Radiation safety during remediation of the SevRAO facilities: 10 years of regulatory experience.

In compliance with the fundamentals of the government's policy in the field of nuclear and radiation safety approved by the President of the Russian Federation, Russia has developed a national program for decommissioning of its nuclear legacy. Under this program, the State Atomic Energy Corporation 'Rosatom' is carrying out remediation of a Site for Temporary Storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste (RW) at Andreeva Bay located in Northwest Russia. The short term plan includes implementation of the most critical stage of remediation, which involves the recovery of SNF from what have historically been poorly maintained storage facilities. SNF and RW are stored in non-standard conditions in tanks designed in some cases for other purposes. It is planned to transport recovered SNF to PA 'Mayak' in the southern Urals. This article analyses the current state of the radiation safety supervision of workers and the public in terms of the regulatory preparedness to implement effective supervision of radiation safety during radiation-hazardous operations. It presents the results of long-term radiation monitoring, which serve as informative indicators of the effectiveness of the site remediation and describes the evolving radiation situation. The state of radiation protection and health care service support for emergency preparedness is characterized by the need to further study the issues of the regulator-operator interactions to prevent and mitigate consequences of a radiological accident at the facility. Having in mind the continuing intensification of practical management activities related to SNF and RW in the whole of northwest Russia, it is reasonable to coordinate the activities of the supervision bodies within a strategic master plan. Arrangements for this master plan are discussed, including a proposed programme of actions to enhance the regulatory supervision in order to support accelerated mitigation of threats related to the nuclear legacy in the area.

A best fit approach to estimating multiple diffuse source terms using ambient air monitoring data and an air dispersion model.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory uses CAP88-PC Version 1.0 modeling software to demonstrate compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations Title 40 Part 61 Subpart H (National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities). Annual air emissions from both well characterized stack sources and difficult to characterize diffuse sources must be assessed. This paper describes a process that uses a mathematical optimization routine to find a set of estimated diffuse source terms that together with the measured stack source terms provides a best fit of modeled air concentrations to measured air concentrations at available sampling locations. The estimated and measured source terms may then be used in subsequent CAP88-PC modeling to estimate dose at the off-site maximally exposed individual. LLNL has found this process to be an effective way to deal with the required assessment of diffuse sources that have otherwise been difficult to assess.

Comparison of CAP88 PC Ver. 3.0 and MAXDOSE dose assessment models involving co-located stack releases at the Savannah River site.

The Savannah River National Laboratory's Environmental Dosimetry Group performs dosimetry assessments for Savannah River Site (SRS) radionuclide air emissions utilizing the Clean Air Act Assessment Package-1988 (CAP88) code (CAP88 PC Ver. 3.0) and the MAXDOSE-SR Ver. 2011 code, which is an SRS-specific version of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's MAXIGASP code. CAP88 PC and MAXDOSE-SR are used at SRS for demonstrating compliance with Environmental Protection Agency dose standards for radionuclide emissions to the atmosphere and Department of Energy Order 458.1 dose standards, respectively. During a routine comparison of these two assessment models, it was discovered that CAP88 PC Ver. 3.0 was not producing the expected results when using multiple co-located stacks in a single run. Specifically, if the stack heights are considered separately, the results for several radionuclides (but not all) differ from the combined run [i.e., 1 + 2 does not equal (1+2)]. Additionally, when two or more stack heights are considered in a run, the results depend on the order of the selected stack heights. For example, for a two stack-height run of 0 meter and 61 m input produces different results from a 61 m and 0 m input run. This study presents a comparison of CAP88 PC Ver. 3.0 and MAXDOSE-SR Ver. 2011 based on SRS input data and on two-stack release scenarios. The selected radionuclides for this study included gases/vapors (H, C, Kr, and I) and particulates (Sr, Cs, Pu, and Am) commonly encountered at SRS.

[Contemporary legislation and importance of psychophysiologic examination in system of medical support for workers engaged into production with radiation and nuclear danger].

In accordance with contemporary legislation, the article covers materials on specification and approbation of concept model for psychophysiologic examination in medical establishments during medical examination of workers engaged into production with raidation and nuclear danger. The authors defined methodology, examination methods and designed an order of psychophysiologic examination. The psychophysiologic examination and purpose-oriented rehabilitation appeared efficient.

