A Multilingual Tool for Standardized Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity Assessment and Monitoring.

Control of infectious diseases requires the handling of infectious materials by both clinical and public health laboratories with exposure risks for laboratory personnel and environment. A comprehensive tool for assessing the capacity to manage these risks could enable the development of action plans for mitigation. Under the framework of the Global Health Security Agenda action package for biosafety and biosecurity, the authors developed a tool dedicated to assessing laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. The Biosafety and Biosecurity Laboratory Assessment Tool (BSS LAT) assesses the status of all laboratory biosafety core requirements across 10 different modules. It consists of a standardized spreadsheet-based tool that provides automatic scoring. It is designed to support national, regional, and global efforts to strengthen biosafety in clinical, public health, and veterinary laboratories. The BSS LAT was first used in Burkina Faso in collaboration with the African Society for Laboratory Medicine and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to support the country in strengthening their biorisk management system. Since then, it has been successfully used in other countries (ie, Armenia, Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Liberia), various settings (medical and veterinary laboratories), and translated into several languages (eg, English, French, Russian). The BSS LAT is a multipurpose tool that assists with standardization of biosafety and biosecurity requirements for all laboratories working with infectious materials, serves as a self-assessment guide for laboratories to develop improvement plans and reinforce capacities, and serves as a training guide for individual laboratories and networks or at the national level. The BSS LAT can also be used as a monitoring tool for the assessment of biosafety and biosecurity across all laboratories working with infectious materials at the national, regional, and global levels.

Strengthening laboratory biosafety in Liberia during the COVID-19 pandemic: Experience from the Global Laboratory Leadership Programme.

Background: The Global Laboratory Leadership Programme (GLLP) has biosafety and biosecurity as one of its core competencies and advocates for a One Health approach involving all relevant sectors across the human-animal-environment interface to empower national laboratory systems and strengthen health security. Decentralization of SARS-CoV-2 testing in Liberia coupled with an increase in the number of COVID-19 infections among laboratory professionals raised biosafety concerns. In response, a set of trainings on laboratory biosafety was launched for lab personnel across the country under the framework of the GLLP. The goal was to deliver a comprehensive package for laboratory biosafety in the context of SARS-CoV-2 through active learning. Methods: Three one-day workshops were conducted between September and October 2020, training personnel from human, animal and environmental laboratories through a One Health approach. Concepts critical to laboratory biosafety were delivered in an interactive engagement format to ensure effective learning and retention of concepts. Pre- and post-training assessments were performed, and a paired t-test was used to assess knowledge gain. Results: Of the 67 participants, 64 were from the human health sector, one from veterinary sector and two from environmental health sector. The average pre-test score was 41%. The main gaps identified were failure to acknowledge surgical antisepsis as a form of hand hygiene and recognition of PPE as the best risk control measure. The average post-test score was 75.5%. The mean difference of pre-test and post-test scores was statistically significant (p-value <0.001). Participants indicated satisfaction with the workshop content, mode of delivery and trainers' proficiency. Conclusions: The workshops were impactful as evidenced by significant improvement (34.5%) in the post-test scores and positive participant feedback. Repeated refresher trainings are vital to addressing the gaps, ensuring compliance, and promoting biosafety culture. GLLP's approach to cultivating multisectoral national laboratory leaders ready to take responsibility and ownership for capacity building provides a sustainable solution for attaining strong national laboratory systems better prepared for health emergencies and pandemics like COVID-19.

National Biosafety Management System: A Combined Framework Approach Based on 15 Key Elements.

The pervasive nature of infections causing major outbreaks have elevated biosafety and biosecurity as a fundamental component for resilient national laboratory systems. In response to international health security demands, the Global Health Security Agenda emphasizes biosafety as one of the prerequisites to respond effectively to infectious disease threats. However, biosafety management systems (BMS) in low-medium income countries (LMIC) remain weak due to fragmented implementation strategies. In addition, inefficiencies in implementation have been due to limited resources, inadequate technical expertise, high equipment costs, and insufficient political will. Here we propose an approach to developing a strong, self-sustaining BMS based on extensive experience in LMICs. A conceptual framework incorporating 15 key components to guide implementers, national laboratory leaders, global health security experts in building a BMS is presented. This conceptual framework provides a holistic and logical approach to the development of a BMS with all critical elements. It includes a flexible planning matrix with timelines easily adaptable to different country contexts as examples, as well as resources that are critical for developing sustainable technical expertise.

A Competency Framework for Developing Global Laboratory Leaders.

Building sustainable national health laboratory systems requires laboratory leaders who can address complex and changing demands for services and build strong collaborative networks. Global consensus on laboratory leadership competencies is critically important to ensure the harmonization of learning approaches for curriculum development across relevant health sectors. The World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL) have partnered to develop a Laboratory Leadership Competency Framework (CF) that provides a foundation for the Global Laboratory Leadership Programme (GLLP). The CF represents the first global consensus from multiple disciplines on laboratory leadership competencies and provides structure for the development of laboratory leaders with the knowledge, skills and abilities to build bridges, enhance communication, foster collaboration and develop an understanding of existing synergies between the human, animal, environmental, and other relevant health sectors.

Challenges and solutions for instituting an efficient maintenance program for laboratory equipment in Central Asian, and developing world, countries.

