Inequality, fiscal policy and COVID19 restrictions in a demand-determined economy.

We evaluate the effects of inequality, fiscal policy, and COVID19 restrictions in a model of economic slack with potentially rigid capital operating costs. Rich households satiate their demand for goods/services (and consume an endowment on the margin), whereas poor households' spending on goods/services is limited by their income (which in turn depends on spending by the rich and on fiscal transfers). The model implies that inequality has large negative effects on output, while also diminishing the effects of demand-side fiscal stimulus. COVID restrictions can reduce current-period GDP by more than is directly associated with the restrictions themselves when rigid capital costs induce firm exit. Higher inequality is associated with larger restriction multipliers. The effectiveness of fiscal policies depends on inequality and the joint distribution of capital operating costs and firm revenues. Furthermore, COVID19 restrictions can cause future inflation, as households tilt their expenditure toward the future.

The effects of the COVID pandemic on the federal budget outlook.

We examine the impact of COVID-19 on the federal budget outlook. We find substantial but temporary effects on spending and revenues, with more moderate but permanent effects on the long-term projections. We project that the debt-to-GDP ratio, currently 98%, will rise to 190% in 2050 under current law, compared to a CBO pre-COVID projection of 180%. Sharply lower interest rates projected for the next dozen years help moderate future debt accumulation. Under a "current policy" projection that allows temporary tax provisions-such as those in the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017-to be made permanent, the debt-to-GDP ratio would rise to 222% by 2050 and would continuing rising thereafter. The long-term projections are sensitive to interest rates. We discuss several aspects of these results, including how the current episode compares to past debt changes, the role of historically low interest rates, and the role of recent Federal Reserve Board policies and actions. Because of the macro-stabilization effects of fiscal tightening, and because low interest rates create "breathing room" for fiscal policy, we do not see the large, short-run debt accumulation resulting from the current pandemic as necessitating any immediate offsetting response. But the long-term projections show that significant fiscal imbalances remain and will eventually require attention.

HOW THE GROWING GAP IN LIFE EXPECTANCY MAY AFFECT RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND REFORMS.

Older Americans have experienced dramatic gains in life expectancy in recent decades, but an emerging literature reveals that these gains are accumulating mostly to those at the top of the income distribution. We explore how growing inequality in life expectancy affects lifetime benefits from Social Security, Medicare, and other programs and how this phenomenon interacts with possible program reforms. We first project that life expectancy at age 50 for males in the two highest income quintiles will rise by 7 to 8 years between the 1930 and 1960 birth cohorts, but that the two lowest income quintiles will experience little to no increase over that time period. This divergence in life expectancy will cause the gap between average lifetime program benefits received by men in the highest and lowest quintiles to widen by $130,000 (in $2009) over this period. Finally we simulate the effect of Social Security reforms such as raising the normal retirement age and changing the benefit formula to see whether they mitigate or enhance the reduced progressivity resulting from the widening gap in life expectancy.

Welfare and Generational Equity in Sustainable Unfunded Pension Systems.

Using stochastic simulations we analyze how public pension structures spread the risks arising from demographic and economic shocks across generations. We consider several actual and hypothetical sustainable PAYGO pension structures, including: (1) versions of the US Social Security system with annual adjustments of taxes or benefits to maintain fiscal balance; (2) Sweden's Notional Defined Contribution system and several variants developed to improve fiscal stability; and (3) the German system, which also includes annual adjustments to maintain fiscal balance. For each system, we present descriptive measures of uncertainty in representative outcomes for a typical generation and across generations. We then estimate expected utility for generations based on simplifying assumptions and incorporate these expected utility calculations in an overall social welfare measure. Using a horizontal equity index, we also compare the different systems' performance in terms of how neighboring generations are treated.While the actual Swedish system smoothes stochastic fluctuations more than any other and produces the highest degree of horizontal equity, it does so by accumulating a buffer stock of assets that alleviates the need for frequent adjustments. In terms of social welfare, this accumulation of assets leads to a lower average rate of return that more than offsets the benefits of risk reduction, leaving systems with more frequent adjustments that spread risks broadly among generations as those most preferred.