Metacognitive Effort Regulation across Cultures.

Success in cognitive tasks is associated with effort regulation and motivation. We employed the meta-reasoning approach to investigate metacognitive monitoring accuracy and effort regulation in problem solving across cultures. Adults from China, from Israel, and from Europe and North America (for simplicity: "Western countries") solved nonverbal problems and rated their confidence in their answers. The task involved identifying geometric shapes within silhouettes and, thus, required overcoming interference from holistic processing. The Western group displayed the worst monitoring accuracy, with both the highest overconfidence and poorest resolution (discrimination in confidence between the correct and wrong solutions). The Israeli group resembled the Western group in many respects but exhibited better monitoring accuracy. The Chinese group invested the most time and achieved the best success rates, demonstrating exceptional motivation and determination to succeed. However, their efficiency suffered as they correctly solved the fewest problems per minute of work. Effort regulation analysis based on the Diminishing Criterion Model revealed distinct patterns: the Western participants invested the least amount of time regardless of item difficulty and the Israelis invested more time only when addressing the hardest items. The Chinese group allocated more time throughout but particularly in moderate to difficult items, hinting at their strategic determination to overcome the challenge. Understanding cultural differences in metacognitive processes carries implications for theory (e.g., motivational factors) and practice (e.g., international teams, education). The present findings can serve as a foundation for future research in these and other domains.

We know what stops you from thinking forever: A metacognitive perspective.

This commentary addresses omissions in De Neys's model of fast-and-slow thinking from a metacognitive perspective. We review well-established meta-reasoning monitoring (e.g., confidence) and control processes (e.g., rethinking) that explain mental effort regulation. Moreover, we point to individual, developmental, and task design considerations that affect this regulation. These core issues are completely ignored or mentioned in passing in the target article.

Higher theta-beta ratio during screen-based vs. printed paper is related to lower attention in children: An EEG study.

Reading is considered a non-intuitive, cognitively demanding ability requiring synchronization between several neural networks supporting visual, language processing and higher-order abilities. With the involvement of technology in our everyday life, reading from a screen has become widely used. Several studies point to challenges in processing written materials from the screen due to changes in attention allocation when reading from a screen compared to reading from a printed paper. The current study examined the differences in brain activation when reading from a screen compared to reading from a printed paper focusing on spectral power related to attention in fifteen 6-8-year-old children. Using an electroencephalogram, children read two different age-appropriate texts, without illustrations, presented randomly on the screen and on a printed paper. Data were analyzed using spectral analyses in brain regions related to language, visual processing, and cognitive control, focusing on theta vs. beta waveforms. Results indicated that while reading from a printed paper was accompanied by higher energy in high-frequency bands (beta, gamma), reading from the screen was manifested by a higher power in the lower frequency bands (alpha, theta). Higher theta compared to the beta ratio, representing challenges in allocating attention to a given task, was found for the screen reading compared to the printed paper reading condition. Also, a significant negative correlation was found between differences in theta/beta ratio for screen vs paper reading and accuracy level in the age-normalized Sky-Search task measuring attention and a positive correlation with performance time. These results provide neurobiological support for the greater cognitive load and reduced focused attention during screen-based compared to print-based reading and suggest a different reliance on attention resources for the two conditions in children.

The Role of Semantic Associations as a Metacognitive Cue in Creative Idea Generation.

Is my idea creative? This question directs investing in companies and choosing a research agenda. Following previous research, we focus on the originality of ideas and consider their association with self-assessments of idea generators regarding their own originality. We operationalize the originality score as the frequency (%) of each idea within a sample of participants and originality judgment as the self-assessment of this frequency. Initial evidence suggests that originality scores and originality judgments are produced by separate processes. As a result, originality judgments are prone to biases. So far, heuristic cues that lead to such biases are hardly known. We used methods from computational linguistics to examine the semantic distance as a potential heuristic cue underlying originality judgments. We examined the extent to which the semantic distance would contribute additional explanatory value in predicting originality scores and originality judgments, above and beyond cues known from previous research. In Experiment 1, we re-analyzed previous data that compared originality scores and originality judgments after adding the semantic distance of the generated ideas from the stimuli. We found that the semantic distance contributed to the gap between originality scores and originality judgments. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the examples given in task instructions to prime participants with two levels of idea originality and two levels of semantic distance. We replicated Experiment 1 in finding the semantic distance as a biasing factor for originality judgments. In addition, we found differences among the conditions in the extent of the bias. This study highlights the semantic distance as an unacknowledged metacognitive cue and demonstrates its biasing power for originality judgments.

