Brazilian women in politics.

PIP: Women are gradually gaining influence in Brazilian politics, especially since recent advances in the women's movement, but they still play a limited role. There have been journals devoted to feminism and some notable feminists since 1850. In 1932 suffragettes in Brazil gained women the right to vote. Women's associations burgeoned in the 1940s and 1950s, culminating in a peak in number of women in national elected positions in 1965. A repressive military regime reversed the process, which resumed in 1975. 1975 was also significant for the Brazilian women's movement because of the U.N. Women's Year. Several large, influential feminist political action groups were formed, typically by upper class women with leftist views, although some church and union groups from lower classes also appeared. In 1979-1981, the coherence of these groups fell into schism and fragmentation, because of disagreements over the feminist political doctrines and roles, views on legality of abortion, and special interest groups such as lesbians. Another bitter dispute is opposition by leftist women to BEMFAM, the Brazilian Society of Family Welfare, which provides family planning for the poor: leftists oppose BEMFAM because it is supported by funds from "imperialist" countries such as the U.S. There are several types of feminists groups: those that emphasize health, sexuality and violence; those composed of lesbians; those originating from lower classes and unions; publicly instituted organizations. Brazilian law forbids discrimination against women holding public office, but in reality very few women actually do hold office, except for mayors of small towns and a few administrators of the Education and Social Security ministries. Political office in Brazil is gained by clientism, and since women rarely hold powerful positions in business, they are outsiders of the system. Brazilian women have achieved much, considering the low female literacy rate and traditional power system, but their equality continues to be a major challenge.^ieng

Paraguay: population and the economy.

PIP: Paraguay's political conflicts and development experiences have been accompanied by compensatory population movements; however, economic and population policies of the past are not adequate to address the current economic challenges. The principal structural problem is dependence on international commodity prices. Since late 1984, the international prices for soya and cotton have declined more than 50%; these 2 products account for 83% of official exports. The external debt has grown significantly in the past 5 years and is increasingly difficult to service. A major problem the government faces in servicing the debt and maintaining economic growth is its inability to get control of foreign exchange. Much of Paraguay's external trade is contraband, with the dollars passing into the black market. As a result of the illegal economy, government earnings have been insufficient to cover expenses. Unemployment stands at 12% because of general economic decline, cuts in government expenditure, and the reduction of investment in hydroelectricity. Occupation of new land, the classic solution by the Paraguayan peasantry, is no longer a viable option since all land is now utilized. About 20-25% of Paraguayans live outside the country, expecially in Argentina. In 1986, a commission drafted an Adjustment Plan that recommended a devaluation of the official gurani rate, tax increases, higher tariffs for public services, and incentives to invest in priority areas; however, this plan has not been implemented to date.^ieng

Peru's population in the 1980s.

PIP: In this discussion of Peru's population in the 1980s, attention focuses on the following; population growth; population policy and family planning; internal migration; and economic and social characteristics. Peru's rate of population growth was 1.8% annually between the censuses of 1940-61, a little less than 2.9% between 1961-71, and 2.7% in the decade preceding the 1981 census. These figures demonstrate that the national population is now growing at a less rapid rate than 1 or 2 decades ago but that Peru did not experience a marked drop like that in several other countries. As with overall population growth, the decline of fertility in Peru has been slow and gradual. During the past 20 years the crude birthrate dropped from 46.27 to 36.71/1000 and the total fertility rate from 6.85 to 5.00. The reason why Peru's population growth rate never exceeded 3% is a direct result of its exceptionally high mortality and infant mortality levels. Peru has a crude mortality rate of 10.74/1000 and an infant mortality rate of 98.63/1000. These are extremely high compared with other Latin American countries. Theoretically, the momentum of progress should be carrying Peru rapidly into the demographic transition. Some modernizing factors, i.e., improved health care, urbanization, communications, and education, are slowly reducing fertility and mortality, but progress on other factors such as per capita income and social mobility is not occurring. A table projects Per's population at various projected growth rates until 2025. Differences in fertility among Peruvian women indicate that family planning and contraception are relatively common in urban areas. The adoption of contraception occurred totally without government assistance before 1980, when policy changed. Until then, Peru was the only major Latin American country with population growing at over 2.5% annually that did not have some kind of public family planning program. In 1981 a survey on contraceptive use was conducted. Study results include: only 25% of women were currently using a contraceptive method, whether traditional or modern, though an additional 15% had used a method previously; and the methods used were largely traditional (rhythm or withdrawal), rather than modern. The 1981 census data reflect a change in migratory patterns during the previous decade. Lima, which grew precipitously after 1940, has slowed the pace of its growth. The flow to the coastal cities has declined somewhat. Although outmigration from the Sierra continues to exceed inmigration, the difference between them is much less, and a process of urbanization is occurring. Finally, the long hoped for population redistribution into the Oriente is now beginning to occur. Peru's economic crisis worsened during the past 3 years. Yet, despite an unimpressive economic performance in the past 2 decades, Peru has done a creditable job of responding to the educational needs of its population. The health of the population is reflected in the high mortality and infant mortality rates.^ieng

