Population reproduction: a method of breakdown and estimation.

PIP: "This article shows how, working with a number of loose hypotheses, a classic measure of the reproduction rate...can be broken down into a series of multiplicative components, each of which reflects a specific dimension (intensity or frequency) of nuptiality, mortality, fertility and, if required, migration.... A number of simple algorithms are proposed for calculating the mean [maternal] age at birth and for estimating the proportion of women who are married at this age. An application to England, France and Germany establishes the existence and the characteristics of their respective demographic regimes in the [seventeenth] and [eighteenth] centuries." (EXCERPT)^ieng

Demographics and the pension system.

"Italian demographic evolution closely resembles that of the other leading European countries, although with some distinctive features, such as a lower birth rate, more rapid population aging and fewer immigrants. Projections for the next two or three decades point to accelerating expansion of the aged population, especially of the very old, and a contraction of the working age population after the turn of the century. However, there are also unknowns involved in the demographic evolution of the aged population, turning on the speed of the decline in senile mortality in the decades to come and the possible effects on the health of the elderly population, hence on the demand for social services, considering among other things changing family patterns. There is broad agreement that the birth rate is now too low, that this could have serious long-run repercussions on relations between generations and on intergenerational transfers, and that there is room for social policy action to influence the reproductive choices of couples. This article examines several possible reproductive models and discusses the foundations for action and the potential policy contradictions."

["Us" and "them": European and North American attitudes to immigration]. / "Nous" et "eux": l'Europe et les Etats-Unis facea a l'immigration.

PIP: This work compares attitudes toward immigration in Europe and North America. Europe has adopted and reinforced a restrictive immigration policy since the 1970s, but family reunification and asylum for refugees have replaced labor migration to maintain the flow of newcomers over the past two decades. Illegal immigration has increased in countries such as Italy and Spain where immigration is a recent phenomenon. Migratory pressure from the former Soviet block, violence against immigrants in Germany and elsewhere, the crisis of social protection systems, economic recession and increasing unemployment have pressured European governments to reinforce their closed door policy. In the US, restrictions against immigration have relaxed greatly since adoption of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986. Over 800,000 immigrants have been admitted annually to the US in recent years. The factors explaining the different immigration policies in North America and Europe are not economic or demographic, but stem rather from history, social structure, the functioning of the labor market and social mobility. North America, more than Europe, has a positive view of immigration as contributing to the vitality and renewal of the culture and promoting development by broadening experience and knowledge. Immigration is regarded in Europe as, at best, a necessity in times of labor shortage and economic expansion. European countries tend to perceive themselves as totally formed and not requiring further cultural contribution. Homogeneity in culture, language, and religion is valued. Social mobility is possible in North America through professional success, but in the older and more hierarchical societies of Europe, social status is determined by birth and family or other connections. Since the early 1990s, public opinion toward immigration has become less favorable on both sides of the Atlantic, with increasing proportions favoring limitation. The positive perception of immigration in America and the work of pressure groups have thus far blocked restrictionist measures. In Europe, restrictive policies are in perfect harmony with public opinion.^ieng

[The month of birth as factor of child survival]. / Le mois de naissance comme facteur de survie des enfants.

Season of birth may influence considerably children's survival. This study extends the analysis that the authors have already carried out on the Italian regions and Savoy to other countries: Russia, Low Countries, Belgium and Switzerland. The data refer to the second half of the 19th century. It is in Italy that differential mortality according to season of birth is larger (maximum differential in the Venetia region), followed by Russia and Switzerland. Climate's influence (cold in winter and heat in the summer) combine its effects with social customs typical of each country, age and weaning, other customs concerning children's survival. These different combinations determine some unexpected results in the various countries. In the final part of the paper, data derived from family reconstitution of two Tuscan villages (1790-1916) are analysed in order to build a simple model measuring the net impact of climate on mortality during the first two years of life.

[Other routes toward the past: from life series to demographic dynamics in historical populations]. / Otras vias hacia el pasado: de series vitales a dinamicas demograficas en poblaciones historicas.

PIP: The authors apply various indirect estimation methods to data for New Castile, Spain, from the early 1500s to 1887. They project the size of the population and its levels of fertility, mortality, and nuptiality, then discuss the applicability of the various methods in light of the results obtained.^ieng

[361 million problems]. / 361 millones de problemas.

