An integrative framework of conflict and control.

People regularly encounter various types of conflict. Here, we ask if, and, if so, how, different types of conflict, from lab-based Stroop conflicts to everyday-life self-control or moral conflicts, are related to one other. We present a framework that assumes that action-goal representations are hierarchically organized, ranging from concrete actions to abstract goals. The framework's key assumption is that conflicts involving more abstract goals (e.g., self-control/moral conflict) are embedded in a more complex action space; thus, to resolve such conflicts, people need to consider more associated goals and actions. We discuss how differences in complexity impact conflict resolution mechanisms and the costs/benefits of resolving conflicts. Altogether, we offer a new way to conceptualize and analyze conflict regulation across different domains.

Choosing between bad and worse: investigating choice in moral dilemmas through the lens of control.

People's preferences for the utilitarian outcome in sacrificial moral dilemmas, where a larger group of individuals are saved at the cost of a few, have been argued to be influenced by various factors. Taking expected utility (EU) theory into consideration, we investigate whether the expected effectiveness of actions elucidate certain inconsistencies in moral judgments. Additionally, we also explore whether participants' role in the dilemma as the executor or a superior who merely makes a decision, which is carried out by a subordinate, influences judgments-a factor generally overlooked by classical EU models. We test these hypotheses using a modified moral dilemma paradigm with a choice between two actions, one highly successful and the other more likely to fail. Both actions are either expected to result in a favorable outcome of saving five individuals by sacrificing one or an unfavorable outcome of sacrificing five to save one. When the efficient action is anticipated to lead to a favorable outcome, in line with EU models, people almost invariably choose the efficient action. However, in conditions where the EUs associated with efficient and inefficient actions are close to each other, people's choice for favored outcome is above chance when they act as agents themselves. We discuss the implications of our results for existing theories of moral judgments.

Do Adverse Childhood Experiences Make Us More Utilitarian in Moral Dilemmas?

Purpose: Adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) have been associated with various aspects of morality, but their precise impact on moral decision-making remains unclear. This study aims to explore how ACEs influence moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas. Methods: Study 1 employed traditional dilemma analysis to quantify utilitarian responses and compare them among groups with no, low, and high ACEs. Study 2 utilized the CNI model to quantify three determinants of moral decision-making: sensitivity to consequences (C parameter), sensitivity to norms (N parameter), and general action tendencies (I parameter). Differences in these parameters among groups with no, low, and high ACEs were investigated. Results: Both Study 1 and Study 2 revealed that the high-ACE and low-ACE groups showed significantly higher utilitarian responses compared to the no-ACE group. However, no notable differences emerged between the high-ACE and low-ACE groups. Study 2 found that the N parameter was significantly lower in the high-ACE group compared to the low and no-ACE groups. Similarly, the low-ACE group exhibited significantly lower scores in the N parameter compared to the no-ACE group. Additionally, no significant differences were observed in the C and I parameters among groups with no, low, and high ACEs. Conclusion: These findings suggest that individuals with a high number of ACEs tend to exhibit more utilitarian responses, attributed to decreased affective response to the violation of moral rules, rather than increased deliberative cost-benefit reasoning or a general preference for action. Such insights deepen our understanding of the precise aspects of moral decision-making influenced by ACEs.

Conflict in moral and nonmoral decision making: an empirical study coupled with a computational model.

While moral psychology research has extensively studied decision making using moral dilemmas, such high-conflict situations may not fully represent all moral decisions. Moreover, most studies on the effect of conflict have focused on nonmoral decisions, and it is unclear how it applies to the moral realm. The present mixed-method research investigates how conflict impacts moral compared to nonmoral decision making. In a preregistered empirical study ( N = 42 ), participants made moral and nonmoral decisions with varying levels of conflict while their mouse trajectories were recorded. Results indicate that moral decisions were more stable in the presence of conflict, while still seeking compromise. In addition, decisions were more affected when conflict got higher. Mouse-tracking data further indicate that some factors are impacting the decision process earlier than others, supporting the relevance of tracing methods to dig into finer-grained decision dynamics. We also present a computational model that aims to capture decision mechanisms and how conflict and morality influence decision making. The model uses dynamic neural fields coupled with sensorimotor control to map a continuous decision space. Two model versions were compared: one with greater perceptual weight for moral information, and another with earlier processing of moral versus nonmoral information. The simulated data more successfully reproduced empirical patterns for the second version, thus providing insights into the underlying decision processes for both moral and nonmoral decisions, in the presence of conflict or not.

Cognitive control in honesty and dishonesty under different conflict scenarios: insights from reaction time.

