Executive functions and theory of mind associations in middle childhood: Does social interaction act as a mediator?

This study explored the interplay of executive functions (EFs), social interactions, and theory of mind (ToM) in middle childhood. The first aim was to examine how specific EFs-shifting, inhibition, and working memory (WM)-predict social-perceptual and social-cognitive ToM. The second aim was to explore the potential mediating role of social interactions in the EF-ToM relationship. A total of 98 children aged 8 to 11 years completed three computerized EF tasks (task switching, flanker, and running span) and two ToM tasks (Strange Stories and Reading the Mind in the Eyes). The quality and quantity of social interactions were self-reported by using questionnaires. First, multiple regression analyses with age-adjusted scores examined how specific EFs predict ToM scores. The regression model was significant for social-cognitive ToM, but not for social-perceptual ToM. WM accuracy was the only significant, positive predictor for performance on the Strange Stories task. Second, mediation analyses assessed whether social interactions mediate this EF-ToM relationship. There were no significant mediation effects of the quality and quantity of social interactions on the relationship between WM and social-cognitive ToM. In conclusion, EFs play a significant role in explaining social-cognitive ToM variability in middle childhood. WM is relevant for understanding others' mental states, in contrast to shifting and inhibition that lacked predictive value. The results also suggest different cognitive processes associated with social-perceptual versus social-cognitive ToM in this developmental stage.

Large language models have divergent effects on self-perceptions of mind and the attributes considered uniquely human.

The rise of powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) provides a compelling opportunity to investigate the consequences of anthropomorphism, particularly regarding how their exposure may influence the way individuals view themselves (self-perception) and other people (other-perception). Using a mind perception framework, we examined attributions of agency (the ability to do) and experience (the ability to feel). Participants evaluated their agentic and experiential capabilities and the extent to which these features are uniquely human before and after exposure to LLM responses. Post-exposure, participants increased evaluations of their agentic and experiential qualities while decreasing their perception that agency and experience are considered to be uniquely human. These results indicate that anthropomorphizing LLMs impacts attributions of mind for humans in fundamentally divergent ways: enhancing the perception of one's own mind while reducing its uniqueness for others. These results open up a range of future questions regarding how anthropomorphism can affect mind perception toward humans.

Continuity in false belief understanding from 33 to 52 months of age.

Conceptual continuity in children's false belief understanding from toddlerhood to childhood was investigated in a longitudinal study of 75 children. Performance in a low-demands false belief task at 33 months of age was significantly correlated with performance in a content false belief task at 52 months independent of language ability and executive function. In contrast, there was no correlation with performance in a location false belief task, which differed from the "Sally-Anne" format of the low-demands task and was high in executive demands. These findings support the view that explicit false belief understanding may be continuous from toddlerhood to childhood and that developmental change may be characterized in terms of enrichment and increasing stability of core conceptual understanding rather than in terms of fundamental change.

Influences of heart rate feedback and autistic traits on affective mindreading.

Although mindreading is an important prerequisite for successful social interactions, the underlying mechanisms are still matter of debate. It is unclear, for example, if inferring others' and own mental states are distinct processes or are based on a common mechanism. Using an affect-induction experimental set-up with an acoustic heart rate feedback that addresses affective mindreading in self and others, we investigated if non-autistic study participants relied on similar information for self- and other-directed mindreading. We assumed that due to altered mindreading capacities in autism, mainly individuals with low autistic traits would focus on additional sensory cues, such as heart rate, to infer their own and their gambling partner's affective states. Our analyses showed that the interpretation of a heart rate signal differed in self- and other-directed mindreading trials. This effect was modulated by autistic traits suggesting that individuals with higher autistic traits might not have interpreted the heart rate feedback for gambling partner ratings and differentiated less between self- and other-directed mindreading trials. We discuss these results in the context of a common mechanism underlying self- and other-directed mindreading and hypothesize that the weighting of internal and external sensory information might contribute to how we make sense of our and others' mental states.

Tracking politically motivated reasoning in the brain: the role of mentalizing, value-encoding, and error detection networks.