We review the current state of quality assurance in laboratories of the five Central Asia Republics (CARs), focusing on laboratory equipment, and compare quality assurance approaches with CLSI standards. The laboratories of the CARs faced exceptional challenges including highly-structured laboratory systems that retain centralized and outmoded Soviet-era approaches to quality assurance, considerably jeopardizing the validity of laboratory tests. The relative isolation of the CARs, based on geography and almost exclusive use of the Russian language, further hamper change. CARs must make high-level government decisions to widely implement quality assurance programs within their laboratory systems, within which approaches to the management of laboratory equipment will be a prominent part.

Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program, Where Is the L-Track?

Background: Modifications of the Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) curricula to include a laboratory track (L-Track), to become Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (FELTP), began in 2004 in Kenya. The L-Track offered candidates training on laboratory competencies in management, policy, quality systems, and diagnostic methods as well as epidemiology, disease surveillance and outbreak response. Since then several FELTPs have discontinued the L-Track and instead offer all candidates, epidemiologists and laboratorians, a single FETP curriculum. Reasons for these changes are reported here. Methods: A questionnaire was sent to directors of 13 FELTP programs collecting information on the status of the programs, reasons for any changes, basic entry qualifications, source institutions and where residents were post enrollment or after graduation. Data from previous CDC internal assessments on FELTP L-Track was also reviewed. Results: Out of the 13 FELTPs included, directors from 10 FELTPs sent back information on their specific programs. The FELTPs in Kenya, Mozambique, Cameroon and Kazakhstan and Mali have discontinued a separate L-Track while those in Ghana, Georgia, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Tanzania continue to offer the separate L-Track. Reasons for discontinuation included lack of standardized curriculum, unclear strategies of the separate L-Track, and funding constraints. Two countries Kenya and Tanzania reported on the career progression of their graduates. Results show 84% (Kenya) and 51% (Tanzania) of candidates in the FELTP, L-Track were recruited from national/regional medical health laboratories. However post-graduation, 56% (Kenya) and 43% (Tanzania) were working as epidemiologists, program managers, program coordinators, or regulatory/inspection boards. Professional upward mobility was high; 87% (Kenya) and 73% (Tanzania) residents, reported promotions either in the same or in new institutions. Conclusions: The FELTP L-Track residents continue to offer critical contributions to public health workforce development with high upward mobility. While this may be a reflection of professional versatility and demand of the FELTP graduates, the move from core laboratory services underscores the challenges in filling and retaining qualified staff within the laboratory systems. Results suggest different strategies are needed to strengthen laboratory management and leadership programs with a clear focus on laboratory systems and laboratory networks to meet current and future clinical and public health laboratory workforce demands.

Integrated Disease Investigations and Surveillance planning: a systems approach to strengthening national surveillance and detection of events of public health importance in support of the International Health Regulations.

The international community continues to define common strategic themes of actions to improve global partnership and international collaborations in order to protect our populations. The International Health Regulations (IHR[2005]) offer one of these strategic themes whereby World Health Organization (WHO) Member States and global partners engaged in biosecurity, biosurveillance and public health can define commonalities and leverage their respective missions and resources to optimize interventions. The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Cooperative Biological Engagement Program (CBEP) works with partner countries across clinical, veterinary, epidemiological, and laboratory communities to enhance national disease surveillance, detection, diagnostic, and reporting capabilities. CBEP, like many other capacity building programs, has wrestled with ways to improve partner country buy-in and ownership and to develop sustainable solutions that impact integrated disease surveillance outcomes. Designing successful implementation strategies represents a complex and challenging exercise and requires robust and transparent collaboration at the country level. To address this challenge, the Laboratory Systems Development Branch of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and CBEP have partnered to create a set of tools that brings together key leadership of the surveillance system into a deliberate system design process. This process takes into account strengths and limitations of the existing system, how the components inter-connect and relate to one another, and how they can be systematically refined within the local context. The planning tools encourage cross-disciplinary thinking, critical evaluation and analysis of existing capabilities, and discussions across organizational and departmental lines toward a shared course of action and purpose. The underlying concepts and methodology of these tools are presented here.

Characterization of hepatitis E virus from outbreak and sporadic cases in Turkmenistan.

Large outbreaks and sporadic cases of hepatitis E have been reported in Central Asia. We assessed the genetic relatedness of hepatitis E virus (HEV) strains from outbreak and sporadic cases in Turkmenistan. Specimens from outbreak and sporadic cases of acute hepatitis non-A, non-B were tested by reverse transcription (RT)-polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to identify the presence of HEV RNA; nucleotide sequences were analyzed. HEV RNA was detected from 23/156 (15%) outbreak cases and 2/23 (9%) sporadic cases. The HEV outbreak isolates represented 14 unique sequences with genetic distances varying between 0.3% and 8.6%, 12 of which were closely related, with distances between 0.3% and 5.6%. Two unique sequences from outbreak cases 32 and 42 were closely related (99.7%) and shared 91.8-93.4% of sequence with the other 12 strains. The two strains were closely related to the previously published isolates from Burma (99.7-100%) and India-Madras (95.7-96.1%). The two 1994 sporadic HEV strains were 97.4% distinct, wile revealing 91.4-94.1% homology to 1985 strains, and 94.4-94.7% to HEV from the neighboring China and Pakistan. Genetic diversity of HEV that caused the hepatitis E outbreak in Turkmenistan in 1985 suggests heterogeneity of viral sources. Sporadic hepatitis E that occurred in 1994 was caused by viral strains genetically distinct from those causing the outbreak in 1985, yet closely related to HEV from neighboring countries. The study suggests that circulation of a broad variety of strains of HEV may occur in Central Asia, regardless of international borders, presenting a significant public health threat to the population of the region.