This study investigated the role of cognitive control in moral decision-making, focusing on conflicts between financial temptations and the integrity of honesty. We employed a perceptual task by asking participants to identify which side of the diagonal contained more red dots within a square to provoke both honest and dishonest behaviors, tracking their reaction times (RTs). Participants encountered situations with no conflict, ambiguous conflict, and clear conflict. Their behaviors in the clear conflict condition categorized them as either "honest" or "dishonest." Our findings suggested that, in ambiguous conflict situations, honest individuals had significantly longer RTs and fewer self-interest responses than their dishonest counterparts, suggesting a greater need for cognitive control to resolve conflicts and a lesser tendency toward self-interest. Moreover, a negative correlation was found between participants' number of self-interest responses and RTs in ambiguous conflict situations (r = -0.27 in study 1 and r = -0.66 in study 2), and a positive correlation with cheating numbers in clear conflict situations (r = 0.36 in study 1 and r = 0.82 in study 2). This suggests less cognitive control was required for self-interest and cheating responses, bolstering the "Will" hypothesis. We also found that a person's self-interest tendency could predict their dishonest behavior. These insights extend our understanding of the role of cognitive control plays in honesty and dishonesty, with potential applications in education, policy-making, and business ethics.

Intact moral decision-making in adults with moderate-severe traumatic brain injury.

Background and aim: Deficits in decision-making are a common consequence of moderate-severe traumatic brain injury (TBI). Less is known, however, about how individuals with TBI perform on moral decision-making tasks. To address this gap in the literature, the current study probed moral decision-making in a sample of individuals with TBI using a widely employed experimental measure. Methods/hypothesis: We administered a set of 50 trolley-type dilemmas to 31 individuals with TBI and 31 demographically matched, neurotypical comparison participants. We hypothesized that individuals with TBI would be more likely to offer utilitarian responses to personal dilemmas than neurotypical peers. Results: In contrast to our hypothesis, we observed that individuals with TBI were not more likely to offer utilitarian responses for personal dilemmas. Conclusion: Our results suggest that moral decision-making ability is not uniformly impaired following TBI. Rather, neuroanatomical (lesion location) and demographic (age at injury) characteristics may be more predictive of a disruption in moral decision-making than TBI diagnosis or injury severity alone. These results inform the neurobiology of moral decision-making and have implications for characterizing patterns of spared and impaired cognitive abilities in TBI.

Evidence for a dissociation between moral reasoning and moral decision-making in Tourette syndrome.

Despite the growing interest on how Tourette syndrome (TS) affects social cognition skills, this field remains to date relatively under-explored. Here, we aim to advance knowledge on the topic by studying moral decision-making and moral reasoning in a group of adolescents with TS and a group of healthy controls. Overall, we found higher endorsement (i.e. a greater 'yes' response rate) for utilitarian solutions of incidental and instrumental moral dilemmas in TS compared to controls. By contrast, we reported an overall higher tendency of TS individuals to apply principles described in the moral foundation questionnaire to establish whether something is morally right or wrong. Our results document intact moral reasoning in TS and suggest that a deficit in suppressing inappropriate behaviours and/or altered sense of agency might be responsible for their higher utilitarian moral decision-making.

When Do Korsakoff Patients Justify Immoral Behaviors? The Influence of Premorbid Delinquency and Self-Other Perspectives in Moral Decision-Making and Moral Reasoning.

Korsakoff's syndrome (KS) is a chronic neuropsychiatric disorder caused by a vitamin B1 deficiency. KS is characterized by profound amnesia and often accompanied by poor executive functioning, decreased social-cognitive abilities, and difficulties in behavioral regulation. As moral behaviors and attitudes may provide insight in socio-behavioral interactions, the current study aimed to evaluate everyday moral maturity by administering self- versus other-oriented moral dilemmas in a group of KS patients (n = 20) and healthy controls (n = 20). Responses were scored according to the Kohlberg stages of moral reasoning. Furthermore, we assessed premorbid delinquency and current neurocognitive functioning as possible relevant factors. Our results show that KS patients were prone to lower levels of moral maturity when confronted with moral dilemmas relating to themselves, compared to dilemmas relating to (un)personal others in KS patients, while healthy subjects showed an opposite pattern. Moral immaturity could find its origin already before the onset of the KS diagnosis, as suggested by the elevated premorbid levels of delinquent behavior and correlation between premorbid delinquency and moral maturity in KS. Lower moral maturity could therefore be a possible predisposing factor to both delinquency and later development of Korsakoff's syndrome.