Susceptibility to misinformation and belief polarization often reflects people's tendency to incorporate information in a biased way. Despite the presence of competing theoretical models, the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of motivated reasoning remain elusive as previous empirical work did not properly track the belief formation process. To address this problem, we employed a design that identifies motivated reasoning as directional deviations from a Bayesian benchmark of unbiased belief updating. We asked the members of a proimmigration or an anti-immigration group regarding the extent to which they endorse factual messages on foreign criminality, a polarizing political topic. Both groups exhibited a desirability bias by overendorsing attitude-consistent messages and underendorsing attitude-discrepant messages and an identity bias by overendorsing messages from in-group members and underendorsing messages from out-group members. In both groups, neural responses to the messages predicted subsequent expression of desirability and identity biases, suggesting a common neural basis of motivated reasoning across ideologically opposing groups. Specifically, brain regions implicated in encoding value, error detection, and mentalizing tracked the degree of desirability bias. Less extensive activation in the mentalizing network tracked the degree of identity bias. These findings illustrate the distinct neurocognitive architecture of desirability and identity biases and inform existing cognitive models of politically motivated reasoning.

Theory of mind in epilepsy.

Epilepsy is characterized by recurrent, chronic, and unprovoked seizures. Epilepsy has a significant negative impact on a patient's quality of life even if seizures are well controlled. In addition to the distress caused by seizures, patients with epilepsy (PwE) may suffer from cognitive impairment with serious social consequences such as poor interpersonal relationships, loss of employment, and reduced social networks. Pathological changes and functional connectivity abnormalities observed in PwE can disrupt the neural network responsible for the theory of mind. Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states to other people (intentions, beliefs, and emotions). It is a complex aspect of social cognition and includes cognitive and affective constructs. In recent years, numerous studies have assessed the relationship between social cognition, including the theory of mind, in PwE, and suggested impairment in this domain. Interventions targeting the theory of mind can be potentially helpful in improving the quality of life of PwE.

Precision mapping of the default network reveals common and distinct (inter) activity for autobiographical memory and theory of mind.

The default network is widely implicated as a common neural substrate for self-generated thought, such as remembering one's past (autobiographical memory) and imagining the thoughts and feelings of others (theory of mind). Findings that the default network comprises subnetworks of regions, some commonly and some distinctly involved across processes, suggest that one's own experiences inform their understanding of others. With the advent of precision functional MRI (fMRI) methods, however, it is unclear if this shared substrate is observed instead due to traditional group analysis methods. We investigated this possibility using a novel combination of methodological strategies. Twenty-three participants underwent multi-echo resting-state and task fMRI. We used their resting-state scans to conduct cortical parcellation sensitive to individual variation while preserving our ability to conduct group analysis. Using multivariate analyses, we assessed the functional activation and connectivity profiles of default network regions while participants engaged in autobiographical memory, theory of mind, or a sensorimotor control condition. Across the default network, we observed stronger activity associated with both autobiographical memory and theory of mind compared to the control condition. Nonetheless, we also observed that some regions showed preferential activity to either experimental condition, in line with past work. The connectivity results similarly indicated shared and distinct functional profiles. Our results support that autobiographical memory and theory of mind, two theoretically important and widely studied domains of social cognition, evoke common and distinct aspects of the default network even when ensuring high fidelity to individual-specific characteristics.NEW & NOTEWORTHY We used cutting-edge precision functional MRI (fMRI) methods such as multi-echo fMRI acquisition and denoising, a robust experimental paradigm, and individualized cortical parcellation across 23 participants to provide evidence that remembering one's past experiences and imagining the thoughts and feelings of others share a common neural substrate. Evidence from activation and connectivity analyses indicate overlapping and distinct functional profiles of these widely studied episodic and social processes.

Mentalizing self mind but not others: Self-reported mentalization difficulties in multiple sclerosis.

BACKGROUND: Mentalization can be defined as a mental process by which an individual directly or indirectly perceives and interprets one's own and others' behavior, emotions, beliefs, and needs based on designed mental states. Mentalization problems may be linked to remove associative white matter fiber disconnection. Multiple sclerosis (MS) is one of the diseases with white matter lesions. By comparing MS patients with healthy controls, it was aimed to assess whether MS patients' mentalization skills are affected. METHOD: This study involved 243 participants (170 healthy controls and 73 patients with MS). All the participants completed a sociodemographic questionnaire and the Mentalization Scale (MentS). RESULTS: While it was discovered that MentS scores for the dimension of others-based mentalization (MentS-O) were statistically lower in MS group, there was no statistically significant difference between the groups in terms of the dimensions of motivation to mentalize (MentS-M) and self-based mentalization (MentS-S) scores. CONCLUSION: We may conclude that MS patients have trouble comprehending other people's thoughts. This effect can be one of the causes of MS patients' issues with social cognition.

