Acinetobacter - the trojan horse of infection control?

BACKGROUND: Five cases of multi-resistant Acinetobacter baumanii (MRA) producing OXA-23 and OXA-51 occurred in a regional burn intensive care unit (BICU). Three were repatriated from other parts of the world (Dubai and Mumbai) and colonized on admission. Despite optimal precautions, two patients acquired MRA. Both had been nursed in the same room. METHODS: Multi-disciplinary outbreak investigation of MRA in a regional BICU. FINDINGS: The mechanism of transfer for the first case is thought to have been contaminated air from theatre activity releasing MRA bacteria into the communal corridor. No MRA patients went to theatre between the first and second acquired cases. The mechanism of transfer for the second case is thought to have been via a shower unit that was decontaminated inadequately between patients. CONCLUSION: In an outbreak where contact precautions and environmental cleaning are optimal, it is important to give careful consideration to other mechanisms of spread. If there is a failure to do this, it is likely that the true causes of transmission will not be addressed and the problem will recur. It is recommended that burn theatres within burn facilities should be designed to operate at negative pressure; this is the opposite of normal operating theatre ventilation. Where showers are used, both the shower head and the hose should be changed after a patient with a resistant organism. The role of non-contact disinfection (e.g. hydrogen peroxide dispersal) should be reconsidered, and constant vigilance should be given to any 'trojan horse' item in the room.

Prevention and control of carbapenemase-producing organisms at a regional burns centre.

In many parts of the world, carbapenemase-producing organisms (CPOs) are endemic. The transfer of medical patients from such countries to the UK requires us to have control systems in place to avoid onward transmission. This report describes the experience of a regional burns centre challenged by its first four cases of CPO in two separate incidents. Key learning from our experience was the importance of CPOs being considered in empirical antibiotics for any patient from an endemic area. Using contact plates, we demonstrated high bacterial counts after cleaning and we describe a terminal cleaning strategy along with the importance of continuing staff engagement and education.