RESUMEN
Using a recursion model with real parameters of Nabis pseudoferus, we show that its filial cannibalism is an optimal foraging strategy for life reproductive success, but it is not an evolutionarily optimal foraging strategy, since it cannot maximize the descendant's number at the end of the reproductive season. Cannibalism is evolutionarily rational, when the number of newborn offspring produced from the cannibalized offspring can compensate the following two effects: (a) The cannibalistic lineage wastes time, since the individuals hatched from eggs produced by cannibalism start to reproduce later. (b) Cannibalism eliminates not only one offspring, but also all potential descendants from the cannibalized offspring during the rest of reproductive season. In our laboratory trials, from conspecific prey Nabis pseudoferus did not produce newborn nymphs enough to compensate the above two effects.
Asunto(s)
Canibalismo , Reproducción , Humanos , Recién NacidoRESUMEN
The symbiogenetic origin of eukaryotes with mitochondria is considered a major evolutionary transition. The initial interactions and conditions of symbiosis, along with the phylogenetic affinity of the host, are widely debated. Here, we focus on a possible evolutionary path toward an association of individuals of two species based on unidirectional syntrophy. With the backing of a theoretical model, we hypothesize that the first step in the evolution of such symbiosis could be the appearance of a linking structure on the symbiont's membrane, using which it forms an ectocommensalism with its host. We consider a commensalistic model based on the syntrophy hypothesis in the framework of coevolutionary dynamics and mutant invasion into a monomorphic resident system (evolutionary substitution). We investigate the ecological and evolutionary stability of the consortium (or symbiotic merger), with vertical transmissions playing a crucial role. The impact of the 'effectiveness of vertical transmission' on the dynamics is also analyzed. We find that the transmission of symbionts and the additional costs incurred by the mutant determine the conditions of fixation of the consortia. Additionally, we observe that small and highly metabolically active symbionts are likely to form the consortia.
Asunto(s)
Eucariontes , Simbiosis , Humanos , Filogenia , Mitocondrias , Evolución BiológicaRESUMEN
The moral rule "Risk your life to save your family members" is, at the same time, a biological phenomenon. The prominent population geneticist, J.B.S. Haldane told his friends that he would risk his life to save two drowning brothers, but not one - so the story goes. In biological terms, Haldane's arithmetic claims that sib altruism is evolutionarily rational, whenever by "self-sacrifice" an altruistic gene "rescues", on average, more than one copy of itself in its lineage. Here, we derive conditions for evolutionary stability of sib altruism, using population genetic models for three mating systems (monogamy, promiscuity and polygyny) with linear and non-linear group effect on the siblings' survival rate. We show that for all considered selection situations, the condition of evolutionary stability is equivalent to Haldane's arithmetic. The condition for evolutionary stability is formulated in terms of genetic relatedness and the group effect on the survival probability, similarly to the classical Hamilton's rule. We can set up a "scale of mating systems", since in pairwise interactions the chance of evolutionary stability of sib altruism decreases in this order: monogamy, polygyny and promiscuity. Practice of marrying and siblings' solidarity are moral rules in a secular world and in various religious traditions. These moral rules are not evolutionarily independent, in the sense that the subsistence of sib altruism is more likely in a monogamous population.
Asunto(s)
Altruismo , Selección Genética , Humanos , Masculino , Evolución Biológica , Reproducción , Modelos GenéticosRESUMEN
The pandemic reminded us that the pathogen evolution still has a serious effect on human societies. States, however, can prepare themselves for the emergence of a novel pathogen with unknown characteristics by analysing potential scenarios. Game theory offers such an appropriate tool. In our game-theoretical framework, the state is playing against a pathogen by introducing non-pharmaceutical interventions to fulfil its socio-political goals, such as guaranteeing hospital care to all needed patients, keeping the country functioning, while the applied social restrictions should be as soft as possible. With the inclusion of activity and economic sector dependent transmission rate, optimal control of lockdowns and health care capacity management is calculated. We identify the presence and length of a pre-symptomatic infectious stage of the disease to have the greatest effect on the probability to cause a pandemic. Here we show that contrary to intuition, the state should not strive for the great expansion of its health care capacities even if its goal is to provide care for all requiring it and minimize the cost of lockdowns.