Neural correlates of static and dynamic social decision-making in real-time sibling interactions.

In traditional game theory tasks, social decision-making is centered on the prediction of the intentions (i.e., mentalizing) of strangers or manipulated responses. In contrast, real-life scenarios often involve familiar individuals in dynamic environments. Further research is needed to explore neural correlates of social decision-making with changes in the available information and environmental settings. This study collected fMRI hyperscanning data (N = 100, 46 same-sex pairs were analyzed) to investigate sibling pairs engaging in an iterated Chicken Game task within a competitive context, including two decision-making phases. In the static phase, participants chose between turning (cooperate) and continuing (defect) in a fixed time window. Participants could estimate the probability of different events based on their priors (previous outcomes and representation of other's intentions) and report their decision plan. The dynamic phase mirrored real-world interactions in which information is continuously changing (replicated within a virtual environment). Individuals had to simultaneously update their beliefs, monitor the actions of the other, and adjust their decisions. Our findings revealed substantial choice consistency between the two phases and evidence for shared neural correlates in mentalizing-related brain regions, including the prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus. Specific neural correlates were associated with each phase; increased activation of areas associated with action planning and outcome evaluation were found in the static compared with the dynamic phase. Using the opposite contrast, dynamic decision-making showed higher activation in regions related to predicting and monitoring other's actions, including the anterior cingulate cortex and insula. Cooperation (turning), compared with defection (continuing), showed increased activation in mentalizing-related regions only in the static phase, while defection, relative to cooperation, exhibited higher activation in areas associated with conflict monitoring and risk processing in the dynamic phase. Men were less cooperative and had greater TPJ activation. Sibling competitive relationship did not predict competitive behavior but showed a tendency to predict brain activity during dynamic decision-making. Only individual brain activation results are included here, and no interbrain analyses are reported. These neural correlates emphasize the significance of considering varying levels of information available and environmental settings when delving into the intricacies of mentalizing during social decision-making among familiar individuals.

The neural structures of theory of mind are valence-sensitive: evidence from three tDCS studies.

Several cortical structures are involved in theory of mind (ToM), including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and the right temporo- parietal junction (rTPJ). We investigated the role of these regions in mind reading with respect to the valence of mental states. Sixty-five healthy adult participants were recruited and received transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) (1.5 mA, 20 min) with one week interval in three separate studies. The stimulation conditions were anodal tDCS over the dlPFC coupled with cathodal tDCS over the vmPFC, reversed stimulation conditions, and sham in the first study, and anodal tDCS over the vmPFC, or dlPFC, and sham stimulation, with an extracranial return electrode in the second and third study. During stimulation, participants underwent the reading mind from eyes/voice tests (RMET or RMVT) in each stimulation condition. Anodal left dlPFC/cathodal right vmPFC stimulation increased the accuracy of negative mental state attributions, anodal rTPJ decreased the accuracy of negative and neutral mental state attributions, and decreased the reaction time of positive mental state attributions. Our results imply that the neural correlates of ToM are valence-sensitive.

Effective connectivity analysis of resting-state mentalizing brain networks in spinocerebellar ataxia type 2: A dynamic causal modeling study.