Sixth Warren K. Sinclair keynote address: The role of a strong regulator in safe and secure nuclear energy.

The history of nuclear regulation is briefly reviewed to underscore the early recognition that independence of the regulator was essential in achieving and maintaining public credibility. The current licensing process is reviewed along with the status of applications. Challenges faced by both the NRC and the industry are reviewed, such as new construction techniques involving modular construction, digital controls replacing analog circuitry, globalization of the entire supply chain, and increased security requirements. The vital area of safety culture is discussed in some detail, and its importance is emphasized.

Advanced reactors and associated fuel cycle facilities: safety and environmental impacts.

The safety and environmental impacts of new technology and fuel cycle approaches being considered in current U.S. nuclear research programs are contrasted to conventional technology options in this paper. Two advanced reactor technologies, the sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) and the very high temperature gas-cooled reactor (VHTR), are being developed. In general, the new reactor technologies exploit inherent features for enhanced safety performance. A key distinction of advanced fuel cycles is spent fuel recycle facilities and new waste forms. In this paper, the performance of existing fuel cycle facilities and applicable regulatory limits are reviewed. Technology options to improve recycle efficiency, restrict emissions, and/or improve safety are identified. For a closed fuel cycle, potential benefits in waste management are significant, and key waste form technology alternatives are described.

U.S. Department of Energy facilities needed to advance nuclear power.

This talk is based upon a November 2008 report by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee (NEAC). The report has two parts, a policy section and a technology section. Here extensive material from the Technical Subcommittee section of the NEAC report is used.

Licensing a new industrial irradiator.

After nearly three decades of medical product sterilization, 3M launched a major new project to build and license an irradiator facility. 3M Corporate Health Physics was responsible for the licensing aspect of this project. The licensing process consisted of six amendments, over 30 submissions to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC) and four U.S. NRC site visits. It took approximately 22 months to complete. The six license amendments are reviewed and several of the submissions are discussed. These include 3M's response to the U.S. NRC's interest in the shielding calculations used for the bioshield, the development of a protocol of radiation safety system test methods, and an analysis to show that a dropped cask during loading operations would not fall on sealed sources. A number of lessons were learned during the course of licensing the new irradiator. Among these were the importance of understanding the U.S. NRC license reviewer's perspective, the need to thoroughly review the irradiator manufacturer's licensing package during project negotiations, the benefits of leaving the Health Physics Office and meeting with the non-health physicists involved in the project, and the necessity of maintaining the solid relationships that already existed with the site Radiation Safety Officer and Sterilization Engineer.

Imaginary Savior: the image of the nuclear bomb in Korea, 1945-1960.

Two atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 brought the unexpected liberation of Korea from the 35-year Japanese occupation. Koreans therefore had a very favorable and positive image of the nuclear bomb and nuclear energy from the beginning. The image of the nuclear bomb as "savior" was strengthened during the Korean War when the United States openly mentioned the possible use of the nuclear bomb against North Korean and Chinese military. After the end of the Korean War in July 1953 South Koreans strongly supported the development of the nuclear bomb in order to deter another North Korean invasion. When the US government provided South Korea with a research nuclear reactor in the late 1950s, most South Koreans hailed it as the first step to developing their own nuclear bomb. This paper will analyze how and why the savior image of the nuclear bomb originated and spread in Korea during the 1950s.

Radiological protection regulation during spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management in the western branch of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise 'SevRAO'.

The site of temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, situated at Andreeva Bay in Northwest Russia, was developed in the 1960s, and it has carried out receipt and storage of fresh and spent nuclear fuel, and solid and liquid radioactive waste generated during the operation of nuclear submarines and nuclear-powered icebreakers. The site is now operated as the western branch of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise, SevRAO. In the course of operation over several decades, the containment barriers in the Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste storage facilities partially lost their containment effectiveness, so workshop facilities and parts of the site became contaminated with radioactive substances. This paper describes work being undertaken to provide an updated regulatory basis for the protection of workers during especially hazardous remediation activities, necessary because of the unusual radiation conditions at the site. It describes the results of recent survey work carried out by the Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Centre, within a programme of regulatory cooperation between the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority and the Federal Medical-Biological Agency of Russia. The survey work and subsequent analyses have contributed to the development of special regulations setting out radiological protection requirements for operations planned at the site. Within these requirements, and taking account of a variety of other factors, a continuing need arises for the implementation of optimisation of remediation at Andreeva Bay.

