Ultra-low level plutonium isotopes in the NIST SRM 4355A (Peruvian Soil-1).

For more than 20 years, countries and their agencies which monitor radionuclide discharge sites and storage facilities have relied on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Standard Reference Material (SRM) 4355 Peruvian Soil. Its low fallout contamination makes it an ideal soil blank for measurements associated with terrestrial-pathway-to-man studies. Presently, SRM 4355 is out of stock, and a new batch of the Peruvian soil is currently under development as future NIST SRM 4355A. Both environmental radioanalytical laboratories and mass spectrometry communities will benefit from the use of this SRM. The former must assess their laboratory procedural contamination and measurement detection limits by measurement of blank sample material. The Peruvian Soil is so low in anthropogenic radionuclide content that it is a suitable virtual blank. On the other hand, mass spectrometric laboratories have high sensitivity instruments that are capable of quantitative isotopic measurements at low plutonium levels in the SRM 4355 (first Peruvian Soil SRM) that provided the mass spectrometric community with the calibration, quality control, and testing material needed for methods development and legal defensibility. The quantification of the ultra-low plutonium content in the SRM 4355A was a considerable challenge for the mass spectrometric laboratories. Careful blank control and correction, isobaric interferences, instrument stability, peak assessment, and detection assessment were necessary. Furthermore, a systematic statistical evaluation of the measurement results and considerable discussions with the mass spectroscopy metrologists were needed to derive the certified values and uncertainties. The one sided upper limit of the 95% tolerance with 95% confidence for the massic (239)Pu content in SRM 4355A is estimated to be 54,000 atoms/g.

The US national isotope program: current status and strategy for future success.

Since their introduction in the 1940s, peaceful use of stable isotopes and radioisotopes in the United States has expanded continuously. Today, new isotopes for diagnostic and therapeutic uses are not being developed, critical isotopes for national security are in short supply, and demand for isotopes critical to homeland security exceeds supply. While commercial suppliers, both domestic and foreign, can only meet specific needs, the nation needs a consistent, reliable supply of radioactive and stable isotopes for research, medical, security, and space power applications. The national isotope infrastructure, defined as both facilities and trained staff at national laboratories and universities, is in danger of being lost due to chronic underfunding. With the specific recommendations given herein, the US Department of Energy may realign and refocus its Isotope Program to provide a framework for a successful National Isotope Program.