Neuroimaging studies on healthy subjects described the causal effective connectivity of cerebellar-cerebral social mentalizing networks, revealing the presence of closed-loops. These studies estimated effective connectivity by applying Dynamic Causal Modeling on task-related fMRI data of healthy subjects performing mentalizing tasks. Thus far, few studies have applied Dynamic Causal Modeling to resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) data to test the effective connectivity within the cerebellar-cerebral mentalizing network in the absence of experimental manipulations, and no study applied Dynamic Causal Modeling on fMRI data of patients with cerebellar disorders typically showing social cognition deficits. Thus, in this research we applied spectral Dynamic Causal Modeling, to rsfMRI data of 13 patients affected by spinocerebellar ataxia type 2 (SCA2) and of 23 matched healthy subjects. Specifically, effective connectivity was tested between acknowledged mentalizing regions of interest: bilateral cerebellar Crus II, dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral temporo-parietal junctions and precuneus. SCA2 and healthy subjects shared some similarities in cerebellar-cerebral mentalizing effective connectivity at rest, confirming the presence of closed-loops between cerebellar and cerebral mentalizing regions in both groups. However, relative to healthy subjects, SCA2 patients showed effective connectivity variations mostly in cerebellar-cerebral closed loops, namely weakened inhibitory connectivity from the cerebellum to the cerebral cortex, but stronger inhibitory connectivity from the cerebral cortex to the cerebellum. The present study demonstrated that effective connectivity changes affect a function-specific mentalizing network in SCA2 patients, allowing to deepen the direction and strength of the causal effective connectivity mechanisms driven by the cerebellar damage associated with SCA2.

Improving mentalizing deficits in older age with region-specific transcranial direct current stimulation.

Older adults have difficulties to detect the intentions, thoughts, and feelings of others, indicating an age-associated decline of socio-cognitive abilities that are known as "mentalizing". These deficits in mental state recognition are driven by neurofunctional alterations in brain regions that are implicated in mentalizing, such as the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) and the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). We tested whether focal transcranial current stimulation (tDCS) of the rTPJ and dmPFC has the potential to eliminate mentalizing deficits in older adults. Mentalizing deficits were assessed with a novel mindreading task that required the recognition of mental states in child faces. Older adults (n = 60) performed worse than younger adults (n = 30) on the mindreading task, indicating age-dependent deficits in mental state recognition. These mentalizing deficits were ameliorated in older adults who received sham-controlled andodal tDCS over the rTPJ (n = 30) but remained unchanged in older adults who received sham-controlled andodal tDCS over the dmPFC (n = 30). We, thus, showed for the first time that anodal tDCS over the rTPJ has the potential to remediate age-dependent mentalizing deficits in a region-specific way. This provides a rationale for exploring stimulation-based interventions targeting mentalizing deficits in older age.

Online chasing action recruits both mirror neuron and mentalizing systems: A pilot fNIRS study.

Engaging in chasing, where an actor actively pursues a target, is considered a crucial activity for the development of social skills. Previous studies have focused predominantly on understanding the neural correlates of chasing from an observer's perspective, but the neural mechanisms underlying the real-time implementation of chasing action remain poorly understood. To gain deeper insights into this phenomenon, the current study employed functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) techniques and a novel interactive game. In this interactive game, participants (N = 29) were tasked to engage in chasing behavior by controlling an on-screen character using a gamepad, with the goal of catching a virtual partner. To specifically examine the brain activations associated with the interactive nature of chasing, we included two additional interactive actions: following action of following the path of a virtual partner and free action of moving without a specific pursuit goal. The results revealed that chasing and following actions elicited activation in a broad and overlapping network of brain regions, including the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), premotor cortex (PMC), primary somatosensory cortex (SI), and primary motor cortex (M1). Crucially, these regions were found to be modulated by the type of interaction, with greater activation and functional connectivity during the chasing interaction than during the following and free interactions. These findings suggested that both the MNS, encompassing regions such as the PMC, M1 and SI, and the mentalizing system (MS), involving the TPJ and mPFC, contribute to the execution of online chasing actions. Thus, the present study represents an initial step toward future investigations into the roles of MNS and MS in real-time chasing interactions.

Neural bases of social deficits in ADHD: A systematic review. Does the Theory of Mind matter?

INTRODUCTION: The Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) causes serious interpersonal problems from childhood to adulthood, one of them being problematic social functioning. This phenomenon in ADHD should be associated with impairments in the Theory of Mind (ToM). Therefore, understanding the neural correlates of the ToM could be crucial for helping individuals with ADHD with their social functioning. Thus, we aimed to review published literature concerning neuroanatomical and functional correlates of ToM deficits in children and adolescents with ADHD. METHODS: We reviewed studies published between 1970 and 2023. In accordance with PRISMA guidelines, after data from three databases were collected, two authors (LN and PM) independently screened all relevant records (n=638) and consequently, both authors did the data extraction. The quality of the included studies (n=5) was measured by a modified version of The Newcastle-Ottawa Scale and by measures specific for our study. This systematic review was registered on PROSPERO (CRD42020139847). RESULTS: Results indicated that impairments in performing of the ToM tasks were negatively associated with the grey matter volume in the bilateral amygdala and hippocampus in both, ADHD and control group. In EEG studies, a significantly greater electrophysiological activity during ToM tasks was observed in the, frontal, temporal, parietal and occipital lobes in participants with ADHD as compared to healthy subjects. CONCLUSION: More research is needed to explore the ToM deficits in children with ADHD. Future research might focus on the neural circuits associated with attention and inhibition, which deficits seems to contribute to the ToM deficits in children and adolescents with ADHD.

