RESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Patients with brain injury who are unresponsive to commands may perform cognitive tasks that are detected on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG). This phenomenon, known as cognitive motor dissociation, has not been systematically studied in a large cohort of persons with disorders of consciousness. METHODS: In this prospective cohort study conducted at six international centers, we collected clinical, behavioral, and task-based fMRI and EEG data from a convenience sample of 353 adults with disorders of consciousness. We assessed the response to commands on task-based fMRI or EEG in participants without an observable response to verbal commands (i.e., those with a behavioral diagnosis of coma, vegetative state, or minimally conscious state-minus) and in participants with an observable response to verbal commands. The presence or absence of an observable response to commands was assessed with the use of the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R). RESULTS: Data from fMRI only or EEG only were available for 65% of the participants, and data from both fMRI and EEG were available for 35%. The median age of the participants was 37.9 years, the median time between brain injury and assessment with the CRS-R was 7.9 months (25% of the participants were assessed with the CRS-R within 28 days after injury), and brain trauma was an etiologic factor in 50%. We detected cognitive motor dissociation in 60 of the 241 participants (25%) without an observable response to commands, of whom 11 had been assessed with the use of fMRI only, 13 with the use of EEG only, and 36 with the use of both techniques. Cognitive motor dissociation was associated with younger age, longer time since injury, and brain trauma as an etiologic factor. In contrast, responses on task-based fMRI or EEG occurred in 43 of 112 participants (38%) with an observable response to verbal commands. CONCLUSIONS: Approximately one in four participants without an observable response to commands performed a cognitive task on fMRI or EEG as compared with one in three participants with an observable response to commands. (Funded by the James S. McDonnell Foundation and others.).
Asunto(s)
Lesiones Encefálicas , Trastornos de la Conciencia , Trastornos Disociativos , Estado Vegetativo Persistente , Adulto , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Adulto Joven , Encéfalo/diagnóstico por imagen , Encéfalo/fisiopatología , Lesiones Encefálicas/fisiopatología , Lesiones Encefálicas/complicaciones , Lesiones Encefálicas/diagnóstico por imagen , Cognición/fisiología , Trastornos de la Conciencia/diagnóstico por imagen , Trastornos de la Conciencia/etiología , Trastornos de la Conciencia/fisiopatología , Electroencefalografía , Imagen por Resonancia Magnética , Estado Vegetativo Persistente/diagnóstico por imagen , Estado Vegetativo Persistente/etiología , Estado Vegetativo Persistente/fisiopatología , Estudios Prospectivos , Trastornos Disociativos/diagnóstico por imagen , Trastornos Disociativos/etiología , Trastornos Disociativos/fisiopatologíaRESUMEN
Neuroscientists agree on the value of locating the source of consciousness within the brain. Anaesthesiologists are no exception, and have their own operational definition of consciousness based on phenomenological observations during anaesthesia. The full functional correlates of consciousness are yet to be precisely identified, however rapidly evolving progress in this scientific domain has yielded several theories that attempt to model the generation of consciousness. They have received variable support from experimental observations, including those involving anaesthesia and its ability to reversibly modulate different aspects of consciousness. Aside from the interest in a better understanding of the mechanisms of consciousness, exploring the functional tenets of the phenomenological consciousness states of general anaesthesia has the potential to ultimately improve patient management. It could facilitate the design of specific monitoring devices and approaches, aiming at reliably detecting each of the possible states of consciousness during an anaesthetic procedure, including total absence of mental content (unconsciousness), and internal awareness (sensation of self and internal thoughts) with or without conscious perception of the environment (connected or disconnected consciousness, respectively). Indeed, it must be noted that unresponsiveness is not sufficient to infer absence of connectedness or even absence of consciousness. This narrative review presents the current knowledge in this field from a system-level, underlining the contribution of anaesthesia studies in supporting theories of consciousness, and proposing directions for future research.