Family planning and population policy in Brazil.

PIP: Attitudes toward population growth and family planning in Brazil were discussed from a historical perspective and reasons for the government's failure to institute an efective family planning program were examined. During the colonial period, Portugal encouraged population growth in order to exert firm control over Brazil's vast and sparsely populated regions. A large number of African slaves were introduced, and the country's expanding population became recially mixed. Following independence in 1822, Brazilian governments continued to stress the need to expand the population. European immigration was vigorously promoted in order to dilute the population's African ancestry. During the 1900s, population growth became increasingly identified with the nation's destiny. In the 1950s and 1960s, despite the continuing pronatalist attitudes of the government, Brazil's middle and upper classes began to practice family planning. By 1965, the fertility rate began to decline. Between 1970-78 the total fertility rate declined from 4.911-3.983; however, the rate among the poor remained high. In 1965, the medical profession established the Brazilian Society of Family Welfare (BEMFAM) to promote and provide family planning services, especially for the poor. The organization provides these services through the existing network of private and municipal health facilities and works in cooperation with many local and state governments. BEMFAM's goal is to promote individual and family well-being, and BEMFAM strongly believes that the national government should assume responsibility for providing these services to the Brazilian population. In 1974 the Brazilian government presented a statement at the World Population Conference in Bucharest that lead many to believe that government's attitude toward population growth had changed. The statement recognized the right of all couples to have the number of children they wanted and the responsibility of the government to ensure that the poor also had this right. Futhermore, in 1978, President Geisel expressed fear of the consequences of continued population growth, and the current president, Figueiredo, recently noted that progress in family planning was a prerequisite for the continued social and economic development of the country. Despite these public statements, the government faled to implement effective population policies. The government now provides limited family planning services through the exisiting network of private hospitals and clinics. These servies are provided in the context of the government's maternal and child health program. The program is understaffed and underfinanced. As a result, the family planning component is frequently ignored. The programs lack of support stems from the pronatalist views still held by many government officials. The program is also resisted by national level officials of the Catholic Church. Brazil's population was 119 million in 1980 and is expected to increase to 185 million by the year 2000. If raid population continues, Brazil will not attain its desired status as a major developed country in the near future.^ieng

Population and development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

PIP: The data sheet compiled by the Population Reference Bureau and reprinted here provides a picture of many of the principal population characteristics of Latin America and the Caribbean. The reduced rate of average population increase, to 2.3% annually, compares favorably with the peak level that reached nearly 3% in 1960. Mortality rates have continued to decline in the intervening period, and fertility has decreased even more, resulting in a notable drop in overall rates of population growth for the region as a whole. Yet, total population has jumped from about 208 million in 1960 to an estimated 390 million in 1983. Statistics for the 2 regions obscure important differences in the patterns of growth among countries. Among Spanish speaking countries, the ones in "Temperate South America" represent a distinct type. Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are all growing at less than 1.6% annually. These 3 countries have completed the demographic transition. 2 more Spanish speaking political units in the Caribbean, Cuba and Puerto Rico, also fall into this category. Most of the English speaking islands in the Caribbean, plus Martinique and Guadaloupe, have also passed through demographic transition. The growth pattern of nearly all the countries in this category has baeen influenced by outmigration. A 2nd population category in Latin America and the Caribbean is composed of countries that had high rates of growth in 1960 but have reduced growth significantly in the past 2 decades as a result of modernizing influences and family planning programs. This category includes several of Latin America's most populous countries, i.e., Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, plus several smaller countries like Panama, Costa Rica, and Paraguay. A number of Caribbean countries also fall into this category. This 2nd group is the one to watch for assessing the future relationship of population to development. A 3rd category of countries in the region includes several nations that are growing at over 3% annually. The principal reason for their high growth levels in a sustained high rate of fertility. The prospects for many of these countries are not promising. Changes in the pattern of births and deaths have occurred mainly as a result of modernizing influences and the adoption of family planning. Of the two, modernization seems to be more important. Several countries encourage family planning as a means of reducing population growth rates. A number of countries with public family programs justify them as a human right or as a means of improving the health of mothers and children and not as a way to reduce growth rates. Argentina and Uruguay continue their strong pronatalist policies, and Chile and Bolivia have moved from policies favoring family planning to a reverse position. Other population data presented covers internal and international migration, urbanization, and population growth and development.^ieng