Using confidence and consensuality to predict time invested in problem solving and in real-life web searching.

Understanding processes that lead people to invest a certain amount of time in challenging tasks is important for theory and practice. In particular, researchers often assume strong linear associations between confidence, consensuality (the degree to which an answer is independently given by multiple participants), and response time. The Diminishing Criterion Model (DCM; Ackerman, 2014) is a metacognitive model which explains the stopping rules people employ under uncertainty in terms of the confidence-time association. This model is unique in predicting a curvilinear rather than a linear confidence-time association. Using consensuality as an alternative to confidence for predicting response time offers theoretical and practical opportunities. In four experiments, including replications and variations, we examined confidence (where collected) and consensuality as predictors of the time people invest in three problem-solving tasks and in real-life web searching. The results using consensuality, like those for confidence, fitted the curvilinear time pattern predicted by the DCM, with one exception: at least 30% of the population must endorse a potential answer for consensuality to predict response time based on the stopping rules in the DCM. Beyond examining consensuality as a predictor, the study brings converging evidence supporting the DCM's curvilinear confidence-time association over alternative models. The methodology used for analyzing web searching offers new directions for metacognitive research in naturally-performed tasks.

You may be more original than you think: Predictable biases in self-assessment of originality.

How accurate are individuals in judging the originality of their own ideas? Most metacognitive research has focused on well-defined tasks, such as learning, memory, and problem solving, providing limited insight into ill-defined tasks. The present study introduces a novel metacognitive self-judgment of originality, defined as assessments of the uniqueness of an idea in a given context. In three experiments, we examined the reliability, potential biases, and factors affecting originality judgments. Using an ideation task, designed to assess the ability to generate multiple divergent ideas, we show that people accurately acknowledge the serial order effect-judging later ideas as more original than earlier ideas. However, they systematically underestimate their ideas' originality. We employed a manipulation for affecting actual originality level, which did not affect originality judgments, and another one designed to affect originality judgments, which did not affect actual originality performance. This double dissociation between judgments and performance calls for future research to expose additional factors underlying originality judgments.

Metacognitive hindsight bias.

Hindsight bias (HB) is the tendency to see known information as obvious. We studied metacognitive hindsight bias (MC-HB)-a shift away from one's original confidence regarding answers provided before learning the actual facts. In two experiments, participants answered general-knowledge questions in social scenarios and provided their confidence in each answer. Subsequently, they learned answers to half the questions and then recalled their initial answers and confidence. Finally, they reanswered, as a learning check. We measured confidence accuracy by calibration (over/underconfidence) and resolution (discrimination between incorrect and correct answers), expecting them to improve in hindsight. In both experiments, participants displayed robust HB and MC-HB for resolution despite attempts to recall the initial confidence in one's answer. In Experiment 2, promising anonymity to participants eliminated MC-HB, while social scenarios produced MC-HB for both resolution and calibration-indicative of overconfidence. Overall, our findings highlight that in social contexts, recall of confidence in hindsight is more consistent with answers' accuracy than confidence initially was. Social scenarios differently affect HB and MC-HB, thus dissociating these two biases.

Metacognitive myopia in change detection: A collective approach to overcome a persistent anomaly.

Going beyond the origins of cognitive biases, which have been the focus of continued research, the notion of metacognitive myopia refers to the failure to monitor, control, and correct for biased inferences at the metacognitive level. Judgments often follow the given information uncritically, even when it is easy to find out or explicitly explained that information samples are misleading or invalid. The present research is concerned with metacognitive myopia in judgments of change. Participants had to decide whether pairs of binomial samples were drawn from populations with decreasing, equal, or increasing proportions p of a critical feature. Judgments of p changes were strongly affected by changes in absolute sample size n, such that only increases (decreases) in p that came along with increasing (decreasing) n were readily detected. Across 4 experiments these anomalies persisted even though the distinction of p and n was strongly emphasized through outcome feedback and full debriefing (Experiment 1-4), simultaneous presentation (Experiments 2-4), and recoding of experienced samples into descriptive percentages (Experiment 3-4). In Experiment 4, a joint attempt was made by 10 scientists working in 7 different institutions to develop an effective debiasing training, suggesting how multilab-collaboration might improve the quality of science in the early stage of operational research designing. Despite significant improvements in change judgments, debiasing treatments did not eliminate the anomalies. Possible ways of dealing with the metacognitive deficit are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Feeling happy and (over)confident: the role of positive affect in metacognitive processes.