PIP: The discipline of demography has come to focus on questions amenable to specific quantifiable answers to the detriment of larger, more significant questions that were uppermost in the minds of the 1st demographers. The question of what determines total population size at a given moment is 1 such larger question. On a scale of centuries or millenia, a curve representing 3 great phases in populaiton growth, in the upper paleolithic, from the neolithic to the industrial revolution, and from the industrial revolution to the present may appear reasonable. But the appearance of orderly progress disapprears when decades or even single years are substituted for millenia. Population growth can be considered the result of opposing forces of constriction and election. The forces of constriction historically were tied to limitations in the natural environment, hostile climates, food shortages, or infectious diseases. Human beings exercised partial control at best over these forces. The demographically relevant forces of election were those affecting processes of family formation, fertility, and occupation of new territories and empty land. The forces of election allowed populations to adapt and react to the forces of constriction, providing the flexibility needed to ensure survival. Flexibility would also come from processes of biological or sociobiological adaptation to the forces of constriction. Technical advances over the past 2 centuries have deluded many into believing that human beings are overcoming the tyranny of constrictive forces and that human demographic behavior can be guided by election. The 20th century has to some extent witnessed greater flexibility of populations in responding to factors of constriction. The gradual diffusion of modern fertility control is a great advance, but on the other hand the regulator of geographic distribution of population through migration is becoming more and more limited. The constrictive factors limiting population growth are changing from the basic subsistence and energy of Malthus's day, as are the factors of election and adaptation. In an increasingly interdependent world, the link between production and consumption of natural resources has become less obvious, so that signs of dangerous imbalances between population and resources may be overlooked. But the demographic problems of 1 region will increasingly affect all other regions.^ieng

[The census of Floridablanca in the context of European censuses]. / Il censimento di Floridablanca nel contesto dei censimenti europei.

PIP: The 1787 census of Spain, known as the census of Floridablanca, is described and compared with the first censuses of the United States, Great Britain, and France. The focus is on the historical circumstances that initially led these countries to conduct censuses. (SUMMARY IN ENG AND FRE)^ieng

[Season of birth and climate as determinants of infant mortality in the mainland part of the Kingdom of Sardinia]. / Stagione di nascita e clima come determinanti della mortalita' infantile negli Stati Sardi di Terraferma.

The authors extend earlier work on the impact of climate and culture on child survival in nineteenth-century Italy. They find that "new data for the Kingdom of Sardinia during 1828-37 confirm the preeminence of cultural factors related to child care over pure climatic causes. In the French speaking Savoy, with a continental climate, differences between infant mortality of the winter and of the summer cohorts are very small. In Piedmont, with the same climate, infant mortality of the winter cohort was 35% higher than infant mortality of the summer cohort. In Liguria, with a mild climate because of maritime influence, the differences between winter and summer cohorts are reduced but still evident, Nice being closer to Liguria than to the other French speaking areas." (SUMMARY IN ENG AND FRE)

Population policy in Western Europe.

Abstract Policies concerning procreation and fertility are considered first. In Western Europe there are countries which fully recognize and implement the personal rights of the individual to plan and space the number of children, as well as others denying these rights. The nature and implications of laws and policies concerning contraception, abortion and family planning in general are briefly described and their effects discussed. The second topic considered the welfare and the economy of the family. The incidence of family allowance schemes, taxation systems, protection of working mothers, educational facilities (especially for children of pre-school age), and publicly financed housing is reviewed in an effort to understand whether the various social and legislative systems favour procreation and the raising of the children. The situation is contradictory: very mild pro-natalist effects of family allowances are partly offset by a taxation system that im unfavourable to the family, since husbands' and wives' incomes are in many instances assessed jointly. Increasing protection of working women may reconcile economic activity with childbearing, but serious shortage of institutions to care for very young children makes employment of mothers difficult. The third topic is mobility, internal and international. Possibly the most serious demographic problems of Western Europe are the strong internal streams of migrants, congestion of cities and depopulation of rural areas. Measures for coping with these problems are generally in adequate. At the same time, international migration in very strong with many millions of foreign workers in various countries. The countries of immigration, although themselves tending towards almost stationary populations, seem not to accept the implications of this fact - particularly the cessation of growth of the domestic labour force. Temporary import of manpower through temporary immigration is a short-term solution which cannot be sustained indefinitely. The paper concludes with a final consideration. Western European countries could probably lower their levels of fertility rather easily by giving more support to family planning programmes, liberalizing abortion, etc. But should fertility consistently and for a long time fall below replacement, where are the measures for stimulating recovery? Address delivered before the Population Association of America, New Orleans, 26 April 1973.