Population and the Colombian economy.

PIP: Colombia is the only one of the 6 most populous Latin American countries that is currently free of major economic crisis requiring an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The difference in the economic performances of these countries is relative, since the rate of growth in the Colombian economy was only 1.5% in 1982. Yet, Colombia seems to have weathered the international recession better than most. The crisis atmosphere in the rest of Latin America, triggered by overall economic decline, high rates of inflation, and an indebtedness that soaks up much of export earnings to service it, is lacking in Colombia or present in lesser degree. If Colombia can strengthen its political performance and tighten national unity, it could move through the 1980s with considerable confidence and success in economic development. Colombia differs little from other major Latin American countries with regard to traditionalism and modernization. Most Colombians are secularized. Colombia is far ahead of most comparable Latin American countries in fertility control. The lower rate of population increase defines the extent to which the economy must provide education, health, food, and jobs. 2 other factors are essential for understanding the current situation in Colombia and its prospects for the 1980s. Government policy in the 1970s opted for an austerity program while the other countries were growing rapidly, in large part through borrowed resources. A 2nd factor is the prospect of attaining autonomy in energy production. These special characteristics--population, public policy, and energy--are discussed. Since the mid 1960s Colombia has functioned with 3 family planning programs. Their existence makes contraception easily available to the population generally. In 1960 Colombia had a higher total fertility rate (TFR) 7.0, than either Venezuela (6.6) or Brazil (5.3), but by 1976 its TFR was down to 4.1, while Venezuela's (4.8) and Brazil's (4.3) were now higher. On balance, when compared with other Latin American countries, Colombia's basic population trends place it in a relatively favorable position. The economy affected by these population changes is 1 of the most diversified in Latin America. 1 of the most promising aspects of the Colombian economy in the future will be energy production. Although currently an energy importer, in the form of petroleum and petroleum products, Colombia expects to be totally self-sufficient in all forms of energy by 1985 and to become a major importer of coal. The road ahead is not smooth, but Colombia seems likely to make progress in raising the standard of living of its population, especially if the world economy recovers.^ieng

Economic and social characteristics of the Brazilian population.

PIP: The question of whether Brazilians have improved their economic situation since 1970 is controversial. A number of questions on the Brazilian census of 1980 dealt with the economic and social characteristics of the population. The usefulness of census data lies in their capacity to indicate trends every 10 years. Consequently, one can get some idea of whether Brazil is making progress in certain aspects of modernization or in improving the skills and living conditions of the people. Census data have limitations. They indicate averages, not specific cases. They fail to raise a number of questions about economic and social conditions that would improve understanding. Discussion is focused on population structure and the economy, income, housing, education, and health. Brazil is continuing the process of modernization by which population shifts from the primary sector (agriculture and mining) into other sectors of the economy. The 14.88% of the work force in agriculture, livestock, and fishing represent about 30% of the potentially economically active (PEA) population. 1/3 of the population is still rural, but the trend since 1940 is striking. The momentum of decline intensified in both 1960-70 and 1970-80, reflecting a process of abandoning small farms, mechanizing larger farms, and a general flow of population to the cities. All other sectors of the economy have increased the proportion of people working in them. The data of 1980 reflect a period of sustained economic growth that culminated in that year with an increase of 8%. In 1981 and 1982, Brazil had been in a recession so that in 1983 some of these figures might have changed. The dispute began when the results of the 1970 census were used to show that income was becoming more concentrated, i.e., the top percentages, in comparison with 1960, received a larger share of national income, while the lowest percentages received less. The differences in income between men and women is particularly strong in the "destitute" class. The majority of Brazilians own the house in which they live. In urban areas about half as many people rent as own their homes, but renting is rare in rural areas. The quality of Brazilian houses is low, and they tend to be quite crowded. Over 4 million houses have only 1 bedroom, but 3 or more people live in them. In 7 million houses 4 or more persons occupy 2 bedrooms. 1 of the most important achievements have been an increase in the level of literacy. About 85% of Brazil's young people are now apparently learning to read and write. There is little improvement in the 15-19 age category as compared with 20-29.^ieng

Mexican population: 1982.

