[Secondary use of human tissue: consent and better information required]. / Nader gebruik van lichaamsmateriaal: zeggenschap en betere informatie nodig.

Human tissue remaining after diagnostic procedures is important for use in scientific research. This 'secondary use' of tissue is regulated by the Dutch Medical Treatment Contracts Act and the Code of Conduct for Proper Secondary Use of Human Tissue of the Dutch Federation of Biomedical Scientific Societies. Patients have the right to opt-out of further use of their residual tissue, but the procedures for objection and the provision of information involved are not regulated by statute. Dutch patients have a positive attitude to further use of human tissue for other purposes. They prefer, however, a procedure in which they are informed verbally by their health professional about research with residual tissue. The information can be brief and is best provided early in the treatment. Administrative and technical modifications of the current registration systems are necessary to support the opting-out procedure in practice. By taking the preferences of patients into account, trust in medical practice can be maintained.

Risk analysis-based food safety policy: scientific factors versus socio-cultural factors.

The purpose of this article is to illustrate the importance of socio-cultural factors in risk management and the need to incorporate these factors in a standard, internationally recognized (WTO) framework. This was achieved by analysing the relevance of these factors in three cases. It can be concluded that the pre-eminent role of science in food-related regulatory decisions is debatable. At a risk management level, other factors, such as cultural, social, or economic issues, are often more important than scientific advice in determining policy. There is a need for transparency at an international level as trade barriers are gradually being removed and these other factors are becoming more apparent. Therefore it is important that all the factors implicated in the food safety policy-making process are recognized in a standard framework.

The ethics of rodent control.

Because western societies generally see animals as objects of moral concern, demands have been made on the way they are treated, e.g. during animal experimentation. In the case of rodent pests, however, inhumane control methods are often applied. This inconsistency in the human-animal relationship requires clarification. This paper analyses the criteria that must be met when judging the use of animals during experiments, and investigates whether these can be applied in rodent control. This is important, because, until now, animal welfare has been less of an issue in pest control: effectiveness, hygiene and cost efficiency have been leading principles. Two options are available to solve the inconsistency: the first is to abandon the criteria used in animal experimentation; the second is to apply these criteria to both animal experimentation and rodent control. This latter option implies that rodent control methods should not lead to intense pain or discomfort, and any discomfort should have a short duration and should allow escaped rodents to lead a natural life. Adherence to this option will, however, require a shift in the design of rodent control methods: effectiveness will no longer be the leading principle. It will have to share its position with animal welfare and humaneness.

Science and society: different bioethical approaches towards animal experimentation.

The use of live animals for experiments plays an important role in many forms of research. This gives rise to an ethical dilemma. On the one hand, most of the animals used are sentient beings who may be harmed by the experiments. The research, on the other hand, may be vital for preventing, curing or alleviating human diseases. There is no consensus on how to tackle this dilemma. One extreme is the view taken by adherents of the so-called animal rights view. According to this view, we are never justified in harming animals for human purposes - however vital these purposes may be. The other extreme is the ruthless view, according to which animals are there to be used at our discretion. However, most people have a view situated somewhere between these two extremes. It is accepted that animals may be used for research - contrary to the animal rights view. However, contrary to the ruthless view, that is only accepted under certain conditions. The aim of this presentation is to present different ethical views which may serve as a foundation for specifying the circumstances under which it is acceptable to use animals for research. Three views serving this role are contractarianism, utilitarianism and a deontological approach. According to contractarianism, the key ethical issue is concern for the sentiments of other human beings in society, on whose co-operation those responsible for research depend. Thus it is acceptable to use animals as long as most people can see the point of the experiment and are not offended by the way it is done. According to utilitarianism, the key ethical issue is about the consequences for humans and animals. Thus it is justified to use animals for research if enough good comes out of it in terms of preventing suffering and creating happiness, and if there is no better alternative. In the deontological approach the prima facie duty of beneficence towards human beings has to be weighed against the prima facie duties not to harm animals and to respect their integrity. By weighing these prima facie duties, the moral problem of animal experimentation exists in finding which duty actually has to be considered as the decisive duty. It will be argued that these three views, even though they will all justify animal experimentation to some extent, will do so in practice under different conditions. Many current conflicts regarding the use of animals for research may be better understood in light of the conflict between the three bioethical perspectives provided by these views.

Brave new birds. The use of 'animal integrity' in animal ethics.

Suppose "chicken" eggs could be produced by quasi-chickens--genetically engineered humps of living chicken-flesh that do nothing but lay eggs. Would there be anything amiss with that? Animal ethicists invoke the notion of animal integrity in order to give intellectual content to the intuition that there would be. On inspection, 'integrity' isn't everything its proponents want it to be. Yet there's enough in it to make reasoned argument possible.