Overprecision is a property of thinking systems.

Overprecision is the excessive certainty in the accuracy of one's judgment. This article proposes a new theory to explain it. The theory holds that overprecision in judgment results from neglect of all the ways in which one could be wrong. When there are many ways to be wrong, it can be difficult to consider them all. Overprecision is the result of being wrong and not knowing it. This explanation can account for why question formats have such a dramatic influence on the degree of overprecision people report. It also explains the ubiquity of overprecision not only among people but also among artificially intelligent agents. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Reporting all results efficiently: A RARE proposal to open up the file drawer.

While the social sciences have made impressive progress in adopting transparent research practices that facilitate verification, replication, and reuse of materials, the problem of publication bias persists. Bias on the part of peer reviewers and journal editors, as well as the use of outdated research practices by authors, continues to skew literature toward statistically significant effects, many of which may be false positives. To mitigate this bias, we propose a framework to enable authors to report all results efficiently (RARE), with an initial focus on experimental and other prospective empirical social science research that utilizes public study registries. This framework depicts an integrated system that leverages the capacities of existing infrastructure in the form of public registries, institutional review boards, journals, and granting agencies, as well as investigators themselves, to efficiently incentivize full reporting and thereby, improve confidence in social science findings. In addition to increasing access to the results of scientific endeavors, a well-coordinated research ecosystem can prevent scholars from wasting time investigating the same questions in ways that have not worked in the past and reduce wasted funds on the part of granting agencies.

Empirical audit and review and an assessment of evidentiary value in research on the psychological consequences of scarcity.

Empirical audit and review is an approach to assessing the evidentiary value of a research area. It involves identifying a topic and selecting a cross-section of studies for replication. We apply the method to research on the psychological consequences of scarcity. Starting with the papers citing a seminal publication in the field, we conducted replications of 20 studies that evaluate the role of scarcity priming in pain sensitivity, resource allocation, materialism, and many other domains. There was considerable variability in the replicability, with some strong successes and other undeniable failures. Empirical audit and review does not attempt to assign an overall replication rate for a heterogeneous field, but rather facilitates researchers seeking to incorporate strength of evidence as they refine theories and plan new investigations in the research area. This method allows for an integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches to review and enables the growth of a cumulative science.

The social transmission of overconfidence.

We propose and test the overconfidence transmission hypothesis, which predicts that individuals calibrate their self-assessments in response to the confidence others display in their social group. Six studies that deploy a mix of correlational and experimental methods support this hypothesis. Evidence indicates that individuals randomly assigned to collaborate in laboratory dyads converged on levels of overconfidence about their own performance rankings. In a controlled experimental context, observing overconfident peers causally increased an individual's degree of bias. The transmission effect persisted over time and across task domains, elevating overconfidence even days after initial exposure. In addition, overconfidence spread across indirect social ties (person to person to person), and transmission operated outside of reported awareness. However, individuals showed a selective in-group bias; overconfidence was acquired only when displayed by a member of one's in-group (and not out-group), consistent with theoretical notions of selective learning bias. Combined, these results advance understanding of the social factors that underlie interindividual differences in overconfidence and suggest that social transmission processes may be in part responsible for why local confidence norms emerge in groups, teams, and organizations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Overprecision increases subsequent surprise.

Overconfident people should be surprised that they are so often wrong. Are they? Three studies examined the relationship between confidence and surprise in order to shed light on the psychology of overprecision in judgment. Participants reported ex-ante confidence in their beliefs, and after receiving accuracy feedback, they then reported ex-post surprise. Results show that more ex-ante confidence produces less ex-post surprise for correct answers; this relationship reverses for incorrect answers. However, this sensible pattern only holds for some measures of confidence; it fails for confidence-interval measures. The results can help explain the robust durability of overprecision in judgment.

A study of the impact of data sharing on article citations using journal policies as a natural experiment.

This study estimates the effect of data sharing on the citations of academic articles, using journal policies as a natural experiment. We begin by examining 17 high-impact journals that have adopted the requirement that data from published articles be publicly posted. We match these 17 journals to 13 journals without policy changes and find that empirical articles published just before their change in editorial policy have citation rates with no statistically significant difference from those published shortly after the shift. We then ask whether this null result stems from poor compliance with data sharing policies, and use the data sharing policy changes as instrumental variables to examine more closely two leading journals in economics and political science with relatively strong enforcement of new data policies. We find that articles that make their data available receive 97 additional citations (estimate standard error of 34). We conclude that: a) authors who share data may be rewarded eventually with additional scholarly citations, and b) data-posting policies alone do not increase the impact of articles published in a journal unless those policies are enforced.