PIP: In 1940, Mexico had less than 30% of its 1980 population of 69,346,900. The annual rate of growth by decades accelerated from 1.72% in 1930-40, to 2.72% in 1940-50, to 3.13% in 1950-60, and to 3.43% in 1960-70. Infant mortality has declined from 124.5/1000 in 1940 to 56.8/1000 in 1980, while general mortality has declined from 26.6/1000 in 1930 to 7.5/1000 in 1980. Average life expectancies of men and women respectively have increased from 40.39 and 42.50 in 1940 to 62.3 and 66.1 in 1980 and are expected to continue a slow rise. Mortality, infant mortality, and average life expectancy figures are least favorable in the poorest and least developed areas. Political opposition is believed to be 1 main reason for Mexico's late adoption of a population control program, but since the family planning program was established it has enjoyed solid government support. Mexico's rate of population growth appeared to peak at about 3.5% in 1975; it was estimated at 2.7% by the 1980 census and may have declined to 2.5% in 1982. By 1979 all age groups of women were having fewer children, with those aged 20-34 achieving the most significant drop. Fertility differentials by rural and urban residence, size of place and women's education are marked. The government's goal is to reduce the rate of population increase to 1%/year by the year 2000, with a population of 100,041,400. Because of the unfavorable age structure resulting from past rapid growth, that goal will be difficult to achieve. The most realistic of 3 National Population Council population projections envisions a rate of increase of 2% annually and a population of 106,570,400 in 2000. The pattern of city growth from 1970-80 indicates that Mexico is having some success in decentralizing economic growth and urban population concentration, but the largest cities continued to grow substantially. About 39.31% of workers are in agriculture, 13.17% are in services and transport, 22.47% are in other areas, 8.14% are vendors, and about 17% are administrative, professional, or technical workers. Mexico's continuing high rate of population increase, despite recent declines, is causing serious strains on national economy, the public services, and for the people themselves.^ieng

Brazilian population 1982: growth, migration, race, religion.

PIP: The rate of population increase dropped to less than 2.5% annually in Brazil between 1970-80, but 26 million more people were born. The 1980 census also provides details of continuing urbanization, settlement of the farthest frontiers, and changes in racial composition. The direct cause of the drop in population increase was a drop of about 15% in the fertility rate that had been projected for the decade. Brazil's rate of population increase declined impressively despite the fact that the country continued to make progress in reducing mortality. The greatest improvement occurred between 1930-60. The mortality rate averaged 20.9/1000 between 1940-50 but dropped to 14.2/1000 between 1950-60. Even though the crude death rate dropped 28% in the 1970-80 decade and each child born in 1980 can expect to live 6.5 years longer than a child born in 1970, the life expectancy of 62 years compares with Colombia and El Salvador, which are much poorer countries. In Brazil as a whole the crude birthrate in the 15-19 age group was 66/1000 in 1980. It was 46/1000 in 1970, an increase of nearly 50%. In urban areas the rate increased from 37/1000 to 57/1000 and in the countryside from 59/1000 to 89/1000. The crude birthrate went down slightly in Brazil from 1970-80 from 34 to 32/1000. The total fertility rate (TFR) dropped in the same period from 4.9ll to 3.983. The question that arises is whether fertility rates will increase, with women in the youngest age group continuing to have more children during their reproductive years. Internal migration plays a major role in the distribution of the population. Between 1970-80 there were changes in the migration pattern from the previous decade. All the rapidly growing areas, defined as the frontier, have high fertility rates, but much of their growth results from migration. Between 1960-70 and 1970-80 the most rapidly growing areas of the frontier changed. Few are aware of the extent to which Brazil is becoming a country of large cities. The top 10 of the 30 largest cities in the country all have more than 1 million inhabitants. Another manifestation of urbanization within states is the overall loss of population in the rural areas while most of the capital cities grew quite rapidly. Brazil is a multiracial society based on the native Amerindians, Europeans, Middle Easterners, the decendants of African slaves, and Orientals. A substantial portion of the population is racially mixed and cannot be placed within any of these categories. In the 1980 census the racial categories were the ones used in prevouse censuses: white, black, yellow, and "parda" (mixed). Brazil's population is predominantly white, but nearly 45% is racially mixed or black. Orientals are less than 1%. In regard to religion, the clearest trend is an increase in Protestants.^ieng

The problems of nutrition in Brazil.