The relationship between affect and metacognitive processes has been largely overlooked in both the affect and the metacognition literatures. While at the core of many affect-cognition theories is the notion that positive affective states lead people to be more confident, few studies systematically investigated how positive affect influences confidence and strategic behaviour. In two experiments, when participants were free to control answer interval to general knowledge questions (e.g. QUESTION: "in what year", answer: "it was between 1970 and 1985"), participants induced with positive affect outperformed participants in a neutral affect condition. However, in Experiment 1 positive affect participants showed larger overconfidence than neutral affect participants. In Experiment 2, enhanced salience of social cues eliminated this overconfidence disadvantage of positive affect relative to neutral affect participants, without compromising their enhanced performance. Notably, in both experiments, positive affect led to compromised social norms regarding the answers' informativeness. Implications for both affect and metacognition are discussed.

Meta-Reasoning: Monitoring and Control of Thinking and Reasoning.

Meta-Reasoning refers to the processes that monitor the progress of our reasoning and problem-solving activities and regulate the time and effort devoted to them. Monitoring processes are usually experienced as feelings of certainty or uncertainty about how well a process has, or will, unfold. These feelings are based on heuristic cues, which are not necessarily reliable. Nevertheless, we rely on these feelings of (un)certainty to regulate our mental effort. Most metacognitive research has focused on memorization and knowledge retrieval, with little attention paid to more complex processes, such as reasoning and problem solving. In that context, we recently developed a Meta-Reasoning framework, used here to review existing findings, consider their consequences, and frame questions for future research.

The puzzle of study time allocation for the most challenging items.

Learners often allocate more study time to challenging items than to easier ones. Nevertheless, both predicted and actual memory performance are typically worse for difficult than for easier items. The resulting inverse relations between people's predictions of their memory performance (judgments of learning; JOLs) and self-paced study time (ST) are often explained by bottom-up, data-driven ST allocation that is based on fluency. However, we demonstrate robust inverted U-shaped relations between JOLs and ST that cannot be explained by data-driven ST allocation alone. Consequently, we explored how two models of top-down, strategic ST allocation account for curvilinear JOL-ST relations. First, according to the Region of Proximal Learning model, people stop quickly on items for which they experience too little progress in learning. Second, according to the Diminishing Criterion Model, people set a time limit and stop studying when this time limit is reached. In three experiments, we manipulated motivation with different methods and examined which model best described JOL-ST relations. Consistent with the Diminishing Criterion Model but not with the Region of Proximal Learning model, results revealed that curvilinearity was due to people setting a time limit.

Disfluent fonts don't help people solve math problems.

Prior research suggests that reducing font clarity can cause people to consider printed information more carefully. The most famous demonstration showed that participants were more likely to solve counterintuitive math problems when they were printed in hard-to-read font. However, after pooling data from that experiment with 16 attempts to replicate it, we find no effect on solution rates. We examine potential moderating variables, including cognitive ability, presentation format, and experimental setting, but we find no evidence of a disfluent font benefit under any conditions. More generally, though disfluent fonts slightly increase response times, we find little evidence that they activate analytic reasoning.

The effect of concrete supplements on metacognitive regulation during learning and open-book test taking.

BACKGROUND: Previous studies have suggested that when reading texts, lower achievers are more sensitive than their stronger counterparts to surface-level cues, such as graphic illustrations, and that even when uninformative, such concrete supplements tend to raise the text's subjective comprehensibility. AIMS: We examined how being led astray by uninformative concrete supplements in expository texts affects achievement. We focused on the mediating role of metacognitive processes by partialling out the role of cognitive ability, as indicated by SAT scores, in accounting for the found differences between higher and lower achievers. SAMPLE AND METHOD: Undergraduate students studied expository texts in their base versions or in concrete versions, including uninformative supplements, in a within-participant design. The procedure had three phases: Studying, open-book test taking, and reanswering questions of one's choice. RESULTS: Overall, judgements of comprehension (JCOMPs) were higher after participants studied the concrete than the base versions, and the participants benefited from the open-book test and the reanswering opportunity. An in-depth examination of time investment, JCOMP, confidence in test answers, choice of questions to reanswer, and test scores indicated that those whose metacognitive processes were more effective and goal driven achieved higher scores. CONCLUSIONS: The effectiveness of metacognitive processes during learning and test taking constitutes an important factor differentiating between higher and lower achievers when studying texts that include potentially misleading cues.

