Population-Based Evaluation of Vaccine Effectiveness against SARS-CoV-2 Infection, Severe Illness, and Death, Taiwan.

Taiwan provided several COVID-19 vaccine platforms: mRNA (BNT162b2, mRNA-1273), adenoviral vector-based (AZD1222), and protein subunit (MVC-COV1901). After Taiwan shifted from its zero-COVID strategy in April 2022, population-based evaluation of vaccine effectiveness (VE) became possible. We conducted an observational cohort study of 21,416,151 persons to examine VE against SARS-CoV-2 infection, moderate and severe illness, and death during March 22, 2021-September 30, 2022. After adjusting for age and sex, we found that persons who completed 3 vaccine doses (2 primary, 1 booster) or received MVC-COV1901 as the primary series had the lowest hospitalization incidence (0.04-0.20 cases/100,000 person-days). We also found 95.8% VE against hospitalization for 3 doses of BNT162b2, 91.0% for MVC-COV1901, 81.8% for mRNA-1273, and 65.7% for AZD1222, which had the lowest overall VE. Our findings indicated that protein subunit vaccines provide similar protection against SARS-CoV-2---associated hospitalization as mRNA vaccines and can inform mix-and-match vaccine selection in other countries.

Policy Decisions and Use of Information Technology to Fight COVID-19, Taiwan.

Because of its proximity to and frequent travelers to and from China, Taiwan faces complex challenges in preventing coronavirus disease (COVID-19). As soon as China reported the unidentified outbreak to the World Health Organization on December 31, 2019, Taiwan assembled a taskforce and began health checks onboard flights from Wuhan. Taiwan's rapid implementation of disease prevention measures helped detect and isolate the country's first COVID-19 case on January 20, 2020. Laboratories in Taiwan developed 4-hour test kits and isolated 2 strains of the coronavirus before February. Taiwan effectively delayed and contained community transmission by leveraging experience from the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak, prevalent public awareness, a robust public health network, support from healthcare industries, cross-departmental collaborations, and advanced information technology capacity. We analyze use of the National Health Insurance database and critical policy decisions made by Taiwan's government during the first 50 days of the COVID-19 outbreak.

Successful Control of Streptococcus pneumoniae 19A Replacement With a Catch-up Primary Vaccination Program in Taiwan.

BACKGROUND: Streptococcus pneumoniae infections in Taiwan mostly occur in children aged 2-4 years. Because of a significant increase in the incidence of serotype 19A-related infections, the 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13) was initially introduced in the national immunization program for children 2-5 years of age, prior to the national programs for infants. We have assessed the impact of such vaccination programs in reducing the incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) in Taiwanese children. METHODS: We analyzed the national data on IPDs from the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control between 2008 and 2017. We calculated the incidence rates of IPD and incidence rate ratios (IRRs) between years for different serotypes to estimate the effectiveness of the vaccination programs. RESULTS: The national catch-up primary vaccination schedule successfully reduced the incidence rate of IPD from 17.8/100 000 in 2012 to 5.5/100 000 in 2017 among children aged 0-5 years. The IRR (2017 over 2012) was 0.31, corresponding to a 69% reduction. A modest herd effect was also observed, with a 37% reduction in the incidence of IPD in elderly people (≥70 years) from 2012 to 2017. The incidence of IPD caused by serotype 19A in children aged 0-5 years was reduced by 32.6-44.3% yearly from 2012 to 2017. In 2015, serogroup 15 outnumbered 19A, to become the leading serotypes in children 0-5 years old. CONCLUSIONS: Special catch-up vaccination programs starting from children 2-5 years of age with PCV13 have been highly effective in reducing the incidence of IPD, especially as caused by serotype 19A, in Taiwanese children.

Public Health Responses to Reemergence of Animal Rabies, Taiwan, July 16-December 28, 2013.

