How to build a cold chain supply chain system for fresh agricultural products through blockchain technology-A study of tripartite evolutionary game theory based on prospect theory.

The global cold chain logistics market is witnessing a significant upswing, driven by the rising demand for perishable food products and increasing shipment volumes worldwide. Technological advancements are leading to a more intelligent and digitally enabled cold chain logistics system. However, the high loss rate of fresh agricultural products in China poses a significant threat to the country's food security. Therefore, it is imperative to explore innovative solutions, such as blockchain, to address the challenges of traditional cold chain logistics. In this paper, inspired by the prospect theory and evolutionary game theory, we propose an evolutionary game model to analyze the behavioral strategies of the tripartite of n-level cold chain participants, consumers, and government. Using MATLAB software, the numerical simulation of the game path of this tripartite theory is conducted, and the influence of variable parameters on the evolutionary process and outcomes of the system is analyzed. The results the following: (1) The development of an effective cold chain supply chain system can be divided into three stages, and blockchain technology plays a pivotal role in creating a seamless cold chain environment. The cost of blockchain adoption, government rewards, as well as penalties can significantly influence the behavioral choices of the three stakeholders. (2) The behavior of individual cold chain participants has a strong negative externality, which can impact the behavior of others. We also find that the larger the scale of the cold chain, the lower the probability of default by the participants. (3) The government's adoption of blockchain technology and the implementation of effective incentive policies can foster the successful development of the cold chain blockchain infrastructure. Our research contributes to the theoretical understanding of cold chain logistics decision making and policy creation for the tripartite stakeholders, including cold chain participants, consumers, and government. Our findings can serve as a valuable reference for scientific decision making and policy formulation to encourage the development of a robust cold chain supply chain system.

Research on immature wheat harvesting behavior of farmers from the perspective of food security: An evolutionary game based analysis.

Food security constitutes a foundational cornerstone for social stability, with the achievement of sustainable agricultural production serving as a vital step towards this objective. Currently, the untimely harvesting of unripe wheat by farmers has led to a decline in food production, thereby posing a significant threat to the sustainability of China's food system and exacerbating food insecurity. Although the Chinese government has implemented various measures in response, their effectiveness has been limited. Limited scholarly literature exists on this particular issue. To advance food security in China, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving farmers, the government, and breeding enterprises. Adopting a systemic perspective, this study examines the interactions and impact mechanisms among these key actors during the wheat harvesting process. The findings indicate that the government should prioritize policies that enforce penalties. By implementing penalties within a reasonable range, the government can mitigate farmers' production costs and enhance the market price of grain. This approach discourages farmers from harvesting immature wheat and contributes to enhancing food security. Based on the research findings, this paper provides practical recommendations to guide the government in addressing food security governance issues.

How can blockchain technology promote food safety in agricultural market?-an evolutionary game analysis.

The governance of agricultural food safety issues is closely linked to social interests. To promote food safety supervision in the Chinese agricultural markets under the background of blockchain application, this paper develops a partnership comprising vendors, consumers, and the government. Using the theory of evolutionary game combined with the actual situation of China, the evolutionary process simulations of three participants prove that the tripartite subjects can realize a stable state under the specific relationship. Impact investigation results of typical influential factors indicate the following: (1) The behavior of vendors depends on the government's supervision and consumers' reporting attitude. Limiting the penalty amount for vendors to 66.7% of speculative gains can shorten the processing time for vendors to comply with the law. (2) Consumers play a vital role in food safety supervision of the agricultural market. The penalty for consumers should be limited to 1/3 of the reward amount. (3) The government's incentive-oriented and punishment-inhibited policies can promote blockchain technology in supervision. Punishment-inhibited and key influencing parameters can cooperate in obtaining the maximum regulatory benefits. The results of this study have certain reference values for promoting policy formulation and implementing blockchain technology in agricultural food safety supervision.