How people decide who is correct when groups of scientists disagree.

Uncertainty that arises from disputes among scientists seems to foster public skepticism or noncompliance. Communication of potential cues to the relative performance of contending scientists might affect judgments of which position is likely more valid. We used actual scientific disputes-the nature of dark matter, sea level rise under climate change, and benefits and risks of marijuana-to assess Americans' responses (n = 3150). Seven cues-replication, information quality, the majority position, degree source, experience, reference group support, and employer-were presented three cues at a time in a planned-missingness design. The most influential cues were majority vote, replication, information quality, and experience. Several potential moderators-topical engagement, prior attitudes, knowledge of science, and attitudes toward science-lacked even small effects on choice, but cues had the strongest effects for dark matter and weakest effects for marijuana, and general mistrust of scientists moderately attenuated top cues' effects. Risk communicators can take these influential cues into account in understanding how laypeople respond to scientific disputes, and improving communication about such disputes.

Politicians polarize and experts depolarize public support for COVID-19 management policies across countries.

Political polarization impeded public support for policies to reduce the spread of COVID-19, much as polarization hinders responses to other contemporary challenges. Unlike previous theory and research that focused on the United States, the present research examined the effects of political elite cues and affective polarization on support for policies to manage the COVID-19 pandemic in seven countries (n = 12,955): Brazil, Israel, Italy, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Across countries, cues from political elites polarized public attitudes toward COVID-19 policies. Liberal and conservative respondents supported policies proposed by ingroup politicians and parties more than the same policies from outgroup politicians and parties. Respondents disliked, distrusted, and felt cold toward outgroup political elites, whereas they liked, trusted, and felt warm toward both ingroup political elites and nonpartisan experts. This affective polarization was correlated with policy support. These findings imply that policies from bipartisan coalitions and nonpartisan experts would be less polarizing, enjoying broader public support. Indeed, across countries, policies from bipartisan coalitions and experts were more widely supported. A follow-up experiment replicated these findings among US respondents considering international vaccine distribution policies. The polarizing effects of partisan elites and affective polarization emerged across nations that vary in cultures, ideologies, and political systems. Contrary to some propositions, the United States was not exceptionally polarized. Rather, these results suggest that polarizing processes emerged simply from categorizing people into political ingroups and outgroups. Political elites drive polarization globally, but nonpartisan experts can help resolve the conflicts that arise from it.

Structured reflection increases intentions to reduce other people's health risks during COVID-19.

People believe they should consider how their behavior might negatively impact other people, Yet their behavior often increases others' health risks. This creates challenges for managing public health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic. We examined a procedure wherein people reflect on their personal criteria regarding how their behavior impacts others' health risks. We expected structured reflection to increase people's intentions and decisions to reduce others' health risks. Structured reflection increases attention to others' health risks and the correspondence between people's personal criteria and behavioral intentions. In four experiments during COVID-19, people (N  = 12,995) reported their personal criteria about how much specific attributes, including the impact on others' health risks, should influence their behavior. Compared with control conditions, people who engaged in structured reflection reported greater intentions to reduce business capacity (experiment 1) and avoid large social gatherings (experiments 2 and 3). They also donated more to provide vaccines to refugees (experiment 4). These effects emerged across seven countries that varied in collectivism and COVID-19 case rates (experiments 1 and 2). Structured reflection was distinct from instructions to carefully deliberate (experiment 3). Structured reflection increased the correlation between personal criteria and behavioral intentions (experiments 1 and 3). And structured reflection increased donations more among people who scored lower in cognitive reflection compared with those who scored higher in cognitive reflection (experiment 4). These findings suggest that structured reflection can effectively increase behaviors to reduce public health risks.

Characterizing public perceptions of social and cultural impacts in policy decisions.