Taiwan had been free of indigenous human and animal rabies case since canine rabies was eliminated in 1961. In July 2013, rabies was confirmed among three wild ferret-badgers, prompting public health response to prevent human rabies cases. This descriptive study reports the immediate response to the reemergence of rabies in Taiwan. Response included enhanced surveillance for human rabies cases by testing stored cerebrospinal fluids (CSF) from patients with encephalitides of unknown cause by RT-PCR, prioritizing vaccine use for postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) during periods of vaccine shortage and subsequent expansion of PEP, surveillance of animal bites using information obtained from vaccine application, roll out of preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP) with vaccine stock restoration, surveillance for adverse events following immunization (AEFI), and ensuring surge capacity to respond to general public inquiries by phone and training for healthcare professionals. Enhanced surveillance for human rabies found no cases after testing 205 stored CSF specimens collected during January 2010-July 2013. During July 16 to December 28, 2013, we received 8,241 rabies PEP application; 6,634 (80.5%) were consistent with recommendations. Among the 6,501 persons who received at least one dose of rabies vaccine postexposure, 4,953 (76.2%) persons who were bitten by dogs; only 59 (0.9%) persons were bitten by ferret-badgers. During the study period, 6,247 persons received preexposure prophylaxis. There were 23 reports of AEFI; but no anaphylaxis, Guillain-Barré syndrome, or acute disseminated encephalomyelitis were found. During the study period, there were 40,312 calls to the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control hotline, of which, 8,692 (22%) were related to rabies. Recent identification of rabies among ferret-badgers in a previously rabies-free country prompted rapid response. To date, no human rabies has been identified. Continued multifaceted surveillance and interministerial collaboration are crucial to achieve the goal of rabies-free status in Taiwan.

Maintaining human health at the border of Taiwan.

Because international travel is now more frequent and convenient, communicable diseases that occur in one region can be transmitted to another area within a few hours. For this reason, many efforts have been undertaken in Taiwan to establish a comprehensive border quarantine system to protect against imported diseases that may threaten the health of the population. According to the International Health Regulations (2005), decades of development strategies for border quarantine have covered not only routine practices and specific measures for handling a pandemic but also have drawn attention to the development of core capacities at designated points of entry. However, as a result of the rapidly increasing number of points of entry, changes in transportation patterns, and the emergence of diseases, current border quarantine practice is being challenged to maintain human resources and the efficacy of entry screening. It is therefore critical to reexamine border quarantine strategies that will fit future needs and national conditions. This article reviews the current border health practices in Taiwan and discusses 5 key challenges to be further considered and improved. The findings can serve as a guide for further policy reform in Taiwan and other countries.

Building core capacities at the designated points of entry according to the International Health Regulations 2005: a review of the progress and prospects in Taiwan.

BACKGROUND: As designated points of entry (PoEs) play a critical role in preventing the transmission of international public health risks, huge efforts have been invested in Taiwan to improve the core capacities specified in the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005). This article reviews how Taiwan strengthened the core capacities at the Taoyuan International Airport (TIA) and the Port of Kaohsiung (PoK) by applying a new, practicable model. DESIGN: An IHR PoE program was initiated for implementing the IHR core capacities at designated PoEs. The main methods of this program were 1) identifying the designated PoEs according to the pre-determined criteria, 2) identifying the competent authority for each health measure, 3) building a close collaborative relationship between stakeholders from the central and PoE level, 4) designing three stages of systematic assessment using the assessment tool published by the World Health Organization (WHO), and 5) undertaking action plans targeting the gaps identified by the assessments. RESULTS: Results of the self-assessment, preliminary external assessment, and follow-up external assessment revealed a continuous progressive trend at the TIA (86, 91, and 100%, respectively), and at the PoK (77, 97, and 99.9%, respectively). The results of the follow-up external assessment indicated that both these designated PoEs already conformed to the IHR requirements. These achievements were highly associated with strong collaboration, continuous empowerment, efficient resource integration, and sustained commitments. CONCLUSIONS: Considering that many countries had requested for an extension on the deadline to fulfill the IHR 2005 core capacity requirements, Taiwan's experiences can be a source of learning for countries striving to fully implement these requirements. Further, in order to broaden the scope of public health protection into promoting global security, Taiwan will keep its commitments on multisectoral cooperation, human resource capacity building, and maintaining routine and emergency capacities.