Asunto(s)
Enfermedades Transmisibles , Teoría del Juego , Humanos , Pandemias/prevención & controlRESUMEN
We consider matrix games with two phenotypes (players): one following a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy and another one that always plays a best reply against the action played by its opponent in the previous round (best reply player, BR). We focus on iterated games and well-mixed games with repetition (that is, the mean number of repetitions is positive, but not infinite). In both interaction schemes, there are conditions on the payoff matrix guaranteeing that the best reply player can replace the mixed ESS player. This is possible because best reply players in pairs, individually following their own selfish strategies, develop cycles where the bigger payoff can compensate their disadvantage compared with the ESS players. Well-mixed interaction is one of the basic assumptions of classical evolutionary matrix game theory. However, if the players repeat the game with certain probability, then they can react to their opponents' behavior. Our main result is that the classical mixed ESS loses its general stability in the well-mixed population games with repetition in the sense that it can happen to be overrun by the BR player.
Asunto(s)
Conceptos Matemáticos , Modelos Biológicos , Evolución Biológica , Teoría del Juego , ProbabilidadRESUMEN
Kleptoparasitism can be considered as a game theoretical problem and a foraging tactic at the same time, so the aim of this paper is to combine the basic ideas of two research lines: evolutionary game theory and optimal foraging theory. To unify these theories, firstly, we take into account the fact that kleptoparasitism between foragers has two consequences: the interaction takes time and affects the net energy intake of both contestants. This phenomenon is modeled by a matrix game under time constraints. Secondly, we also give freedom to each forager to avoid interactions, since in optimal foraging theory foragers can ignore each food type (we have two prey types: either a prey item in possession of another predator or a free prey individual is discovered). The main question of the present paper is whether the zero-one rule of optimal foraging theory (always or never select a prey type) is valid or not, in the case where foragers interact with each other? In our foraging game we consider predators who engage in contests (contestants) and those who never do (avoiders), and in general those who play a mixture of the two strategies. Here the classical zero-one rule does not hold. Firstly, the pure avoider phenotype is never an ESS. Secondly, the pure contestant can be a strict ESS, but we show this is not necessarily so. Thirdly, we give an example when there is mixed ESS.
Asunto(s)
Teoría del Juego , Conducta Predatoria , Animales , Evolución Biológica , Ingestión de EnergíaRESUMEN
Recently we interpreted the notion of ESS for matrix games under time constraints and investigated the corresponding state in the polymorphic situation. Now we give two further static (monomorphic) characterizations which are the appropriate analogues of those known for classical evolutionary matrix games. Namely, it is verified that an ESS can be described as a neighbourhood invader strategy independently of the dimension of the strategy space in our non-linear situation too, that is, a strategy is an ESS if and only if it is able to invade and completely replace any monomorphic population which totally consists of individuals following a strategy close to the ESS. With the neighbourhood invader property at hand, we establish a dynamic characterization under the replicator dynamics in two dimensions which corresponds to the strong stability concept for classical evolutionary matrix games. Besides, in some special cases, we also prove the stability of the corresponding rest point in higher dimensions.
Asunto(s)
Evolución Biológica , Teoría del Juego , Dinámica Poblacional , Fenotipo , Factores de TiempoRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: For the understanding of human nature, the evolutionary roots of human moral behaviour are a key precondition. Our question is as follows: Can the altruistic moral rule "Risk your life to save your family members, if you want them to save your life" be evolutionary stable? There are three research approaches to investigate this problem: kin selection, group selection and population genetics modelling. The present study is strictly based on the last approach. RESULTS: We consider monogamous and exogamous families, where at an autosomal locus, dominant-recessive alleles determine the phenotypes in a sexual population. Since all individuals' survival rate is determined by their altruistic family members, we introduce a new population genetics model based on the mating table approach and adapt the verbal definition of evolutionary stability to genotypes. In general, when the resident is recessive, a homozygote is an evolutionarily stable genotype (ESG), if the number of survivors of the resident genotype of the resident homozygote family is greater than that of non-resident heterozygote survivors of the family of the resident homozygote and mutant heterozygote genotypes. Using the introduced genotype dynamics we proved that in the recessive case ESG implies local stability of the altruistic genotype. We apply our general ESG conditions for self-sacrificing life history strategy when the number of new-born offspring does not depend on interactions within the family and the interactions are additive. We find that in this case our ESG conditions give back Hamilton's rule for evolutionary stability of the self-sacrificing life history strategy. CONCLUSIONS: In spite of the fact that the kidney transplantations was not a selection factor during the earlier human evolution, nowadays "self-sacrificing" can be observed in the live donor kidney transplantations, when the donor is one of the family members. It seems that selection for self-sacrificing in family produced an innate moral tendency in modulating social cognition in human brain.