Theory of mind abilities during the course of bipolar disorder: A longitudinal study using mixed models.

Theory of mind (ToM) deficits, difficulties in recognizing the intentions, propensities, and beliefs of others have been shown in individuals with bipolar disorder in several studies; however, it is not yet elucidated how ToM abilities changes over the course of bipolar disorder and is related to illness symptoms. This is one of the first longitudinal studies to compare the ToM abilities of euthymic bipolar individuals and healthy controls over a four and a half years period. ToM abilities were measured using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). A total of 91 euthymic bipolar individuals and 91 healthy controls were included in the analyses. Linear mixed models were used to compare ToM abilities of bipolar individuals and healthy controls. It was found that bipolar individuals scored lower on average on the RMET than healthy controls and that these RMET scores were stable over four and a half years. The results of this study suggest that ToM deficits are a stable (possibly endophenotypic) trait of bipolar disorder. This understanding can contribute to better identification, assessment, and treatment strategies for individuals with bipolar disorder, ultimately improving their overall care and outcome.

Investigating the relationship of theory of mind and empathy with neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and neuropsychiatric data in persons with multiple sclerosis.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is understanding others' minds. Empathy is an insight into emotions and feelings of others. Persons with multiple sclerosis (pwMS) may experience impairment in ToM and empathy. To investigate ToM, empathy, and their relationship with neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and neuropsychiatric data. 41 pwMS and 41 HC were assessed using RMET for ToM, EQ, BICAMS, HADS. Cortical and subcortical gray matter volumes were calculated with Freesurfer from 3T MRI scans. pwMS showed lower EQ scores (44.82 ± 11.9 vs 51.29 ± 9.18, p = 0.02) and worse RMET performance (22.37 ± 4.09 vs 24,47 ± 2.93, p = 0.011). Anxiety and depression were higher in pwMS. EQ correlated with subcortical (amygdala) and cortical (anterior cingulate) volumes. RMET correlated with cortical volumes (posterior cingulate, lingual). In regression analysis, amygdala volume was the single predictor of empathy performance (p = 0.041). There were no significant correlations between social cognitive tests and general cognition. A weak negative correlation was found between EQ and the level of anxiety (r = -0.342, p = 0.038) The present study indicates that pwMS have impairment on ToM and empathy. The performance of ToM and empathy in MS is linked to the volumes of critical brain areas involved in social cognition.

The neural substrates of social cognition deficits in newly diagnosed multiple sclerosis patients.

OBJECTIVE: Cognitive and affective symptoms in multiple sclerosis (MS) can be independently impaired and have different pathways of progression. Cognitive alterations have been described since the earliest MS stages; by contrast, the social cognition (SC) domain has never been investigated in the first year from MS diagnosis. We aimed to evaluate SC and unravel its neural bases in newly diagnosed MS patients. METHODS: Seventy MS patients underwent at diagnosis a 3 T-MRI and a neuropsychological/SC assessment (median time between diagnosis and MRI/cognitive evaluation = 0 months). We tested two matched reference samples: 31 relapsing-remitting MS patients with longer course (mean ± SD disease duration = 7.0 ± 4.5 years) and 38 healthy controls (HCs). Cortical thicknesses (CTh) and volumes of brain regions were calculated. RESULTS: Newly diagnosed MS patients performed significantly lower than HCs in facial emotion recognition (global: p < 0.001; happiness: p = 0.041, anger: p = 0.007; fear: p < 0.001; disgust: p = 0.004) and theory of mind (p = 0.005), while no difference was found between newly diagnosed and longer MS patients. Compared to lower performers, higher performers in facial emotion recognition showed greater volume of amygdala (p = 0.032) and caudate (p = 0.036); higher performers in theory of mind showed greater CTh in lingual gyrus (p = 0.006), cuneus (p = 0.024), isthmus cingulate (p = 0.038), greater volumes of putamen (p = 0.016), pallidum (p = 0.029), and amygdala (p = 0.032); patients with higher empathy showed lower cuneus CTh (p = 0.042) and putamen volume (p = 0.007). INTERPRETATIONS: SC deficits are present in MS patients since the time of diagnosis and remain persistent along the disease course. Specific basal, limbic, and occipital areas play a significant role in the pathogenesis of these alterations.

