Left Cerebellar Lesions may be Associated with an Increase in Spatial Neglect-like Symptoms.

Each cerebellar hemisphere projects to the contralateral cerebral hemisphere. Previous research suggests a lateralization of cognitive functions in the cerebellum that mirrors the cerebral cortex, with attention/visuospatial functions represented in the left cerebellar hemisphere, and language functions in the right cerebellar hemisphere. Although there is good evidence supporting the role of the right cerebellum with language functions, the evidence supporting the notion that attention and visuospatial functions are left lateralized is less clear. Given that spatial neglect is one of the most common disorders arising from right cortical damage, we reasoned that damage to the left cerebellum would result in increased spatial neglect-like symptoms, without necessarily leading to an official diagnosis of spatial neglect. To examine this disconnection hypothesis, we analyzed neglect screening data (line bisection, cancellation, figure copying) from 20 patients with isolated unilateral cerebellar stroke. Results indicated that left cerebellar patients (n = 9) missed significantly more targets on the left side of cancellation tasks compared to a normative sample. No significant effects were observed for right cerebellar patients (n = 11). A lesion overlap analysis indicated that Crus II (78% overlap), and lobules VII and IX (66% overlap) were the regions most commonly damaged in left cerebellar patients. Our results are consistent with the notion that the left cerebellum may be important for attention and visuospatial functions. Given the poor prognosis typically associated with neglect, we suggest that screening for neglect symptoms, and visuospatial deficits more generally, may be important for tailoring rehabilitative efforts to help maximize recovery in cerebellar patients.

Assessment and recovery of visually guided reaching deficits following cerebellar stroke.

The cerebellum is known to play an important role in the coordination and timing of limb movements. The present study focused on how reach kinematics are affected by cerebellar lesions to quantify both the presence of motor impairment, and recovery of motor function over time. In the current study, 12 patients with isolated cerebellar stroke completed clinical measures of cognitive and motor function, as well as a visually guided reaching (VGR) task using the Kinarm exoskeleton at baseline (∼2 weeks), as well as 6, 12, and 24-weeks post-stroke. During the VGR task, patients made unassisted reaches with visual feedback from a central 'start' position to one of eight targets arranged in a circle. At baseline, 6/12 patients were impaired across several parameters of the VGR task compared to a Kinarm normative sample (n = 307), revealing deficits in both feed-forward and feedback control. The only clinical measures that consistently demonstrated impairment were the Purdue Pegboard Task (PPT; 9/12 patients) and the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (6/11 patients). Overall, patients who were impaired at baseline showed significant recovery by the 24-week follow-up for both VGR and the PPT. A lesion overlap analysis indicated that the regions most commonly damaged in 5/12 patients (42% overlap) were lobule IX and Crus II of the right cerebellum. A lesion subtraction analysis comparing patients who were impaired (n = 6) vs. unimpaired (n = 6) on the VGR task at baseline showed that the region most commonly damaged in impaired patients was lobule VIII of the right cerebellum (40% overlap). Our results lend further support to the notion that the cerebellum is involved in both feedforward and feedback control during reaching, and that cerebellar patients tend to recover relatively quickly overall. In addition, we argue that future research should study the effects of cerebellar damage on visuomotor control from a perception-action theoretical framework to better understand how the cerebellum works with the dorsal stream to control visually guided action.

The relative importance of local contingencies and global biases for statistical learning.

Effective behavior requires adapting to the changing regularities evident in the world. Analogous to the global and local processing distinction for perception, these statistical regularities may be evident in global biases (i.e., some events are more likely) or local contingencies (i.e., subsequent events depend on preceding events). To explore whether mental model updating unfolds in distinct ways according to global and local statistical properties, we had healthy individuals perform two variations of an updating task in which both global and local statistical properties changed over time. Participants predicted whether the next triangle in a sequence of triangles would point up or down. The probability of pointing up or down was fixed for epochs of trials (i.e., global probability) and correlated with the colors of elements in the display. In addition, we made the triangle's apex direction on trial n+1 depend on the pointing direction of the prior trial (i.e., local probability). For both experiments, it was the local contingencies that dominated participant choices. When global and local statistical cues of equal magnitude are available, we conclude that healthy individuals are biased towards using the local statistical properties.

Stop paying attention to "attention".