Social scientists and community advocates have expressed concerns that many social and cultural impacts important to citizens are given insufficient weight by decision makers in public policy decision-making. In two large cross-sectional surveys, we examined public perceptions of a range of social, cultural, health, economic, and environmental impacts. Findings suggest that valued impacts are perceived through an initial lens that highlights both tangibility (how difficult it is to understand, observe, and make changes to an impact) and scope (how broadly an impact applies). Valued impacts thought to be less tangible and narrower in scope were perceived to have less support by both decision makers and the public. Nearly every valued impact was perceived to have more support from the public than from decision makers, with the exception of three economic considerations (revenues, profits, and costs). The results also demonstrate that many valued impacts do not fit neatly into the single-category distinctions typically used as part of impact assessments and cost-benefit analyses. We provide recommendations for practitioners and suggest ways that these results can foster improvements to the quality and defensibility of risk and impact assessments.

Evaluating the Effects of News-following, Volume and Content of News Coverage on Americans' Risk Perceptions during the 2014-2016 Ebola Outbreak.

We used the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak to examine the relationships between risk perceptions and media coverage (volume and content). We analyzed how public opinion from longitudinal U.S. panel data related to the number of published news articles and the proportion that discussed risks. News following, volume and risk content were positively related to U.S. and global risk perceptions. Perceptions of U.S. risk declined at different rates, depending upon news attention and potential exposure to risk content. Both media volume and content were significant factors, suggesting scholars should focus more on combined effects of news media volume and content.

A Longitudinal Analysis of Americans' Media Sources, Risk Perceptions, and Judged Need for Action during the Zika Outbreak.

The objective of this study is to better understand the effects of media attention on Americans' perceptions of risk by analyzing the different media sources and outlets, or "repertoires," reported as used during the small 2016-2017 Zika outbreak in the U.S. We analyzed survey data from a four-wave longitudinal panel study over nine months - July 19, 2016 through April 24, 2017 (n = 743) - using an online panel of American adults. Media attention related to ratings of personal risk, U.S. risk, and need for action. Personal risk was enhanced more by reported attention to international coverage, reduced by certain reported website attention, but enhanced by reported attention to public health agency websites. U.S. risk was enhanced by reported attention to both domestic and international coverages, reduced by television. Judged need for U.S. action was enhanced more by exposure to domestic coverage, reduced by reported attention to television and local newspapers, but enhanced by reported exposure to BBC and CNN. Our results demonstrate how the use of different media outlets and sources are related to different perceptions of risk and need for action during 2016-2017 Zika outbreak.

Public perceptions of expert disagreement: Bias and incompetence or a complex and random world?

Expert disputes can present laypeople with several challenges including trying to understand why such disputes occur. In an online survey of the US public, we used a psychometric approach to elicit perceptions of expert disputes for 56 forecasts sampled from seven domains. People with low education, or with low self-reported topic knowledge, were most likely to attribute disputes to expert incompetence. People with higher self-reported knowledge tended to attribute disputes to expert bias due to financial or ideological reasons. The more highly educated and cognitively able were most likely to attribute disputes to natural factors, such as the irreducible complexity and randomness of the phenomenon. Our results show that laypeople tend to use coherent-albeit potentially overly narrow-attributions to make sense of expert disputes and that these explanations vary across different segments of the population. We highlight several important implications for scientists, risk managers, and decision makers.

Pseudoinefficacy: negative feelings from children who cannot be helped reduce warm glow for children who can be helped.

In a great many situations where we are asked to aid persons whose lives are endangered, we are not able to help everyone. What are the emotional and motivational consequences of "not helping all"? In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that negative affect arising from children that could not be helped decreases the warm glow of positive feeling associated with aiding the children who can be helped. This demotivation from the children outside of our reach may be a form of "pseudoinefficacy" that is non-rational. We should not be deterred from helping whomever we can because there are others we are not able to help.

Compassion fade: affect and charity are greatest for a single child in need.

Charitable giving in 2013 exceeded $300 billion, but why do we respond to some life-saving causes while ignoring others? In our first two studies, we demonstrated that valuation of lives is associated with affective feelings (self-reported and psychophysiological) and that a decline in compassion may begin with the second endangered life. In Study 3, this fading of compassion was reversed by describing multiple lives in a more unitary fashion. Study 4 extended our findings to loss-frame scenarios. Our capacity to feel sympathy for people in need appears limited, and this form of compassion fatigue can lead to apathy and inaction, consistent with what is seen repeatedly in response to many large-scale human and environmental catastrophes.