When tainted money should fund public goods: fundraising professional and public moral preferences.

Philanthropy is essential to public goods such as education and research, arts and culture, and the provision of services to those in need. Providers of public goods commonly struggle with the dilemma of whether to accept donations from morally tainted donors. Ethicists also disagree on how to manage tainted donations. Forgoing such donations reduces opportunities for societal well-being and advancement; however, accepting them can damage institutional and individual reputations. Half of professional fundraisers have faced tainted donors, but only around a third of their institutions had relevant policies (n = 52). Here, we draw on two large samples of US laypeople (ns = 2,019; 2,566) and a unique sample of experts (professional fundraisers, n = 694) to provide empirical insights into various aspects of tainted donations that affect moral acceptability: the nature of the moral taint (criminal or morally ambiguous behavior), donation size, anonymity, and institution type. We find interesting patterns of convergence (rejecting criminal donations), divergence (professionals' aversion to large tainted donations), and indifference (marginal role of anonymity) across the samples. Laypeople also applied slightly higher standards to universities and museums than to charities. Our results provide evidence of how complex moral trade-offs are resolved differentially, and can thus motivate and inform policy development for institutions dealing with controversial donors.

What language does your heart speak? The influence of foreign language on moral judgements and emotions related to unrealistic and realistic moral dilemmas.

Emotional attenuation in a second language is believed to be one of the main causes of the Moral Foreign Language effect (MFLe). However, evidence on the mediating role of emotion in the relationship between language and moral judgements is limited and mainly derives from unrealistic moral dilemmas. We conducted two studies to investigate (1) whether the MFLe is present in both unrealistic (Study 1) and realistic (Study 2) moral dilemmas, and (2) whether this effect can be attributed to reduced emotionality. In Study 1, the MFLe was found in the moral judgements made by Spanish-English bilinguals. However, the same pattern was not observed in Greek Cypriot-English bilinguals' moral judgements, and this result was attributed to the prominent role of English in Cyprus. In Study 2, the MFLe extended to realistic moral dilemmas when the outcome of the action entailed the violation of a social norm. Study 1 and Study 2 also revealed that these bilinguals experienced a wide range of emotions in their L1 and L2, which did not differ significantly across languages. Mediation analyses further indicated that the MFLe was not mediated by emotional blunting, which made us consider alternative explanations for the MFLe.

Acute Social Stress Influences Moral Decision-Making Under Different Social Distances in Young Healthy Men.

Acute social stress has been shown to influence social decision-making. This study aimed to examine how social distance modulates the influence of acute social stress on young male moral decision-making. Sixty healthy male college students were randomly divided to be exposed to the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) or a placebo version of the TSST (P-TSST) before they performed moral decision-making tasks. The results showed that participants under acute social stress showed obvious increases in subjective stress perception, negative affect, salivary cortisol, and alpha-amylase and made more altruistic choices for others compared to the control group. However, social distance regulates the promotion of this acute social stress, with the promotion effect being stronger in socially distant others. Furthermore, the interpersonal order difference of different social distances in altruistic decisions is smaller in low-conflict dilemmas than in high-conflict dilemmas. In addition, an increase in salivary cortisol was positively correlated with altruistic choices toward both acquaintances and strangers, whereas an increase in salivary alpha-amylase was only positively correlated with altruistic choices toward friends. The results suggest that social distance modulates the promotion of acute social stress on moral decision-making, which might stem from the divergent effects of cortisol and alpha-amylase.

Amygdala connectivity and aggression.

Neurobiological models propose that reactive aggression is predicated on impairments in amygdala-prefrontal connectivity that subserves moral decision-making and emotion regulation. The amygdala is a key component within this neural network that modulates reactive aggression. We provide a review of amygdala dysfunctional brain networks leading to reactive aggressive behavior. We elaborate on key concepts, focusing on moral decision-making and emotion regulation in a developmental context, and brain network connectivity factors relating to amygdala (dys)function-factors which we suggest predispose to reactive aggression. We additionally discuss insights into the latest treatment interventions, providing the utilization of the scientific findings for practice.

To bridge or not to bridge: Moral Judgement in Cocaine Use Disorders, a case-control study on human morality.