Asunto(s)
Evolución Biológica , Estadios del Ciclo de Vida , Conducta Sexual , Animales , Genética de Población , Genotipo , Humanos , Mutación/genética , FenotipoRESUMEN
Parent-offspring communication remains an unresolved challenge for biologist. The difficulty of the challenge comes from the fact that it is a multifaceted problem with connections to life-history evolution, parent-offspring conflict, kin selection and signalling. Previous efforts mainly focused on modelling resource allocation at the expense of the dynamic interaction during a reproductive season. Here we present a two-stage model of begging where the first stage models the interaction between nestlings and parents within a nest and the second stage models the life-history trade-offs. We show in an asexual population that honest begging results in decreased variance of collected food between siblings, which leads to mean number of surviving offspring. Thus, honest begging can be seen as a special bet-hedging against informational uncertainty, which not just decreases the variance of fitness but also increases the arithmetic mean.
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Rasgos de la Historia de Vida , Modelos Teóricos , Animales , Conducta Alimentaria , Cadenas de Markov , Fenotipo , Estaciones del AñoRESUMEN
We consider two types of optimal foragers: a random searcher and a search image user. A search image user can find its desired prey with higher and undesired prey with lower probability than a random searcher. Our model considers the density-dependent travelling time and the time duration of reproduction (oviposition). In the framework of optimal foraging theory for one predator-two prey systems, we find that there are ranges of prey densities in which the search image user has a higher net energy intake, and there are other ranges of prey densities in which the random searcher has higher net energy intake. The damsel bug Nabis pseudoferus Remane (Hemiptera: Nabidae) is a generalist predator rather than an omnivore. This species has a wide range of arthropod prey (predominantly insects and mites). Several aspects of the biology of this species have been studied, especially its cannibalistic behaviour, which is a quite important feature because N. pseudoferus is often used as a biological control agent against lepidopteran pests in greenhouse crops. Experimentally, we found that Nabis is a search image user in the above sense.
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Heterópteros/fisiología , Ácaros/parasitología , Modelos Teóricos , Conducta Predatoria , Animales , Conducta AnimalRESUMEN
Recently, we introduced the class of matrix games under time constraints and characterized the concept of (monomorphic) evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in them. We are now interested in how the ESS is related to the existence and stability of equilibria for polymorphic populations. We point out that, although the ESS may no longer be a polymorphic equilibrium, there is a connection between them. Specifically, the polymorphic state at which the average strategy of the active individuals in the population is equal to the ESS is an equilibrium of the polymorphic model. Moreover, in the case when there are only two pure strategies, a polymorphic equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable under the replicator equation for the pure-strategy polymorphic model if and only if it corresponds to an ESS. Finally, we prove that a strict Nash equilibrium is a pure-strategy ESS that is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of the replicator equation in n-strategy time-constrained matrix games.
Asunto(s)
Evolución Biológica , Teoría del Juego , Modelos Biológicos , Animales , Biología Computacional , Ecosistema , Humanos , Conceptos Matemáticos , Mutación , Fenotipo , Dinámica Poblacional , Factores de TiempoRESUMEN
Consider and infinitely large asexual population without mutations and direct interactions. The activities of an individual determine the fecundity and the survival probability of individuals, moreover each activity takes time. We view this population model as a simple combination of life history and optimal foraging models. The phenotypes are given by probability distributions on these activities. We concentrate on the following phenotypes defined by optimization of different objective functions: selfish individual (maximizes the average offspring number during life span), survival phenotype (maximizes the probability of non-extinction of descendants) and Darwinian phenotype (maximizes the phenotypic growth rate). We find that the objective functions above can achieve their maximum at different activity distributions, in general. We find that the objective functions above can achieve their maximum at different activity distributions, in general. The novelty of our work is that we let natural selection act on the different objective functions. Using the classical Darwinian reasoning, we show that in our selection model the Darwinian phenotype outperforms all other phenotypes.