Conceptual fragmentation is when a term assumed to have one meaning is found to have many. When these different definitions overlap in meaning and application confusion and wasted effort follows. "Attention" is such a fragmented term. The response to conceptual fragmentation is simple. Stop using the original term. Our reticence to do so reflects false beliefs about attention. "Attention" is not an old term, but a modern one. Its original meaning is not related to our contemporary intuitions. Attention is not a necessary concept; psychology made substantial progress, even in cognitive areas, during the years when its use was banished. Attention is just one among many examples of conceptual fragmentation in psychology. The root cause is a dearth of theory driving cognitive experimentation. Theoretical clarity is enhanced when fundamental concepts can be expressed in a mathematical form. When theories are stated in mathematical language it opens the door to rigorous cross-domain comparisons using tools like category theory. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Neuroscience > Cognition.

Saccadic eye movement metrics reflect surprise and mental model updating.

Two experiments investigated what eye movements can reveal about how we process surprising information and how we update mental models in dynamic and unstructured environments. Participants made saccades to visual targets presented one at a time, radially, around an invisible perimeter. Target locations were normally distributed and shifted at an unannounced point during the task. Trials following the shift were considered surprising and unexpected. These unexpected and surprising events prompted the need to update. Slower saccadic latencies were observed for surprising/unexpected events, perhaps indicative of the need to reorient attention to the unexpected target location. Longer dwell times were observed for events that signaled a change in the distribution. These data show that eye movement metrics provide a reliable indicator of mental model updating when contingencies change even in the absence of explicit change signals.

Cerebellar lesions disrupt spatial and temporal visual attention.

The current study represents the first comprehensive examination of spatial, temporal and sustained attention following cerebellar damage. Results indicated that, compared to controls, cerebellar damage resulted in a larger cueing effect at the longest SOA - possibly reflecting a slowed the onset of inhibition of return (IOR) during a reflexive covert attention task, and reduced the ability to detect successive targets during an attentional blink task. However, there was little evidence to support the notion that cerebellar damage disrupted voluntary covert attention or the sustained attention to response task (SART). Lesion overlay data and supplementary voxel-based lesion symptom mapping (VLSM) analyses indicated that impaired performance on the reflexive covert attention and attentional blink tasks were related to damage to Crus II of the left posterior cerebellum. In addition, subsequent analyses indicated our results are not due to either general motor impairments or to damage to the deep cerebellar nuclei. Collectively these data demonstrate, for the first time, that the same cerebellar regions may be involved in both spatial and temporal visual attention.

Children struggle beyond preschool-age in a continuous version of the ambiguous figures task.

Children until the age of five are only able to reverse an ambiguous figure when they are informed about the second interpretation. In two experiments, we examined whether children's difficulties would extend to a continuous version of the ambiguous figures task. Children (Experiment 1: 66 3- to 5-year olds; Experiment 2: 54 4- to 9-year olds) and adult controls saw line drawings of animals gradually morph-through well-known ambiguous figures-into other animals. Results show a relatively late developing ability to recognize the target animal, with difficulties extending beyond preschool-age. This delay can neither be explained with improvements in theory of mind, inhibitory control, nor individual differences in eye movements. Even the best achieving children only started to approach adult level performance at the age of 9, suggesting a fundamentally different processing style in children and adults.

Representational drawing following brain injury.

Research has shown that damage to either the left or right hemisphere can lead to deficits in visuoconstructional skills including drawing and figure copying. Nevertheless, research would suggest that the nature of the deficits arising from left and right brain injury are distinct in nature if not severity, with the right hemisphere, and parietal cortex specifically, seen as critical for obtaining accurate spatial relations and the left hemisphere important for effective organisation (i.e., executive function). Much of this work on drawing and figure copying following brain damage has rested on qualitative assessments or crude marking scales with descriptive anchors for what constitutes good or poor performance. We employed quantitative analyses of drawings developed to assess accuracy in novice and expert artists. We analyzed drawings of a cube and a star in 50 patients (23, left brain damaged: LBD; 27 right brain damaged: RBD) who had suffered strokes. Our analysis was sensitive to the presence of neglect on the cube (i.e., missing left sided details) with voxel-wise lesion symptom mapping (VLSM) highlighting involvement of expected brain regions (superior temporal and supramarginal gyri). With left-sided omissions removed from analyses, we failed to find any difference between LBD and RBD patients. While the presence of left neglect appeared to exaggerate errors, this was only significant for errors of scale and proportion for the star drawing. VLSM of the distinct error domains demonstrated white matter involvement (and a minor contribution from the right insula) with respect to scale errors of the cube only. Finally, blinded judgements of hemisphere of lesion based on qualitative assessment of the drawings were no better than chance. These results suggest that figure copying is a complex task relying on large scale neural networks involving both hemispheres. Clearly, models of visuoconstructional capacity that emphasise right hemisphere dominance are not entirely accurate.

