The Decline in Marriage in Israel, 1960-2007: Period or Cohort Effect?

Over the past four decades, the more developed countries have experienced a marked decline in the marriage rates of both men and women. The reasons for the decline remain a debated issue. Three explanations predict that the decline in marriage is a period effect, while two predict that it is a birth cohort effect. To determine whether the decline is a period or a cohort effect, this study performed an age-period-cohort analysis. Using data from Israel, our results show that both cohort replacement and period factors were important. Until 1990-1994 the decline in marriage was a period effect, whereas after 1990-1994 the decline was a cohort effect. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for the three major explanations of the decline in marriage.

The marriage boom and marriage bust in the United States: An age-period-cohort analysis.

In the 1950s and 1960s there was an unprecedented marriage boom in the United States. This was followed in the 1970s by a marriage bust. Some argue that both phenomena are cohort effects, while others argue that they are period effects. The study reported here tested the major period and cohort theories of the marriage boom and bust, by estimating an age-period-cohort model of first marriage for the years 1925-79 using census microdata. The results of the analysis indicate that the marriage boom was mostly a period effect, although there were also cohort influences. More specifically, the hypothesis that the marriage boom was mostly a response to rising wages is shown to be consistent with the data. However, much of the marriage bust can be accounted for by unidentified cohort influences, at least until 1980.

Early-life conditions and adult mortality decline in Dutch cohorts born 1812-1921.

Mounting evidence suggests that early-life conditions have an enduring effect on an individual's mortality risks as an adult. The contribution of improvements in early-life conditions to the overall decline in adult mortality, however, remains a debated issue. We provide an estimate of the contribution of improvements in early-life conditions to mortality decline after age 30 in Dutch cohorts born between 1812 and 1921. We used two proxies for early-life conditions: median height and early-childhood mortality. We estimate that improvements in early-life conditions contributed more than five years or about a third to the rise in women's life expectancy at age 30. Improvements in early-life conditions contributed almost three years or more than a quarter to the rise in men's life expectancy at age 30. Height appears to be the more important of the two proxies for early-life conditions.

Marital fertility decline in the Netherlands: child mortality, real wages, and unemployment, 1860-1939.

Previous studies of the fertility decline in Europe are often limited to an earlier stage of the marital fertility decline, when the decline tended to be slower and before the large increase in earnings in the 1920s. Starting in 1860 (before the onset of the decline), this study follows marital fertility trends until 1939, when fertility reached lower levels than ever before. Using data from the Historical Sample of the Netherlands (HSN), this study shows that mortality decline, a rise in real income, and unemployment account for the decline in the Netherlands. This finding suggests that marital fertility decline was an adjustment to social and economic change, leaving little room for attitudinal change that is independent of social and economic change.

Family allowances and fertility: socioeconomic differences.

This article explores socioeconomic differences in the effect of family allowances on fertility. Although several studies have examined the relationship between cash benefits and fertility, few studies have addressed the possible differential effects of cash benefits on families of different income or education levels. I reconstructed the birth histories of women in the past two Israeli censuses of 1983 and 1995 to study socioeconomic differences in the effect of family allowances up to the seventh parity. The results indicate that family allowances have a significant effect at every parity. Using female education as an indicator of socioeconomic status, I find that socioeconomic status is a significant modifier of the effect of family allowances. Family allowances seem to have a relatively large impact on more-educated women.

Religious differentials in marital fertility in The Hague (Netherlands) 1860-1909.

Previous studies of the marital fertility transition in Europe have found religious differentials. Using data collected from the population registers of The Hague, our aim in this study is to search for answers to the following questions: whether religious differentials result from socio-economic characteristics; to what extent religious ideology explains the behaviour of religious groups; which proximate determinants account for the religious differentials; and whether the Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition in Europe. The results provide some evidence of relatively low levels of parity-dependent fertility control among Jews before the transition and among Catholics during the transition. Religious ideology probably accounts for the low level of fertility control among Catholics. The ultimate reason for the relatively high marital fertility among Jews before the transition remains unclear. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that Jews were forerunners in the marital fertility transition.

Religious differentials in infant and child mortality in Holland, 1855-1912.

At least three kinds of hypothesis may be invoked to interpret religious differentials in mortality. They are (i) hypotheses that refer to characteristics, (ii) those that refer to lifestyle, and (iii) those that refer to the social isolation of minorities. This paper tests all three kinds of hypothesis using data on urban child mortality from the Hague just before and during the demographic transition. A hazard analysis suggests that economic and demographic characteristics do not account for much of the variation by religion. An analysis of seasonal mortality suggests that some of the variation may be explained by differences in lifestyle. The third kind of hypothesis is presented here for the first time. We suggest that the social isolation of small religious groups lowered their exposure to certain kinds of infectious disease. We use a simulation study to show that this hypothesis could account for part of the variation.