Judgments of learning depend on how learners interpret study effort.

In self-paced learning, when the regulation of study effort is goal driven (e.g., allocated to different items according to their relative importance), judgments of learning (JOLs) increase with study time. When regulation is data driven (e.g., determined by the ease of committing the item to memory), JOLs decrease with study time (Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006). We induced learners to interpret differences in their study time (Experiment 1) or in another learner's study time (Experiment 2) as reflecting either differences in data-driven regulation or differences in goal-driven regulation. This manipulation was found to moderate the relationship of both study time and rated effort to JOLs. The results were seen to support the idea that JOLs are based on study effort but the effects of experienced effort are mediated by an attribution that intervenes between the metacognitive regulation of effort and the monitoring of one's learning. The results invite an attributional theoretical framework that encompasses both data-driven and goal-driven regulation and incorporates the option of attributing experienced effort to either or both of the 2 types of regulation.

The effects of goal-driven and data-driven regulation on metacognitive monitoring during learning: a developmental perspective.

Research in metacognition (Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006) suggests bidirectional links between monitoring and control during learning: When self-regulation is goal-driven, monitoring affects control so that increased study time (ST) enhances judgments of learning (JOLs). However, when self-regulation is data-driven, JOLs are based on the feedback from control, and therefore JOLs decrease with ST under the heuristic that ease of encoding is diagnostic of successful recall. Evidence for both types of relationships occurring within the same situation was found for adults. We examined the development of the ability to respond differentially to data-driven and goal-driven variation in ST within the same task. Children in Grades 5 and 6 exhibited a positive ST-JOL relationship for goal-driven regulation and a negative relationship for data-driven regulation but never in the same task. In contrast, the JOLs and recall of 9th graders and college students yielded differential cosensitivity to data-driven and goal-driven variation. The 5th and 6th graders also evidenced an adult-like pattern of JOLs and recall under a partitioning procedure that helped them in factoring the variation in ST due to data-driven and goal-driven variation in ST. The results are discussed in terms of the metacognitive sophistication needed for considering both types of variation simultaneously in making metacognitive judgments.

The diminishing criterion model for metacognitive regulation of time investment.

According to the Discrepancy Reduction Model for metacognitive regulation, people invest time in cognitive tasks in a goal-driven manner until their metacognitive judgment, either judgment of learning (JOL) or confidence, meets their preset goal. This stopping rule should lead to judgments above the goal, regardless of invested time. However, in many tasks, time is negatively correlated with JOL and confidence, with low judgments after effortful processing. This pattern has often been explained as stemming from bottom-up fluency effects on the judgments. While accepting this explanation for simple tasks, like memorizing pairs of familiar words, the proposed Diminishing Criterion Model (DCM) challenges this explanation for complex tasks, like problem solving. Under the DCM, people indeed invest effort in a goal-driven manner. However, investing more time leads to increasing compromise on the goal, resulting in negative time-judgment correlations. Experiment 1 exposed that with word-pair memorization, negative correlations are found only with minimal fluency and difficulty variability, whereas in problem solving, they are found consistently. As predicted, manipulations of low incentives (Experiment 2) and time pressure (Experiment 3) in problem solving revealed greater compromise as more time was invested in a problem. Although intermediate confidence ratings rose during the solving process, the result was negative time-confidence correlations (Experiments 3, 4, and 5), and this was not eliminated by the opportunity to respond "don't know" (Experiments 4 and 5). The results suggest that negative time-judgment correlations in complex tasks stem from top-down regulatory processes with a criterion that diminishes with invested time.

The role of answer fluency and perceptual fluency in the monitoring and control of reasoning: reply to Oppenheimer, and Epley (2013).