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Evolución Biológica , Aptitud Genética , Fenotipo , Sobrevida/psicología , Animales , Conducta Competitiva , Humanos , Selección GenéticaRESUMEN
Game theory focuses on payoffs and typically ignores time constraints that play an important role in evolutionary processes where the repetition of games can depend on the strategies, too. We introduce a matrix game under time constraints, where each pairwise interaction has two consequences: both players receive a payoff and they cannot play the next game for a specified time duration. Thus our model is defined by two matrices: a payoff matrix and an average time duration matrix. Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionary stability is extended to this class of games. We illustrate the effect of time constraints by the well-known prisoner's dilemma game, where additional time constraints can ensure the existence of unique evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), both pure and mixed, or the coexistence of two pure ESS. Our general results may be useful in several fields of biology where evolutionary game theory is applied, principally in ecological games, where time constraints play an inevitable role.
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Evolución Biológica , Teoría del Juego , Humanos , Modelos Biológicos , Modelos Teóricos , Factores de TiempoRESUMEN
In this paper, we study the egalitarianism-game in multilevel selection situation. The individuals form reproductive groups. In each group, an egalitarianism-game determines the number of juveniles of different phenotypes (spiteful, envious, neutral and donator). Before the juveniles form the next reproductive group, they have to survive either predators' attacks or a fight between two groups. We adopt the ESS definition of Maynard Smith to multilevel selection. Based on the "group size advantage" assumption (which claims that each juvenile's survival rate depends on the size of his own group, supposing that either the survival rate under predators' attacks is higher in larger groups, or in inter-group aggression usually the larger group wins) we found that when the survival probability has a massive effect on the average fitness, then "group fitness maximizing behavior" (in our case, either neutral or donator) has evolutionary advantage over "competitive behavior" (in our case, either spiteful or envious).
Asunto(s)
Evolución Biológica , Teoría del Juego , Selección Genética , Agresión , Algoritmos , Animales , Conducta Competitiva , Emociones , Aptitud Genética , Humanos , Modelos Teóricos , Mutación , Fenotipo , Conducta Predatoria , Probabilidad , Conducta SocialRESUMEN
We consider an ideal promiscuity group of females, which implies that all males have the same average mating success. If females have concealed ovulation, then the males' paternity chances are equal. We find that male-based monogamy will be fixed in females' promiscuity group when the stochastic Darwinian selection is described by a Markov chain.We point out that in huge populations the relative advantage (difference between average fitness of different strategies) determines primarily the end of evolution; in the case of neutrality (means are equal) the smallest variance guarantees fixation (absorption) advantage; when the means and variances are the same, then the higher third moment determines which types will be fixed in the Markov chains.
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Modelos Biológicos , Conducta Sexual Animal , Animales , Femenino , Masculino , Cadenas de Markov , Selección GenéticaRESUMEN
We introduce an evolutionary game in which envy and charity can be considered as a consequence of Darwinian competition, i.e. individuals aim at increasing their own proportion rather than their absolute contribution to the next generation, and other-regarding-preference is a "method" for that. If the damage is additive and its cost is low, an envious strategy defeats a neutral strategy (rational strategy maximizing its own income). If damage is multiplicative, then coexistence of neutral and envious strategists is possible. Envy is a conditional spiteful strategy, thus in envious groups there is less damage than in spiteful groups, so envy decreases the total cost of spiteful competition. Although envy can be selected out in a mixed population of envious, neutral and spiteful individuals when damage is additive, the envious-spiteful strategists (envious within its kin and spiteful outside its kin) outperform neutral and spiteful ones in a simple kin-selection scenario. Furthermore, Clytemnestra's strategy, namely donating to richer people to evokes envious attacks on them, can spread through an envious group. Moreover, the envious-donator strategy (giving to the poorest and damaging the richer individuals) can spread in the envious group. Charity is a "buy-off" behaviour, since the donator can decrease its own damage from envy, thus charity further decreases the total cost of spiteful competition.