PIP: Low income is the factor most often associated with the existence of malnutrition. Malnutrition in Brazil is more frequently found among Brazilians with less than 2 minimum salaries/family and who live in the less developed parts of the country. In 1976, 59.2% of urban residents earned 2 or less minimum salaries. A study found that those rural residents engaged in agriculture on their own or someone else's property were better paid than those who live from salaried labor alone; temporary salaried workers are the largest rural class in Brazil and have the lowest levels of nutrition. In urban areas the informal sector represent the lowest nutrition level group. The issue of food consumption by the lower classes is linked to 4 aspects of Brazilian development: 1) structure of food production, 2) distribution of income, 3) government attempts to influence prices and marketing systems, and 4) the role of government food supplementation programs. Brazil suffers today from unbalanced growth among its various economic sectors and regions, inequitable income distribution, and inadequate public services. The misconception of the necessity of a large industrial base for development resulted in the neglect of the rural sector and thus higher malnutrition. Recent regulatory efforts by the government have begun to increase rural production, but production of agricultural exports has increased at a much more rapid pace than that of domestic food commodities. Small farmers have not taken advantage of new financial opportunities offered by the government to balance production levels because: 1) banks do not have enough for the demand, 2) access to the small producer of foods is difficult, and 3) the present hesitation to risk his few possessions. The largest percentage of income in Brazil goes to the richest classes and the economy is oriented towards meeting the demands of the more prosperous classes. The government's program of minimum support prices has not been successful in stabilizing prices yet it continues to feel that this policy is the key to increasing productivity. Other government programs such as market intervention through COBAL, the Brazilian Food Company designed to reduce consumer costs and CEASA, large wholesale markets, but these have not succeeded. The National Program of Feeding and Nutrition's projects for poor families aim to provide 50% of calorie and protein needs and nutrition information; there are about 2.5 million beneficiaries. However the program's workers find it too limited and ineffectual. Other feeding programs have also met with little success. Until government policy reflects the true needs of the population, Brazil's nutrition problems cannot be solved.^ieng

Cuba and the Bucharest Conference.

PIP: Cuba has been able to institutionalize its population policy and may influence policies and programs elsewhere in the Third World. The government of Cuba has a policy of planned development, but does not concentrate on increasing or reducing population. Rather, development is stimulated and fertility allowed to find its own level. Cuba is characterized by intermediate demographic indices when compared with the rest of Latin America, with a growth rate higher than Argentina and Urug uay but lower than most of the region's other countries. Even before the Revolution, fertility and mortality rates placed Cuba among the more developed countreis in Latin America. Both natality and mortality rates have declined since 1960. This is due to the institution of a good quality health care system. A moderate increase in growth rate is expected after 1975 when out-migration will decrease. The Cuban demographic transition has been favored by various factors: 1)a political system which organized social and economic change in the country; 2)a favorable demographic situation; and 3)massive financial, expert, and technical aid from other Communist countries. Cuba and othe r Communist countries maintained at Bucharest that population problems were not responsible for other economic and social problems in a country. Cuba seems to have concentrated on the underlying problems and left the matter of family planning to individual motivation.^ieng

Mexico 1974: demographic patterns and population policy.

PIP: In 1974 the population of Mexico (58,000,000) was increasing at about 3.4% per year. In 1968 the mortality rate was 9.6 per 1000. In 1970 the average number of children ever born to women of fertile age was 2.6 in Mexico City and 3.1 natiowide. 42.4% of the population was rural in 1970. In 1960 an estimated 33.5% of the population was of the middle class. As of the 1970 census, 23.81% of the population was illiterate. A 1969 study in Mexico City reported that there were 37 abortions per 1000 women and 13.7% used contraception. A pronatalist policy begun in 1970 by President Echeverria was reversed in 1972 to support family planning which is emphasized as having a role in strengthening the family as an institution. Even the Catholic Church has given its tacit approval. Although the government insists that population stabilization is not a substitute for development, the population program is considered an integral part of national development.^ieng