Surveillance and vaccine effectiveness of an influenza epidemic predominated by vaccine-mismatched influenza B/Yamagata-lineage viruses in Taiwan, 2011-12 season.

INTRODUCTION: The 2011-12 trivalent influenza vaccine contains a strain of influenza B/Victoria-lineage viruses. Despite free provision of influenza vaccine among target populations, an epidemic predominated by influenza B/Yamagata-lineage viruses occurred during the 2011-12 season in Taiwan. We characterized this vaccine-mismatched epidemic and estimated influenza vaccine effectiveness (VE). METHODS: Influenza activity was monitored through sentinel viral surveillance, emergency department (ED) and outpatient influenza-like illness (ILI) syndromic surveillance, and case-based surveillance of influenza with complications and deaths. VE against laboratory-confirmed influenza was evaluated through a case-control study on ILI patients enrolled into sentinel viral surveillance. Logistic regression was used to estimate VE adjusted for confounding factors. RESULTS: During July 2011-June 2012, influenza B accounted for 2,382 (72.5%) of 3,285 influenza-positive respiratory specimens. Of 329 influenza B viral isolates with antigen characterization, 287 (87.2%) were B/Yamagata-lineage viruses. Proportions of ED and outpatient visits being ILI-related increased from November 2011 to January 2012. Of 1,704 confirmed cases of influenza with complications, including 154 (9.0%) deaths, influenza B accounted for 1,034 (60.7%) of the confirmed cases and 103 (66.9%) of the deaths. Reporting rates of confirmed influenza with complications and deaths were 73.5 and 6.6 per 1,000,000, respectively, highest among those aged ≥65 years, 50-64 years, 3-6 years, and 0-2 years. Adjusted VE was -31% (95% CI: -80, 4) against all influenza, 54% (95% CI: 3, 78) against influenza A, and -66% (95% CI: -132, -18) against influenza B. CONCLUSIONS: This influenza epidemic in Taiwan was predominated by B/Yamagata-lineage viruses unprotected by the 2011-12 trivalent vaccine. The morbidity and mortality of this vaccine-mismatched epidemic warrants careful consideration of introducing a quadrivalent influenza vaccine that includes strains of both B lineages.

Nationwide surveillance of influenza during the pandemic (2009-10) and post-pandemic (2010-11) periods in Taiwan.

INTRODUCTION: Although WHO declared the world moving into the post-pandemic period on August 10, 2010, influenza A(H1N1) 2009 virus continued to circulate globally. Its impact was expected to continue during the 2010-11 influenza season. This study describes the nationwide surveillance findings of the pandemic and post-pandemic influenza periods in Taiwan and assesses the impact of influenza A(H1N1) 2009 during the post-pandemic period. METHODS: The Influenza Laboratory Surveillance Network consisted of 12 contract laboratories for collecting and testing samples with acute respiratory tract infections. Surveillance of emergency room visits and outpatient department visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) were conducted using the Real-Time Outbreak and Disease Surveillance system and the National Health Insurance program data, respectively. Hospitalized cases with severe complications and deaths were reported to the National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System. RESULTS: During the 2009-10 influenza season, pandemic A(H1N1) 2009 was the predominant circulating strain and caused 44 deaths. However, the 2010-11 influenza season began with A(H3N2) being the predominant circulating strain, changing to A(H1N1) 2009 in December 2010. Emergency room and outpatient department ILI surveillance displayed similar trends. By March 31, 2011, there were 1,751 cases of influenza with severe complications; 50.1% reported underlying diseases. Of the reported cases, 128 deaths were associated with influenza. Among these, 93 (72.6%) were influenza A(H1N1) 2009 and 30 (23.4%) A(H3N2). Compared to the pandemic period, during the immediate post-pandemic period, increased number of hospitalizations and deaths were observed, and the patients were consistently older. CONCLUSIONS: Reemergence of influenza A(H1N1) 2009 during the 2010-11 influenza season had an intense activity with age distribution shift. To further mitigate the impact of future influenza epidemics, Taiwan must continue its multifaceted influenza surveillance systems, remain flexible with antiviral use policies, and revise the vaccine policies to include the population most at risk.