Digital media use and sleep in late adolescence and young adulthood: A systematic review.

Despite much attention on digital media use and young peoples' sleep, the literature on digital media and its impact on sleep in older adolescents and young adults remains to be synthesized. We conducted a systematic review of studies including young people aged 16-25 years. We searched Medline, Web of Science, and CINAHL for observational studies, identifying 60 studies. These studies were assessed for methodological quality. Only studies rated as moderate or high-quality studies were included (n = 42). A narrative synthesis summarized the impact of digital media use on eight sleep outcomes: Bedtime; Sleep onset latency or problems falling asleep; Sleep duration; Early awakening; Sleep disturbance; Daytime tiredness and function; Sleep deficits; Sleep quality. In summary, digital media use was associated to shorter sleep duration and poorer sleep quality. These associations were found for general screen use and use of mobile phone, computer, internet, and social media, but not for television, game console, and tablet use. Most studies investigating bedtime or nighttime use found associations to poor sleep outcomes. Later bedtime and daytime tiredness were associated with mobile phone use at night. Additional research is warranted to draw solid conclusions about the causal direction and to understand the underlying mechanisms.

Why caregivers have no autonomy-based reason to respect advance directives in dementia care.

Advance directives (ADs) have for some time been championed by ethicists and patient associations alike as a tool that people newly diagnosed with dementia, or prior to onset, may use to ensure that their future care and treatment are organized in accordance with their interests. The idea is that autonomous people, not yet neurologically affected by dementia, can design directives for their future care that caregivers are morally obligated to respect because they have been designed by autonomous individuals. In this paper, we first criticize the idea that ADs can retain moral authority in severe dementia by arguing that it is paradoxical. Second, we consider two arguments that initially seem to refute this critique of ADs, but we eventually dismiss them. The first argument states that ADs retain moral authority in severe dementia because autonomously formed interests, for example, ADs, can only be appropriately discarded by autonomous persons. This we term the historical autonomy argument. We dismiss it by demonstrating how we, in analog cases, are not obligated to continue to respect autonomously formed interests even though they have been discarded under nonappropriate conditions. The second argument is that ADs can be justified by what we term external interests. While we agree that people with severe dementia plausible can be said to have external interests, we show that ADs cannot express such interests and hence cannot be justified by them. We conclude that none of the discussed arguments support the use of ADs and because of this, the idea of ADs should be reassigned.

On the definition of stigma.

BACKGROUND: There are thousands of papers about stigma, for instance about stigma's impact on wellbeing, mental or physical health. But the definition of stigma has received only modest attention. In "Conceptualizing stigma" from 2001, Link and Phelan offer a thorough and detailed definition of stigma. They suggest that there are six necessary conditions for stigma, namely labelled differences, stereotypes, separation, status loss and discrimination, power, and emotional reaction. This definition is widely applied in the literature but is left mainly uncriticized. METHOD: We submit the Link and Phelan definition of stigma to a systematic conceptual analysis. We first interpret, analyze and reconsider each of the six components in Link and Phelan's definition of stigma, and on the basis of these analyses, we secondly suggest a revised definition of stigma. RESULT: The Link and Phelan definition is thorough and detailed, but includes redundant components. These are status loss and discrimination, and emotional reaction. CONCLUSION: We suggest that groups, not individuals, are the target of stigma, though it is individuals who may be the victims of it. We suggest a revised definition of stigma that is more simple, precise, and consistent with the empirical literature on stigma; there is stigma if and only if there is labelling, negative stereotyping, linguistic separation, and power asymmetry.