Trends in Hospital Lawsuits Filed Against Patients for Unpaid Bills Following Published Research About This Activity.

Importance: Suing patients and garnishing their wages for unpaid medical bills can be a predatory form of financial activity that may be inconsistent with the mission of a hospital. Many hospitals in the state of Virginia were discovered to be suing patients for unpaid medical bills, as first presented in a 2019 research article that launched 2.5 months of media attention on hospital billing practices and a grassroots public demand for hospitals to stop the practice. Objective: To evaluate the association of a research publication and subsequent media coverage with the number of hospital lawsuits filed against patients for unpaid medical bills. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study of Virginia hospitals that sued patients for unpaid medical bills used an interrupted time series analysis. Data on hospitals suing patients for unpaid medical bills were collected during a preintervention period (June 25, 2018, to June 24, 2019), an intervention period (June 25, 2019, to September 10, 2019), and a postintervention period (September 11, 2019, to September 10, 2020). Exposures: Publication of a research article and subsequent media coverage. Main Outcomes and Measures: The total number of warrant in debt and wage garnishment lawsuits filed by Virginia hospitals and the frequency of those lawsuits filed before, during, and after the intervention period on a weekly basis. Results: A total of 50 387 lawsuits, filed by 67 Virginia hospitals, were included; 33 204 (65.9%) were warrant in debt lawsuits, and 17 183 (34.1%) were wage garnishment lawsuits. From the preintervention period to the postintervention period, there was a 59% decrease in the number of lawsuits filed (from 30 760 lawsuits to 12 510 lawsuits), a 55% decrease in the number of warrant in debt cases filed (from 19 329 to 8651), a 66% decrease in the number of wage garnishments filed (from 11 431 to 3859), and a 64% decrease in the dollar amount pursued in court (from $38 700 209 to $13 960 300). During the study period, 11 hospitals banned the practice of suing patients for unpaid medical bills. The interrupted time series analysis showed a significant decrease of 5% (incidence rate ratio, 0.95; 95% CI, 0.94-0.96) in the total weekly number of lawsuits in the postintervention period. Conclusions and Relevance: The findings of this study suggest that research leading to public awareness can shift hospital billing practices.

Management Strategies and Patient Selection After a Hospital Funding Reform for Prostate Cancer Surgery in Canada.

Importance: Hospital funding reforms for prostate cancer surgery may have altered management of localized prostate cancer in the province of Ontario, Canada. Objective: To determine whether changes in hospital funding policy aimed at improving health care quality and value were associated with changes in the management of localized prostate cancer or the characteristics of patients receiving radical prostatectomy (RP) for localized prostate cancer. Design, Setting, and Participants: This population-based, interrupted time series study used linked population-based administrative data regarding adults in Ontario with incidental localized prostate cancer and those who underwent RP for localized prostate cancer. Patients who underwent RP were compared with patients who underwent surgical procedures for localized renal cell carcinoma, which was not included in the policy change but was subjected to similar secular trends and potential confounders. Monthly outcomes were analyzed using interventional autoregressive integrated moving average models. Data were collected from January 2011 to November 2017 and analyzed in January 2019. Exposures: Funding policy change in April 2015 from flexible block funding for all hospital-based care to prespecified payment amounts per procedure for treatment of localized prostate cancer, coupled with the dissemination of a diagnosis-specific handbook outlining best practices. Main Outcomes and Measures: Initial management (RP vs radiation therapy vs active surveillance) and tumor risk profiles per management strategy among incident cases of localized prostate cancer. Additional outcomes were case volume, mean length of stay, proportion of patients returning to hospital or emergency department within 30 days, proportion of patients older than 65 years, mean Charlson Comorbidity Index, and proportion of minimally invasive surgical procedures among patients undergoing RP for localized prostate cancer. Results: A total of 33 128 patients with incident localized prostate cancer (median [interquartile range (IQR)] age, 67 [61-73] years; median [IQR] cases per monthly observation interval, 466 [420-516]), 17 159 patients who received radical prostatectomy (median [IQR] age, 63 [58-68] years; median [IQR] cases per monthly observation interval, 209 [183-225]), and 5762 individuals who underwent surgery for renal cell carcinoma (median [IQR] age, 62 [53-70] years; median [IQR] cases per monthly observation interval, 71 [61-77]) were identified. By the end of the observation period, radical prostatectomy and radiation therapy were used in comparable proportions (30.3% and 28.9%, respectively) and included only a small fraction of low-risk patients (6.4% and 2.9%, respectively). No statistically significant association of the funding policy change with most outcomes was found. Conclusions and Relevance: The implementation of funding reform for hospitals offering RP was not associated with changes in the management of localized prostate cancer, although it may have encouraged more appropriate selection of patients for RP. Mostly preexisting trends toward guideline-conforming practice were observed. Co-occurring policy changes and/or guideline revisions may have weakened signals from the policy change.

Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Policy Changes and Fiscal Year 2018 Rates; Quality Reporting Requirements for Specific Providers; Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program Requirements for Eligible Hospitals, Critical Access Hospitals, and Eligible Professionals; Provider-Based Status of Indian Health Service and Tribal Facilities and Organizations; Costs Reporting and Provider Requirements; Agreement Termination Notices. Final rule.

We are revising the Medicare hospital inpatient prospective payment systems (IPPS) for operating and capital-related costs of acute care hospitals to implement changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems for FY 2018. Some of these changes implement certain statutory provisions contained in the Pathway for Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) Reform Act of 2013, the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, the 21st Century Cures Act, and other legislation. We also are making changes relating to the provider-based status of Indian Health Service (IHS) and Tribal facilities and organizations and to the low-volume hospital payment adjustment for hospitals operated by the IHS or a Tribe. In addition, we are providing the market basket update that will apply to the rate-of-increase limits for certain hospitals excluded from the IPPS that are paid on a reasonable cost basis subject to these limits for FY 2018. We are updating the payment policies and the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) for FY 2018. In addition, we are establishing new requirements or revising existing requirements for quality reporting by specific Medicare providers (acute care hospitals, PPS-exempt cancer hospitals, LTCHs, and inpatient psychiatric facilities). We also are establishing new requirements or revising existing requirements for eligible professionals (EPs), eligible hospitals, and critical access hospitals (CAHs) participating in the Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Programs. We are updating policies relating to the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, and the Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction Program. We also are making changes relating to transparency of accrediting organization survey reports and plans of correction of providers and suppliers; electronic signature and electronic submission of the Certification and Settlement Summary page of the Medicare cost reports; and clarification of provider disposal of assets.

Tracking rural hospital closures.

(1) Over 50 percent of primary care health professional shortage areas (HPSAs) were in rural areas in November 2016, according to the Health Resources and Services Administration. (2) Rural areas face a higher uninsured rate than metropolitan areas. (3) Rural hospitals tend to have low patient volume, a high portion of patients on Medicare and Medicaid, and a high number of uninsured patients.

Assessing Medicare's hospital pay-for-performance programs and whether they are achieving their goals.

Three separate pay-for-performance programs affect the amount of Medicare payment for inpatient services to about 3,400 US hospitals. These payments are based on hospital performance on specified measures of quality of care. A growing share of Medicare hospital payments (6 percent by 2017) are dependent upon how hospitals perform under the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, the Value-Based Purchasing Program, and the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program. In 2015 four of five hospitals subject to these programs will be penalized under one or more of them, and more than one in three major teaching hospitals will be penalized under all three. Interactions among these programs should be considered going forward, including overlap among measures and differences in scoring performance.

Why Medicare Advantage Plans Pay hospitals traditional Medicare prices.

The policy community generally has assumed Medicare Advantage (MA) plans negotiate hospital payment rates similar to those for commercial insurance products and well above those in traditional Medicare. After surveying senior hospital and health plan executives, we found, however, that MA plans nominally pay only 100-105 percent of traditional Medicare rates and, in real economic terms, possibly less. Respondents broadly identified three primary reasons for near-payment equivalence: statutory and regulatory provisions that limit out-of-network payments to traditional Medicare rates, de facto budget constraints that MA plans face because of the need to compete with traditional Medicare and other MA plans, and a market equilibrium that permits relatively lower MA rates as long as commercial rates remain well above the traditional Medicare rates. We explored a number of policy implications not only for the MA program but also for the problem of high and variable hospital prices in commercial insurance markets.

Privatización o liderazgo profesional / Privatization or professional leadership

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