Is overconfidence a social liability? The effect of verbal versus nonverbal expressions of confidence.

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 116(3) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2019-08943-002). In the article "Is Overconfidence a Social Liability? The Effect of Verbal Versus Nonverbal Expressions of Confidence" by Elizabeth R. Tenney, Nathan L. Meikle, David Hunsaker, Don A. Moore, and Cameron Anderson (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Advance online publication. October 11, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000150), the Editor' Note acknowledging David Dunning as the action editor for this article was omitted. All versions of this article have been corrected.] What are the reputational consequences of being overconfident? We propose that the channel of confidence expression is one key moderator-that is, whether confidence is expressed verbally or nonverbally. In a series of experiments, participants assessed target individuals (potential collaborators or advisors) who were either overconfident or cautious. Targets expressed confidence, or a lack thereof, verbally or nonverbally. Participants then learned targets' actual performance. Across studies, overconfidence was advantageous initially-regardless of whether targets expressed confidence verbally or nonverbally. After performance was revealed, overconfident targets who had expressed confidence verbally were viewed more negatively than cautious targets; however, overconfident targets who had expressed confidence nonverbally were still viewed more positively than cautious ones. The one condition wherein nonverbal overconfidence was detrimental was when confidence was clearly tied to a falsifiable claim. Results suggest that, compared with verbal statements, nonverbal overconfidence reaps reputational benefits because of its plausible deniability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Is overconfidence a motivated bias? Experimental evidence.

Are overconfident beliefs driven by the motivation to view oneself positively? We test the relationship between motivation and overconfidence using two distinct, but often conflated measures: better-than-average (BTA) beliefs and overplacement. Our results suggest that motivation can indeed affect these faces of overconfidence, but only under limited conditions. Whereas BTA beliefs are inflated by motivation, introducing some specificity and clarity to the standards of assessment (Experiment 1) or to the trait's definition (Experiments 2 and 3) reduces or eliminates this bias in judgment overall. We find stronger support for a cognitive explanation for overconfidence, which emphasizes the effect of task difficulty. The difficulty of possessing a desirable trait (Experiment 4) or succeeding on math and logic problems (Experiment 5) affects self-assessment more consistently than does motivation. Finally, we find the lack of an objective standard for vague traits allows people to create idiosyncratic definitions and view themselves as better than others in their own unique ways (Experiment 6). Overall, the results suggest motivation's effect on BTA beliefs is driven more by idiosyncratic construals of assessment than by self-enhancing delusion. They also suggest that by focusing on vague measures (BTA rather than overplacement) and vague traits, prior research may have exaggerated the role of motivation in overconfidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

The Belief in a Favorable Future.

People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own. People holding a particular view (e.g., support of President Trump) are more likely to believe that future others will share their view than to believe that future others will have an opposing view (e.g., opposition to President Trump). Six studies demonstrated this belief in a favorable future (BFF) for political views, scientific beliefs, and entertainment and product preferences. BFF is greater in magnitude than the tendency to believe that current others share one's views (false-consensus effect), arises across cultures, is distinct from general optimism, is strongest when people perceive their views as being objective rather than subjective, and can affect (but is distinct from) beliefs about favorable future policy changes. A lab experiment involving monetary bets on the future popularity of politicians and a field experiment involving political donations ( N = 660,542) demonstrated that BFF can influence people's behavior today.

Overconfidence over the lifespan.

This research investigated how different forms of overconfidence correlate with age. Contrary to stereotypes that young people are more overconfident, the results provide little evidence that overestimation of one's performance or overplacement of one's performance relative to that of others is correlated with age. Instead, the results suggest that precision in judgment (confidence that one knows the truth) increases with age. This result is strongest for probabilistic elicitations, and not present in quantile elicitations or reported confidence intervals. The results suggest that a lifetime of experience, rather than leading to better calibration, instead may increase our confidence that we know what we're talking about.

Preregister if you want to.

Prespecification of confirmatory hypothesis tests is a useful tool that makes our statistical tests informative. On the other hand, selectively reporting studies, measures, or statistical tests renders the probability of false positives higher than the p values would imply. The bad news is that it is usually difficult to tell how much higher the probability is. Fortunately, there are enormous opportunities to improve the quality of our science by preregistering our research plans. Preregistration is a highly distinctive strength that should increase our faith in the veracity and replicability of a research result.

