Inactivation Validation of Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa Viruses in AVL and Ethanol-Treated Viral Cultures.

High-consequence pathogens such as the Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa viruses are handled in maximum-containment biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories. Genetic material is often isolated from such viruses and subsequently removed from BSL-4 laboratories for a multitude of downstream analyses using readily accessible technologies and equipment available at lower-biosafety level laboratories. However, it is essential to ensure that these materials are free of viable viruses before removal from BSL-4 laboratories to guarantee sample safety. This study details the in-house procedure used for validating the inactivation of Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa virus cultures after incubation with AVL lysis buffer (Qiagen) and ethanol. This study's findings show that no viable virus was detectable when high-titer cultures of Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa viruses were incubated with AVL lysis buffer for 10 min, followed by an equal volume of 95% ethanol for 3 min, using a method with a sensitivity of ≤0.8 log10 TCID50 as the limit of detection.

Heat Inactivation of Nipah Virus for Downstream Single-Cell RNA Sequencing Does Not Interfere with Sample Quality.

Single-cell RNA sequencing (scRNA-seq) technologies are instrumental to improving our understanding of virus-host interactions in cell culture infection studies and complex biological systems because they allow separating the transcriptional signatures of infected versus non-infected bystander cells. A drawback of using biosafety level (BSL) 4 pathogens is that protocols are typically developed without consideration of virus inactivation during the procedure. To ensure complete inactivation of virus-containing samples for downstream analyses, an adaptation of the workflow is needed. Focusing on a commercially available microfluidic partitioning scRNA-seq platform to prepare samples for scRNA-seq, we tested various chemical and physical components of the platform for their ability to inactivate Nipah virus (NiV), a BSL-4 pathogen that belongs to the group of nonsegmented negative-sense RNA viruses. The only step of the standard protocol that led to NiV inactivation was a 5 min incubation at 85 °C. To comply with the more stringent biosafety requirements for BSL-4-derived samples, we included an additional heat step after cDNA synthesis. This step alone was sufficient to inactivate NiV-containing samples, adding to the necessary inactivation redundancy. Importantly, the additional heat step did not affect sample quality or downstream scRNA-seq results.

Emergent Risk Group-4 (RG-4) Filoviruses: A paradox in progress.

Filoviruses, categorized as World Health Organization (WHO) Risk Group 4 (RG-4) pathogens, represent significant global health risks due to their extraordinary virulence. The Filoviridae family encompasses Ebola strains such as Sudan, Zaire, Bundibugyo, Tai Forest (formerly known as Ivory Coast), Reston, and Bombali, in addition to the closely related Marburg and Ravn virus strains. Filoviruses originated from a common ancestor about 10,000 years ago and displayed remarkable consistency in genetic heterogeneity until the 20th century. However, they overcame a genetic bottleneck by mid-century. Paradoxically, this resulted in the emergence of boosted virulent strains from the 1970's onward. Filovirus research is included in the NIAID Biodefense Program and utilizes the highest level specialized protective laboratories, Biosafety Laboratory (BSL)-4. The spread of Filoviruses as well as other RG-4 pathogens within Africa poses a significant health threat increasingly both in Africa and out of Africa.

Dangerous Risk Group-4 (RG-4) emergent viruses.

World Health Organization (WHO) Risk Group-4 (RG-4) pathogens are among the most dangerous of the emergent and re-emergent viruses. International health agencies, working in concert, bridge the gaps in health care for populations at risk for RG-4 viral pathogen exposure. RG-4 virus research incorporates Biodefense Program and Biosafety Laboratory (BSL)-4 technologies. RG-4 viruses include Arena-viridae, Filo-viridae, Flavi-viridae, Herpes-viridae, Nairo-viridae, Paramyxo-viridae, and Pox-viridae.

Mouse Models of Henipavirus Infection.

The Nipah and Hendra viruses, belonging to henipavirus genus, are recently emerged zoonotic pathogens that cause severe and often fatal, neurologic, and/or respiratory diseases in both humans and various animals. As mice represent a small animal model convenient to study viral infections and provide a well-developed experimental toolbox for analysis in immunovirology, we describe in this chapter a few basic methods used in biosafety 4 level (BSL4) conditions to study henipavirus infection in mice.

Art of the Kill: Designing and Testing Viral Inactivation Procedures for Highly Pathogenic Negative Sense RNA Viruses.

The study of highly pathogenic viruses handled under BSL-4 conditions and classified as Select Agents frequently involves the transfer of inactivated materials to lower containment levels for downstream analyses. Adhering to Select Agent and BSL-4 safety regulations requires validation or verification of the inactivation procedures, which comes with an array of challenges for each method. This includes the use of cytotoxic reagents for chemical inactivation and defining the precise inactivation parameters for physical inactivation. Here, we provide a workflow for various inactivation methods using Ebola, Nipah, and Lassa viruses as our examples. We choose three distinct inactivation methods (TRIzol/TRIzol LS, aldehyde fixation using different fixatives, and heat) to highlight the challenges of each method and provide possible solutions. We show that, whereas published chemical inactivation methods are highly reliable, the parameters for heat inactivation must be clearly defined to ensure complete inactivation. In addition to the inactivation data, we also provide examples and templates for the documentation required for approval and use of inactivation SOPs, including an inactivation report, the procedure sections of developed SOPs, and an electronic inactivation certificate that accompanies inactivated samples. The provided information can be used as a roadmap for similar studies at high and maximum containment laboratories.

