The iatrogenic opioid crisis: An example of 'institutional corruption of pharmaceuticals'?

RATIONALE: Prescribed opioids are major contributors to the international public health opioid crisis. Such widespread iatrogenic harms usually result from collective decision failures of healthcare organizations rather than solely of individual organizations or professionals. Findings from a system-wide safety analysis of the iatrogenic opioid crisis that includes roles of pertinent healthcare organizations may help avoid or mitigate similar future iatrogenic consequences. In this retrospective exploratory study, we report such an analysis. METHODS: The study population encompassed the entire age spectrum and included those in whom opioids prescribed for chronic pain (unrelated to malignancy) were associated with death or morbidity. Root cause analysis, incorporating recent suggestions for improvement, was used to identify possible contributory factors from the literature. Based on their mandated roles and potential influences to prevent or mitigate the iatrogenic crisis, relevant organizations were grouped and stratified from most to least influential. RESULTS: The analysis identified a chain of multiple interrelated causal factors within and between organizations. The most influential organizations were pharmaceutical, political, and drug regulatory; next: experts and their related societies, and publications. Less influential: accreditation, professional licensing and regulatory, academic and healthcare funding bodies. Collectively, their views and decisions influenced prescribing practices of frontline healthcare professionals and advocacy groups. Financial associations between pharmaceutical and most other organizations/groups were common. Ultimately, patients were adversely affected. There was a complex association with psychosocial variables. LIMITATIONS: The analysis suggests associations not causality. CONCLUSION: The iatrogenic crisis has multiple intricately linked roots. The major catalyst: pervasive pharma-linked financial conflicts of interest (CoIs) involving most other healthcare organizations. These extensive financial CoIs were likely triggers for a cascade of erroneous decisions and actions that adversely affected patients. The actions and decisions of pharma ranged from unethical to illegal. The iatrogenic opioid crisis may exemplify 'institutional corruption of pharmaceuticals'.

Gating the holes in the Swiss cheese (part I): Expanding professor Reason's model for patient safety.

INTRODUCTION: Although patient safety has improved steadily, harm remains a substantial global challenge. Additionally, safety needs to be ensured not only in hospitals but also across the continuum of care. Better understanding of the complex cognitive factors influencing health care-related decisions and organizational cultures could lead to more rational approaches, and thereby to further improvement. HYPOTHESIS: A model integrating the concepts underlying Reason's Swiss cheese theory and the cognitive-affective biases plus cascade could advance the understanding of cognitive-affective processes that underlie decisions and organizational cultures across the continuum of care. METHODS: Thematic analysis, qualitative information from several sources being used to support argumentation. DISCUSSION: Complex covert cognitive phenomena underlie decisions influencing health care. In the integrated model, the Swiss cheese slices represent dynamic cognitive-affective (mental) gates: Reason's successive layers of defence. Like firewalls and antivirus programs, cognitive-affective gates normally allow the passage of rational decisions but block or counter unsounds ones. Gates can be breached (ie, holes created) at one or more levels of organizations, teams, and individuals, by (1) any element of cognitive-affective biases plus (conflicts of interest and cognitive biases being the best studied) and (2) other potential error-provoking factors. Conversely, flawed decisions can be blocked and consequences minimized; for example, by addressing cognitive biases plus and error-provoking factors, and being constantly mindful. Informed shared decision making is a neglected but critical layer of defence (cognitive-affective gate). The integrated model can be custom tailored to specific situations, and the underlying principles applied to all methods for improving safety. The model may also provide a framework for developing and evaluating strategies to optimize organizational cultures and decisions. LIMITATIONS: The concept is abstract, the model is virtual, and the best supportive evidence is qualitative and indirect. CONCLUSIONS: The proposed model may help enhance rational decision making across the continuum of care, thereby improving patient safety globally.