In this reply, we provide an analysis of Alter et al. (2013) response to our earlier paper (Thompson et al., 2013). In that paper, we reported difficulty in replicating Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre's (2007) main finding, namely that a sense of disfluency produced by making stimuli difficult to perceive, increased accuracy on a variety of reasoning tasks. Alter, Oppenheimer, and Epley (2013) argue that we misunderstood the meaning of accuracy on these tasks, a claim that we reject. We argue and provide evidence that the tasks were not too difficult for our populations (such that no amount of "metacognitive unease" would promote correct responding) and point out that in many cases performance on our tasks was well above chance or on a par with Alter et al.'s (2007) participants. Finally, we reiterate our claim that the distinction between answer fluency (the ease with which an answer comes to mind) and perceptual fluency (the ease with which a problem can be read) is genuine, and argue that Thompson et al. (2013) provided evidence that these are distinct factors that have different downstream effects on cognitive processes.

Is comprehension of problem solutions resistant to misleading heuristic cues?

Previous studies in the domain of metacomprehension judgments have primarily used expository texts. When these texts include illustrations, even uninformative ones, people were found to judge that they understand their content better. The present study aimed to delineate the metacognitive processes involved in understanding problem solutions - a text type often perceived as allowing reliable judgments regarding understanding, and was not previously considered from a metacognitive perspective. Undergraduate students faced difficult problems. They then studied solution explanations with or without uninformative illustrations and provided judgments of comprehension (JCOMPs). Learning was assessed by application to near-transfer problems in an open-book test format. As expected, JCOMPs were polarized - they tended to reflect good or poor understanding. Yet, JCOMPs were higher for the illustrated solutions and even high certainty did not ensure resistance to this effect. Moreover, success in the transfer problems was lower in the presence of illustrations, demonstrating a bias stronger than that found with expository texts. Previous studies have suggested that weak learners are especially prone to being misled by superficial cues. In the present study, matching the difficulty of the task to the ability of the target population revealed that even highly able participants were not immune to misleading cues. The study extends previous findings regarding potential detrimental effects of illustrations and highlights aspects of the metacomprehension process that have not been considered before.

The role of answer fluency and perceptual fluency as metacognitive cues for initiating analytic thinking.

Although widely studied in other domains, relatively little is known about the metacognitive processes that monitor and control behaviour during reasoning and decision-making. In this paper, we examined the conditions under which two fluency cues are used to monitor initial reasoning: answer fluency, or the speed with which the initial, intuitive answer is produced (Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011), and perceptual fluency, or the ease with which problems can be read (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). The first two experiments demonstrated that answer fluency reliably predicted Feeling of Rightness (FOR) judgments to conditional inferences and base rate problems, which subsequently predicted the amount of deliberate processing as measured by thinking time and answer changes; answer fluency also predicted retrospective confidence judgments (Experiment 3b). Moreover, the effect of answer fluency on reasoning was independent from the effect of perceptual fluency, establishing that these are empirically independent constructs. In five experiments with a variety of reasoning problems similar to those of Alter et al. (2007), we found no effect of perceptual fluency on FOR, retrospective confidence or accuracy; however, we did observe that participants spent more time thinking about hard to read stimuli, although this additional time did not result in answer changes. In our final two experiments, we found that perceptual disfluency increased accuracy on the CRT (Frederick, 2005), but only amongst participants of high cognitive ability. As Alter et al.'s samples were gathered from prestigious universities, collectively, the data to this point suggest that perceptual fluency prompts additional processing in general, but this processing may results in higher accuracy only for the most cognitively able.

The persistence of the fluency-confidence association in problem solving.

Confidence in answers is known to be sensitive to the fluency with which answers come to mind. One aspect of fluency is response latency. Latency is often a valid cue for accuracy, showing an inverse relationship with both accuracy rates and confidence. The present study examined the independent latency-confidence association in problem-solving tasks. The tasks were ecologically valid situations in which latency showed no validity, moderate validity, and high validity as a predictor of accuracy. In Experiment 1, misleading problems, which often elicit initial wrong solutions, were answered in open-ended and multiple-choice test formats. Under the open-ended test format, latency was absolutely not valid in predicting accuracy: Quickly and slowly provided solutions had a similar chance of being correct. Under the multiple-choice test format, latency predicted accuracy better. In Experiment 2, nonmisleading problems were used; here, latency was highly valid in predicting accuracy. A breakdown into correct and incorrect solutions allowed examination of the independent latency-confidence relationship when latency necessarily had no validity in predicting accuracy. In all conditions, regardless of latency's validity in predicting accuracy, confidence was persistently sensitive to latency: The participants were more confident in solutions provided quickly than in those that involved lengthy thinking. The study suggests that the reliability of the latency-confidence association in problem solving depends on the strength of the inverse relationship between latency and accuracy in the particular task.