Improving treatments for psychotic disorders: beyond cognitive behaviour therapy for psychosis.

More effective treatments for people with psychotic disorders are urgently required. Here, we make three suggestions for progress: 1. Targeting the disorders' core phenomenological features ('phenomenological phenotype'), 2. Addressing social disconnection, isolation and loneliness, and 3. Leveraging 'hot' cognitions and using symptom capture approaches that combine psychotherapy with advances in technology and neuroscience.

The neurophenomenology of early psychosis: An integrative empirical study.

BACKGROUND: The integration of various domains or levels of analysis (clinical, neurobiological, genetic, etc.) has been a challenge in schizophrenia research. A promising approach is to use the core phenomenological features of the disorder as an organising principle for other levels of analysis. Minimal self-disturbance (fragility in implicit first-person perspective, presence and agency) is emerging as a strong candidate to play this role. This approach was adopted in a previously described theoretical neurophenomenological model that proposed that source monitoring deficits and aberrant salience may be neurocognitive/neurobiological processes that correlate with minimal self-disturbance on the phenomenological level, together playing an aetiological role in the onset of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. The current paper presents full cross-sectional data from the first empirical test of this model. METHODS: Fifty ultra-high risk for psychosis patients, 39 first episode psychosis patients and 34 healthy controls were assessed with a variety of clinical measures, including the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE), and neurocognitive and neurophysiological (EEG) measures of source monitoring deficits and aberrant salience. RESULTS: Linear regression indicated that source monitoring (composite score across neurocognitive and neurophysiological measures), with study group as an interaction term, explained 39.8% of the variance in EASE scores (R2 = 0.41, F(3,85) = 14.78, p < 0.001), whereas aberrant salience (composite score) explained only 6% of the variance in EASE scores (R2 = 0.06, F(3,85) = 1.44, p = 0.93). Aberrant salience measures were more strongly related to general psychopathology measures, particularly to positive psychotic symptoms, than to EASE scores. DISCUSSION: A neurophenomenological model of minimal self-disturbance in schizophrenia spectrum disorders may need to be expanded from source monitoring deficits to encompass other relevant constructs such as temporal processing, intermodal/multisensory integration, and hierarchical predictive processing. The cross-sectional data reported here will be expanded with longitudinal analysis in subsequent reports. These data and other related recent research show an emerging picture of neuro-features of core phenomenological aspects of schizophrenia spectrum disorders beyond surface-level psychotic symptoms.

What are the neurocognitive correlates of basic self-disturbance in schizophrenia?: Integrating phenomenology and neurocognition. Part 1 (Source monitoring deficits).

Phenomenological research indicates that disturbance of the basic sense of self may be a core phenotypic marker of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Basic self-disturbance refers to disruption of the sense of ownership of experience and agency of action and is associated with a variety of anomalous subjective experiences. Little is known about the neurocognitive underpinnings of basic self-disturbance. In these two theoretical papers (of which this is Part 1), we review some recent phenomenological and neurocognitive research and point to a convergence of these approaches around the concept of self-disturbance. Specifically, we propose that subjective anomalies associated with basic self-disturbance may be associated with: 1. source monitoring deficits, which may contribute particularly to disturbances of "ownership" and "mineness" (the phenomenological notion of presence or self-affection) and 2. aberrant salience, and associated disturbances of memory, prediction and attention processes, which may contribute to hyper-reflexivity, disturbed "grip" or "hold" on the perceptual and conceptual field, and disturbances of intuitive social understanding ("common sense"). In this paper (Part 1) we focus on source monitoring deficits. Part 2 (this issue) addresses aberrant salience. Empirical studies are required in a variety of populations in order to test these proposed associations between phenomenological and neurocognitive aspects of self-disturbance in schizophrenia. An integration of findings across the phenomenological and neurocognitive "levels" would represent a significant advance in the understanding of schizophrenia and possibly enhance early identification and intervention strategies.

What are the neurocognitive correlates of basic self-disturbance in schizophrenia? Integrating phenomenology and neurocognition: Part 2 (aberrant salience).

Phenomenological research indicates that disturbance of the basic sense of self may be a core phenotypic marker of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Basic self-disturbance refers to disruption of the sense of ownership of experience and agency of action and is associated with a variety of anomalous subjective experiences. Little is known about the neurocognitive underpinnings of basic self-disturbance. In these two theoretical papers (of which this is Part 2), we review some recent phenomenological and neurocognitive research and point to a convergence of these approaches around the concept of self-disturbance. Specifically, we propose that subjective anomalies associated with basic self-disturbance may be associated with: 1. source monitoring deficits, which may contribute particularly to disturbances of "ownership" and "mineness" (the phenomenological notion of presence or self-affection) and 2. aberrant salience, and associated disturbances of memory, prediction and attention processes, which may contribute to hyper-reflexivity, disturbed "grip" or "hold" on perceptual and conceptual fields, and disturbances of intuitive social understanding ("common sense"). In this paper (Part 2) we focus on aberrant salience. Part 1 (this issue) addressed source monitoring deficits. Empirical studies are required in a variety of populations in order to test these proposed associations between phenomenological and neurocognitive aspects of self-disturbance in schizophrenia. An integration of findings across the phenomenological and neurocognitive "levels" would represent a significant advance in the understanding of schizophrenia and possibly enhance early identification and intervention strategies.