Transcriptome profiling highlights regulated biological processes and type III interferon antiviral responses upon Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus infection.

Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV) is a biosafety level-4 (BSL-4) pathogen that causes Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) characterized by hemorrhagic manifestation, multiple organ failure and high mortality rate, posing great threat to public health. Despite the recently increasing research efforts on CCHFV, host cell responses associated with CCHFV infection remain to be further characterized. Here, to better understand the cellular response to CCHFV infection, we performed a transcriptomic analysis in human kidney HEK293 â€‹cells by high-throughput RNA sequencing (RNA-seq) technology. In total, 496 differentially expressed genes (DEGs), including 361 up-regulated and 135 down-regulated genes, were identified in CCHFV-infected cells. These regulated genes were mainly involved in host processes including defense response to virus, response to stress, regulation of viral process, immune response, metabolism, stimulus, apoptosis and protein catabolic process. Therein, a significant up-regulation of type III interferon (IFN) signaling pathway as well as endoplasmic reticulum (ER) stress response was especially remarkable. Subsequently, representative DEGs from these processes were well validated by RT-qPCR, confirming the RNA-seq results and the typical regulation of IFN responses and ER stress by CCHFV. Furthermore, we demonstrate that not only type I but also type III IFNs (even at low dosages) have substantial anti-CCHFV activities. Collectively, the data may provide new and comprehensive insights into the virus-host interactions and particularly highlights the potential role of type III IFNs in restricting CCHFV, which may help inform further mechanistic delineation of the viral infection and development of anti-CCHFV strategies.

Development of a Novel Positive Pressure Protective Suit for a Biosafety Level 4 Laboratory in Japan.

Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories are necessary to study microorganisms that are highly pathogenic to humans and have no prevention or therapeutic measures. Currently, most BSL-4 facilities have suit-type laboratories to conduct experiments on highly pathogenic microorganisms. In 2021, the first Japanese suit-type BSL-4 laboratory was constructed at Nagasaki University. Positive pressure protection suit (PPPS) is a primary barrier that protects and isolates laboratory workers from pathogens and the laboratory environment. Here, we developed a novel PPPS originally designed to be used in the Nagasaki BSL-4 laboratory. We modified several parts of a domestic chemical protective suit, including its front face shield, cuff, and air supply hose, for safe handling of microbiological agents. The improved suit, PS-790BSL4-AL, showed resistance to several chemicals, including quaternary ammonium disinfectant, and did not show any permeation against blood and phages. To validate the suit's integrity, we also established an airtight test that eliminated individual differences for quantitative testing. In conclusion, our developed suit performs sufficiently as a primary barrier and allows for the safe handling of pathogens in our new BSL-4 laboratory.

Nipah and Hendra Viruses: Deadly Zoonotic Paramyxoviruses with the Potential to Cause the Next Pandemic.

Nipah and Hendra viruses are deadly zoonotic paramyxoviruses with a case fatality rate of upto 75%. The viruses belong to the genus henipavirus in the family Paramyxoviridae, a family of negative-sense single-stranded RNA viruses. The natural reservoirs of NiV and HeV are bats (flying foxes) in which the virus infection is asymptomatic. The intermediate hosts for NiV and HeV are swine and equine, respectively. In humans, NiV infections result in severe and often fatal respiratory and neurological manifestations. The Nipah virus was first identified in Malaysia and Singapore following an outbreak of encephalitis in pig farmers and subsequent outbreaks have been reported in Bangladesh and India almost every year. Due to its extreme pathogenicity, pandemic potential, and lack of established antiviral therapeutics and vaccines, research on henipaviruses is highly warranted so as to develop antivirals or vaccines that could aid in the prevention and control of future outbreaks.

Maintaining differential pressure gradients does not increase safety inside modern BSL-4 laboratories.

This article discusses a previously unrecognized contradiction in the design of biosafety level-4 (BSL-4) suit laboratories, also known as maximum or high containment laboratories. For decades, it is suggested that both directional airflow and pressure differentials are essential safety measures to prevent the release of pathogens into the environment and to avoid cross-contamination between laboratory rooms. Despite the absence of an existing evidence-based risk analyses demonstrating increased safety by directional airflow and pressure differentials in BSL-4 laboratories, they were anchored in various national regulations. Currently, the construction and operation of BSL-4 laboratories are subject to rigorous quality and technical requirements including airtight containment. Over time, BSL-4 laboratories evolved to enormously complex technical infrastructures. With the aim to counterbalance this development towards technical simplification while still maintaining maximum safety, we provide a detailed risk analysis by calculating pathogen mitigation in maximum contamination scenarios. The results presented and discussed herein, indicate that both directional airflow or a differential pressure gradient in airtight rooms within a secondary BSL-4 containment do not increase biosafety, and are not necessary. Likewise, reduction of pressure zones from the outside into the secondary containment may also provide sufficient environmental protection. We encourage laboratory design professionals to consider technical simplification and policymakers to adapt corresponding legislation and regulations surrounding directional airflow and pressure differentials for technically airtight BSL-4 laboratories.