric bias in adult belief processing, computer mouse tracking was used across three experiments to measure attraction toward response options reflecting one's current knowledge while reporting a false belief. Participants viewed scenarios in which an agent either had a true belief or a false belief about the location of a set of keys. Participants used a mouse to answer reality questions "where are the keys currently hidden?" and belief questions "where does she think the keys are?" Mouse-tracking measures indexing attraction toward response options during decision making were measured, along with time taken to make a response and accuracy. Experiment 1 found no evidence, in any measures, that participants showed a bias toward their own knowledge when reporting another's false belief. Experiment 2 investigated whether differences in event timings between true belief and false belief scenarios in Experiment 1 masked an egocentric bias. Experiment 3 investigated whether the lack of egocentric bias could be explained by participants prioritizing encoding the other's beliefs. Neither follow-up experiment found evidence supporting the presence of an egocentric bias. Overall, contrary to many theories of belief processing, our results suggest that adults are readily able to process other people's beliefs without having to overcome a default bias toward their own knowledge. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).