Leaders' use of moral justifications increases policy support.

Leaders must choose how to justify their organization's actions to stakeholders. We differentiate moral frames, or justifications based on moral values, from pragmatic frames, or justifications based on practical costs and benefits. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we found that moral policy frames elicited more support than pragmatic frames across a variety of scenarios. This effect was mediated by the perception that leaders who offer moral justifications possess relatively greater moral character. In Experiment 2, we found that perceptions of a leader's private motives had a stronger influence on policy support than did the leader's public stance. Experiment 3 demonstrated that, irrespective of how a policy was framed, people were most supportive of a policy championed by a leader high in moral character. In Experiment 4, we documented an additional benefit of moral policy frames: They allow leaders to mitigate the moral outrage generated by reneging on a policy.

(Too) optimistic about optimism: the belief that optimism improves performance.

A series of experiments investigated why people value optimism and whether they are right to do so. In Experiments 1A and 1B, participants prescribed more optimism for someone implementing decisions than for someone deliberating, indicating that people prescribe optimism selectively, when it can affect performance. Furthermore, participants believed optimism improved outcomes when a person's actions had considerable, rather than little, influence over the outcome (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 4 tested the accuracy of this belief; optimism improved persistence, but it did not improve performance as much as participants expected. Experiments 5A and 5B found that participants overestimated the relationship between optimism and performance even when their focus was not on optimism exclusively. In summary, people prescribe optimism when they believe it has the opportunity to improve the chance of success-unfortunately, people may be overly optimistic about just how much optimism can do.

Inflated applicants: attribution errors in performance evaluation by professionals.

When explaining others' behaviors, achievements, and failures, it is common for people to attribute too much influence to disposition and too little influence to structural and situational factors. We examine whether this tendency leads even experienced professionals to make systematic mistakes in their selection decisions, favoring alumni from academic institutions with high grade distributions and employees from forgiving business environments. We find that candidates benefiting from favorable situations are more likely to be admitted and promoted than their equivalently skilled peers. The results suggest that decision-makers take high nominal performance as evidence of high ability and do not discount it by the ease with which it was achieved. These results clarify our understanding of the correspondence bias using evidence from both archival studies and experiments with experienced professionals. We discuss implications for both admissions and personnel selection practices.

A behavioral demonstration of overconfidence in judgment.

Overprecision-an excessive confidence that one knows the truth-is both the most durable and the least understood form of overconfidence. This article outlines an approach to the study of overprecision that avoids some of the methodological problems of other approaches and better reflects the way uncertainty affects choices in everyday life. We measured the precision in judgment implied by people's tendency to adjust their point estimates of an uncertain quantity in response to the costs of overestimating or underestimating the correct answer. The results revealed robust overprecision. People adjusted their estimates less than they should have given their actual knowledge, and this effect was driven by their subjective confidence.

A status-enhancement account of overconfidence.

In explaining the prevalence of the overconfident belief that one is better than others, prior work has focused on the motive to maintain high self-esteem, abetted by biases in attention, memory, and cognition. An additional possibility is that overconfidence enhances the person's social status. We tested this status-enhancing account of overconfidence in 6 studies. Studies 1-3 found that overconfidence leads to higher social status in both short- and longer-term groups, using naturalistic and experimental designs. Study 4 applied a Brunswikian lens analysis (Brunswik, 1956) and found that overconfidence leads to a behavioral signature that makes the individual appear competent to others. Studies 5 and 6 measured and experimentally manipulated the desire for status and found that the status motive promotes overconfidence. Together, these studies suggest that people might so often believe they are better than others because it helps them achieve higher social status.

Correspondence bias in performance evaluation: why grade inflation works.

Performance (such as a course grade) is a joint function of an individual's ability (such as intelligence) and the situation (such as the instructor's grading leniency). Prior research has documented a human bias toward dispositional inference, which ascribes performance to individual ability, even when it is better explained through situational influences on performance. It is hypothesized here that this tendency leads admissions decisions to favor students coming from institutions with lenient grading because those students have their high grades mistaken for evidence of high ability. Three experiments show that those who obtain high scores simply because of lenient grading are favored in selection. These results have implications for research on attribution because they provide a more stringent test of the correspondence bias and allow for a more precise measure of its size. Implications for university admissions and personnel selection decisions are also discussed.