Cognitive-behavioral therapy for schizophrenia: a critical evaluation of its theoretical framework from a clinical-phenomenological perspective.

BACKGROUND: Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) has played an increasingly important role in psychotherapy for schizophrenia since the 1990s, but it has also encountered many theoretical and practical limitations. For example, methodologically rigorous meta-analyses have recently found only modest overall effect sizes of CBT treatment, and therefore questions have emerged about forwhat and for whom it actually works. METHOD: The focus of the present paper is to elucidate the theoretical assumptions underlying CBT for schizophrenia and to examine their consistency with abnormalities of experience and self-awareness frequently reported by schizophrenia patients and systematically studied in phenomenological psychopathology from the beginning of the 20th century. RESULTS: We argue that a strong theoretical emphasis on cognitive appraisals with only subsidiary attention devoted to affective and behavioral processes - as is characteristic of many forms of CBT - cannot satisfactorily account for the complex subjective experiences of schizophrenia patients. We further argue that certain theoretical strategies widely employed in CBT to explore and explain mental disorders, which involve atomization and, at times, a reification of mental phenomena, can be problematic and may result in a loss of explanatory potential. Finally, we provide a detailed account of how negative symptoms and delusions are conceptualized in CBT and consider the question of how these concepts fit the actual phenomenology of schizophrenia. CONCLUSION: We suggest that further advancement of CBT theory and practice can benefit from a dialogue with phenomenological psychiatry in the search for effective psychotherapeutic strategies for schizophrenia patients.

A disturbed sense of self in the psychosis prodrome: linking phenomenology and neurobiology.

Interest in the early phase of psychotic disorders has risen dramatically in recent years. Neurobiological investigations have focused specifically on identifying brain changes associated with the onset of psychosis. The link between these neurobiological findings and the complex phenomenology of the early psychosis period is not well understood. In this article, we re-cast some of these observations, primarily from neuroimaging studies, in the context of phenomenological models of "the self" and disturbance thereof in psychotic illness. Specifically, we argue that disturbance of the basic or minimal self ("ipseity"), as articulated in phenomenological literature, may be associated with abnormalities in midline cortical structures as observed in neuroimaging studies of pre-onset and early psychotic patients. These findings are discussed with regards to current ideas on the neural basis of self-referential mental activity, including the notion of a putative "default-mode" of brain function, and its relation to distinguishing between self- and other-generated stimuli. Further empirical work examining the relationship between neurobiological and phenomenological variables may be of value in identifying risk markers for psychosis onset.

Psychoanalysis and the hermeneutic turn: a critique of Narrative Truth and Historical Truth.

Through a discussion of Donald Spence's Narrative Truth and Historical Truth, a critical introduction to the hermeneutic or interpretive perspective is presented. Spence's book has generally been assumed to offer a hermeneutic reformulation of psychoanalysis. However, its presuppositions are incompatible with fundamental tenets of contemporary hermeneutic thought, as expressed in the philosophies of Heidegger, Gadamer, and the later Wittgenstein. Spence's basic assumptions are classically empiricist and positivistic. His vision of human experience is essentially associationistic and Humean; it treats experience as involving two processes, the passive reception of raw sense data and a subsequent projection of meaningful interpretation. Spence advocates the gathering of brute data while denying or downplaying the epistemological value of theorizing and of interpretive understandings. These assumptions are contrasted with those of the hemeneutic philosophers. Unlike these philosophers, Spence tends to dichotomize coherence and correspondence theories of truth. As a result, he wavers between relativism (regarding therapeutic interpretations) and objectivism (regarding scientific knowledge).

Parental communication deviance and forms of thinking in male schizophrenic offspring.

In a step beyond earlier research on parental communication deviance (CD) and schizophrenia, more specific links between these phenomena were investigated. First, subtypes of schizophrenia were distinguished by amount of formal thought disorder, and two forms of parental CD--called the "disorganized" and the "evasive" types--were qualitatively distinguished. In a sample of young adult male patients, it was found that schizophrenics who manifested definite and severe formal thought disorder had parents with much CD in their speech (especially the disorganized type). In contrast, male paranoid schizophrenics with constricted forms of thinking had parents whose level of CD was lower (and was comparable to that of the parents of the nonschizophrenic controls). This suggests that parental CD may be better understood as specifically associated with cognitive disorganization in the offspring, rather than with overall DSM-III or DSM-II criteria for schizophrenia.