Disentangling the relationship between social cognition, executive functions and behaviour changes in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.

BACKGROUND: Social cognition (SC) deficits are included in the amyotrophic lateral sclerosis-frontotemporal spectrum disorder (ALS-FTDS) revised diagnostic criteria. However, the impact of SC assessment on cognitive classification and the cognitive-behavioural correlates of SC remain unclear. This cross-sectional study aimed to assess the impact of SC assessment on ALS-FTDS categorisation and explore the relationship of SC with executive functions (EF) and behaviour changes in a cohort of ALS patients. METHODS: 121 patients and 56 healthy controls from the Turin ALS Centre underwent cognitive/behavioural testing, including the SC subdomains of facial emotion recognition, and cognitive and affective theory of mind (ToM). RESULTS: Patients performed significantly worse than controls in all SC explored domains, and 45% of patients exhibited a deficit in at least one SC test, dissociated from the presence of EF deficits. In 13% of cases, the SC deficit was isolated and subclinical. SC assessment contributed to the attribution of cognitive impairment in 10% of patients. Through a statistical clustering approach, we found that ToM only partially overlaps with EF while behaviour changes are associated with emotional disorders (anxiety and depression). CONCLUSIONS: SC is overall independent of EF in ALS, with ToM only partially associated with specific EF measures, and behaviour changes associated with emotional disorders. The influence of SC on cognitive categorisation and the frequent identification of a subclinical SC impairment have implications in a clinical setting, considering the substantial impact of cognitive impairment on disease burden and therapeutic choices.

From One's Heart to the Mind of Others: A Study in School-Aged Children.

Studies have shown a significant association between effective parasympathetic modulation of the heart and processes linked to social cognition. Particularly, Quintana and colleagues documented a relation between vagally-mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) and performance on a theory of mind (ToM) task, namely, the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), in a sample of university students. The purpose of the present study was to test whether such result would extend to a sample of school-aged children (7-9 years old) using the child version of the RMET. In addition, the Eyes Test Revised was administered as it is more suitable to evaluate ToM during childhood. Results supported the positive association between vmHRV and ToM abilities, replicating and extending previous results obtained in young adults. The current study adds to the existing literature pointing to HRV as a putative biomarker of social cognition abilities.

Network and state specificity in connectivity-based predictions of individual behavior.

Predicting individual behavior from brain functional connectivity (FC) patterns can contribute to our understanding of human brain functioning. This may apply in particular if predictions are based on features derived from circumscribed, a priori defined functional networks, which improves interpretability. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that task-based FC data may yield more successful predictions of behavior than resting-state FC data. Here, we comprehensively examined to what extent the correspondence of functional network priors and task states with behavioral target domains influences the predictability of individual performance in cognitive, social, and affective tasks. To this end, we used data from the Human Connectome Project for large-scale out-of-sample predictions of individual abilities in working memory (WM), theory-of-mind cognition (SOCIAL), and emotion processing (EMO) from FC of corresponding and non-corresponding states (WM/SOCIAL/EMO/resting-state) and networks (WM/SOCIAL/EMO/whole-brain connectome). Using root mean squared error and coefficient of determination to evaluate model fit revealed that predictive performance was rather poor overall. Predictions from whole-brain FC were slightly better than those from FC in task-specific networks, and a slight benefit of predictions based on FC from task versus resting state was observed for performance in the WM domain. Beyond that, we did not find any significant effects of a correspondence of network, task state, and performance domains. Together, these results suggest that multivariate FC patterns during both task and resting states contain rather little information on individual performance levels, calling for a reconsideration of how the brain mediates individual differences in mental abilities.