Medical and radiological aspects of emergency preparedness and response at SevRAO facilities.

Regulatory cooperation between the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority and the Federal Medical Biological Agency (FMBA) of the Russian Federation has the overall goal of promoting improvements in radiation protection in Northwest Russia. One of the projects in this programme has the objectives to review and improve the existing medical emergency preparedness capabilities at the sites for temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. These are operated by SevRAO at Andreeva Bay and in Gremikha village on the Kola Peninsula. The work is also intended to provide a better basis for regulation of emergency response and medical emergency preparedness at similar facilities elsewhere in Russia. The purpose of this paper is to present the main results of that project, implemented by the Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Centre. The first task was an analysis of the regulatory requirements and the current state of preparedness for medical emergency response at the SevRAO facilities. Although Russian regulatory documents are mostly consistent with international recommendations, some distinctions lead to numerical differences in operational intervention criteria under otherwise similar conditions. Radiological threats relating to possible accidents, and related gaps in the regulation of SevRAO facilities, were also identified. As part of the project, a special exercise on emergency medical response on-site at Andreeva Bay was prepared and carried out, and recommendations were proposed after the exercise. Following fruitful dialogue among regulators, designers and operators, special regulatory guidance has been issued by FMBA to account for the specific and unusual features of the SevRAO facilities. Detailed sections relate to the prevention of accidents, and emergency preparedness and response, supplementing the basic Russian regulatory requirements. Overall it is concluded that (a) the provision of medical and sanitary components of emergency response at SevRAO facilities is a priority task within the general system of emergency preparedness; (b) there is an effective and improving interaction between SevRAO and the local medical institutions of FMBA and other territorial medical units; (c) the infrastructure of emergency response at SevRAO facilities has been created and operates within the framework of Russian legal and normative requirements. Further proposals have been made aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the available system of emergency preparedness and response, and to promote interagency cooperation.

Regulatory supervision of sites for spent fuel and radioactive waste storage in the Russian northwest.

In the 1960s two technical bases for the Northern Fleet were created in the Russian northwest at Andreeva Bay in the Kola Peninsula and Gremikha village on the coast of the Barents Sea. They maintained nuclear submarines, receiving and storing radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. No further waste was received after 1985, and the technical bases have since been re-categorised as temporary storage sites. The handling of these materials to put them into a safe condition is especially hazardous because of their degraded state. This paper describes regulatory activities which have been carried out to support the supervision of radiological protection during recovery of waste and spent fuel, and to support regulatory decisions on overall site remediation. The work described includes: an assessment of the radiation situation on-site; the development of necessary additional regulatory rules and standards for radiation protection assurance for workers and the public during remediation; and the completion of an initial threat assessment to identify regulatory priorities. Detailed consideration of measures for the control of radiation exposure of workers and radiation exposure of the public during and after operations and emergency preparedness and response are complete and provided in sister papers. The continuing requirements for regulatory activities relevant to the development and implementation of on-going and future remediation activities are also outlined. The Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority supports the work, as part of the Norwegian Government's plan of action to promote improvements in radiation protection and nuclear safety in northwest Russia.

Statistical criteria to set alarm levels for continuous measurements of ground contamination.

In the course of the decommissioning of the ASTRA research reactor at the site of the Austrian Research Centers at Seibersdorf, the operator and licensee, Nuclear Engineering Seibersdorf, conducted an extensive site survey and characterization to demonstrate compliance with regulatory site release criteria. This survey included radiological characterization of approximately 400,000 m(2) of open land on the Austrian Research Centers premises. Part of this survey was conducted using a mobile large-area gas proportional counter, continuously recording measurements while it was moved at a speed of 0.5 ms(-1). In order to set reasonable investigation levels, two alarm levels based on statistical considerations were developed. This paper describes the derivation of these alarm levels and the operational experience gained by detector deployment in the field.