BACKGROUND: In the "Dual-Process theory", morality is characterized by the interaction between an automatic-emotional process, mediated by the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and linked to personal-deontological decisions, and a rational-conscious one, mediated by the Dorso-Lateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) and linked to impersonal-utilitarian decisions. These areas are altered by chronic use of cocaine, with a possible impact on moral decision-making. OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the difference between a group of Cocaine Use Disorder (CUD) patients and a control group in moral decision-making. METHODS: Subjects with CUD were compared to an equal-sized healthy group regarding their moral decision-making. Trolley and Footbridge Moral Dilemmas were administered to each group. The quality of the answer (yes or no) and the time needed to answer were recorded. RESULTS: The recruited group includes 72 subjects, 36 with CUD and 36 healthy subjects (average age of 39.51 ± 9.89). In the Trolley dilemma, almost all the subjects (97.3%) answered "yes", while in the Footbridge dilemma CUD subjects answered "yes" more often (52.7%) than the healthy group (19.4%). CONCLUSION: For strong emotional dilemmas (Footbridge), cocaine users answered "yes" with a higher frequency compared to healthy subjects, highlighting a wider utilitarian tendency in decision-making and a poor emotional participation.

Effects of Alexithymia on Moral Decision-Making in Sacrificial Dilemmas: High Alexithymia is Associated with Weaker Sensitivity to Moral Norms.

Purpose: Although several studies have investigated the association between alexithymia and moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas, the evidence remains mixed. The current work investigated this association and how alexithymia affects moral choice in such dilemmas. Methods: The current research used a multinomial model (ie, CNI model) to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms in responses to moral dilemmas. Results: Higher levels of alexithymia were associated with a greater preference for utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (Study 1). Furthermore, individuals with high alexithymia showed significantly weaker sensitivity to moral norms than did those with low alexithymia, whereas there were no significant differences in sensitivity to consequences or a general preference for inaction versus action (Study 2). Conclusion: The findings suggest that alexithymia affects moral choice in sacrificial dilemmas by blunting emotional reactions to causing harm, rather than through increased deliberative cost-benefit reasoning or general preference for inaction.

Psychopathic Traits and Utilitarian Moral Judgment Revisited.

To provide deeper insights into the relationships between psychopathic traits and utilitarian moral judgment, we studied N = 702 adults using three psychopathy scales: (a) the Levenson's Self-report Psychopathy Scale; (b) the Psychopathic Personality Inventory; and (c) the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure; and three measures of utilitarian moral judgment: (a) trolley dilemmas; (b) the Consequences, Norms, and Inaction (CNI) model of moral decision-making; and (c) the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale. When using the traditional approach to moral judgment (i.e., trolley dilemmas, instrumental harm, traditional score from the CNI model), we found that higher levels of psychopathic traits were associated with a higher utilitarian tendency. When using the modeling approach, we found that a higher level of psychopathic traits was related to weaker sensitivity to moral norms and less action averse in morally problematic situations. In addition, we found negative associations between impartial beneficence and all psychopathy scores.

Towards machine learning for moral choice analysis in health economics: A literature review and research agenda.

BACKGROUND: Discrete choice models (DCMs) for moral choice analysis will likely lead to erroneous model outcomes and misguided policy recommendations, as only some characteristics of moral decision-making are considered. Machine learning (ML) is recently gaining interest in the field of discrete choice modelling. This paper explores the potential of combining DCMs and ML to study moral decision-making more accurately and better inform policy decisions in healthcare. METHODS: An interdisciplinary literature search across four databases - PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and Arxiv - was conducted to gather papers. Based on the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic and Meta-analyses (PRISMA) guideline, studies were screened for eligibility on inclusion criteria and extracted attributes from eligible papers. Of the 6285 articles, we included 277 studies. RESULTS: DCMs have shortcomings in studying moral decision-making. Whilst the DCMs' mathematical elegance and behavioural appeal hold clear interpretations, the models do not account for the 'moral' cost and benefit in an individual's utility calculation. The literature showed that ML obtains higher predictive power, model flexibility, and ability to handle large and unstructured datasets. Combining the strengths of ML methods with DCMs has the potential for studying moral decision-making. CONCLUSIONS: By providing a research agenda, this paper highlights that ML has clear potential to i) find and deepen the utility specification of DCMs, and ii) enrich the insights extracted from DCMs by considering the intrapersonal determinants of moral decision-making.

Warmer Individuals Get More Help: The Influence of Stereotypes and Empathy on Moral Decision-Making.

The processing of moral decision-making is influenced by both cognitive and emotional systems, making it worth exploring exactly how each plays a role in the process of individual moral decision-making. In this study, 160 participants with either high or low empathy traits (80 each, as determined by the Interpersonal Response Index Inventory) completed a moral decision-making task regarding whether to help others (stereotyped as high warmth-high competence, high warmth-low competence, low warmth-high competence, low warmth-low competence) at the expense of themselves. The intent was to explore the influence of stereotypes and empathy traits on moral decision-making. The results showed that: (1) participants were more willing to help individuals with high warmth than those with high competence, showing a clear "primacy of warmth effect"; (2) this effect was weakened in participants with high empathy traits in comparison to those with low empathy traits, as their willingness to help individuals with low warmth was significantly higher than that of participants with low empathy traits. The results suggest that stereotypes about warmth and competence moderate altruistic tendencies in moral decision-making and that this moderation is more pronounced in individuals with low empathy traits than in those with high empathy traits.

Cognitive decline, socioemotional change, or both? How the science of aging can inform future research on sacrificial moral dilemmas.

Older adults comprise the fastest-growing population in the United States. By exercising their right to vote, guiding the value systems of future generations, and holding political office, they shape the moral context of society. It is therefore imperative that we understand older adults' capacity for moral decision-making. Although the vast majority of research on moral decision-making has either focused specifically on younger adults or has not considered age, recent work points to age-related differences in sacrificial moral decision-making, with cognitively healthy older adults making more deontological decisions relative to younger adults. Although only a small number of studies have to date examined age-related differences, there is a wealth of relevant literature on cognitive aging, as well as on sacrificial moral decision-making in younger adults, that point to possible mechanistic explanations for the observed age-related differences. The goal of this review is to situate these age-related differences in sacrificial moral decision-making in the context of these existing literatures in order to guide future, theory-informed, research in this area. We specifically highlight age-related decline in cognitive abilities purported to support utilitarian moral decision-making in younger adults, along with age-related changes to socioemotional information processing as potential mechanistic explanations for these age-related differences. The last section of this review discusses how age-related neural changes may contribute to both cognitive decline and motivational shifts, highlighting the importance for future research to understand brain-behavior relationships on the topic of sacrificial moral decision-making and aging.

Moral decision-making in pettism: The influence of animal type, pet ownership status, and social distance.

Speciesism prioritizes humans over animals and pets. Nevertheless, pet owners have a strong attachment bond with their pets, which makes their hierarchical view of pets less clear. Aiming to examine this issue, we present a dilemma involving animals and humans that allowed us to investigate whether animal type, social distance, and pet ownership status can affect moral decision-making related to pets. Save-willingness results showed that in the moral dilemmas of pets versus livestock versus wild animals (Studies 1a and 2a) and their own pets versus strangers (Studies 1b and 2b), pet owners prioritize pets whereas non-owners prioritize pets (Studies 1a and 2a) and strangers (Studies 1b and 2b). Pet owners prefer to save pets more than do non-owners (Study 1a), and this effect was only observed in females (Study 2a). Save-decision results showed that in the moral dilemmas of pets versus livestock versus wild animals (Study 2a), pet owners prioritize pets whereas in the dilemmas of pets versus strangers (Study 2b), pet owners prioritize strangers. The same result was found in non-owners. Pet owners prefer more than do non-owners to save pets (Study 2). Overall, the separation of save-willingness and save-decision results revealed that pet owners show special speciesism (i.e., pettism).

Dissociating the Multiple Psychological Processes in Everyday Moral Decision-Making with the CAN Algorithm.

In previous research frameworks, researchers used an everyday dilemma to test people's altruistic versus egoistic inclination. However, there are at least three different psychological processes that could induce altruistic over egoistic decisions, i.e., stronger altruistic sensitivity, weaker egoistic sensitivity, and stronger overall action versus inaction preference. To dissociate these different psychological processes, we developed new materials and applied the CAN algorithm from traditional moral dilemma research in two studies. In Study 1, we designed scenarios varying with a 2 (egoistic/non-egoistic) × 2 (non-altruistic/altruistic) structure. Then, we recruited 209 participants to validate the scenarios and filtered six scene frameworks with 24 scenarios in total. In Study 2, we recruited 747 participants to judge whether they would conduct behavior that is simultaneously altruistic (or non-altruistic) and egoistic (or non-egoistic) in the filtered scenarios obtained from Study 1. They also filled in the Social Isolation Scale, Distress Disclosure Scale, and some other demographic information. As we dissociated the psychological processes using the CAN algorithm, significant correlations between social isolation and distress disclosure and three parameters (i.e., altruistic tendency, egoistic tendency, and overall action/inaction preference) underlying the altruistic choice were revealed to varying degrees. Other individual differences in the psychological processes in everyday moral decision-making were further demonstrated. Our study provided materials and methodological protocols to dissociate the multiple psychological processes in everyday moral decision-making. It promotes our insights on everyday moral decisions from a differential psychological processes perspective.