Statistical Learning Impairments as a Consequence of Stroke.

Statistical learning is the implicit learning of the contingencies between sequential stimuli, typically from mere exposure. It is present from infancy onward, and plays a role in functions from language learning to selective attention. Despite these observations, there are few data on whether statistical learning capacity changes with age or after brain injury. In order to examine how brain injury affects the ability to learn and update statistical representations, we had young control and healthy elder participants, as well as participants with either left or right brain injury, perform an auditory statistical learning task. Participants listened to two languages with made-up words that were defined by the transition probability between syllables. Following passive listening, learning was assessed with a two-alternative forced choice test for the most familiar word. As in previous studies, we found that young controls have a learning capacity limitation for statistical learning; a second language is less well learned than the first, and this statistical learning capacity limit is attenuated with age. Additionally, we found that brain damaged patients, whether with left or right hemispheric damage, showed impaired statistical learning. This impairment was not explained by aphasia or cognitive deficits. As statistical learning is a critical skill for daily life, a better appreciation of the nature of this impairment will improve our understanding of the cognitive effects of brain injury and could lead to new rehabilitation strategies.

Updating impairments and the failure to explore new hypotheses following right brain damage.

We have shown recently that damage to the right hemisphere impairs the ability to update mental models when evidence suggests an old model is no longer appropriate. We argue that this deficit is generic in the sense that it crosses multiple cognitive and perceptual domains. Here, we examined the nature of this updating impairment to determine more precisely the underlying mechanisms. We had right (RBD, N = 12) and left brain damaged (LBD, N = 10) patients perform versions of our picture-morphing task in which pictures gradually morph from one object (e.g., shark) to another (e.g., plane). Performance was contrasted against two groups of healthy older controls, one matched on age (HCO-age-matched, N = 9) and another matched on general level of cognitive ability (HCO-cognitively-matched, N = 9). We replicated our earlier findings showing that RBD patients took longer than LBD patients and HCOs to report seeing the second object in a sequence of morphing images. The groups did not differ when exposed to a morphing sequence a second time, or when responding to ambiguous images outside the morphing context. This indicates that RBD patients have little difficulty alternating between known representations or labeling ambiguous images. Instead, the difficulty lies in generating alternate hypotheses for ambiguous information. Lesion overlay analyses, although speculative given the sample size, are consistent with our fMRI work in healthy individuals in implicating the anterior insular cortex as critical for updating mental models.

The neural systems for perceptual updating.

In a constantly changing environment we must adapt to both abrupt and gradual changes to incoming information. Previously, we demonstrated that a distributed network (including the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex) was active when participants updated their initial representations (e.g., it's a cat) in a gradually morphing picture task (e.g., now it's a rabbit; Stöttinger et al., 2015). To shed light on whether these activations reflect the proactive decisions to update or perceptual uncertainty, we introduced two additional conditions. By presenting picture morphs twice we controlled for uncertainty in perceptual decision making. Inducing an abrupt shift in a third condition allowed us to differentiate between a proactive decision in uncertainty-driven updating and a reactive decision in surprise-based updating. We replicated our earlier result, showing the robustness of the effect. In addition, we found activation in the anterior insula (bilaterally) and the mid frontal area/ACC in all three conditions, indicative of the importance of these areas in updating of all kinds. When participants were naïve as to the identity of the second object, we found higher activations in the mid-cingulate cortex and cuneus - areas typically associated with task difficulty, in addition to higher activations in the right TPJ most likely reflecting the shift to a new perspective. Activations associated with the proactive decision to update to a new interpretation were found in a network including the dorsal ACC known to be involved in exploration and the endogenous decision to switch to a new interpretation. These findings suggest a general network commonly engaged in all types of perceptual decision making supported by additional networks associated with perceptual uncertainty or updating provoked by either proactive or reactive decision making.

Knowing where is different from knowing what: Distinct response time profiles and accuracy effects for target location, orientation, and color probability.

When a location is cued, targets appearing at that location are detected more quickly. When a target feature is cued, targets bearing that feature are detected more quickly. These attentional cueing effects are only superficially similar. More detailed analyses find distinct temporal and accuracy profiles for the two different types of cues. This pattern parallels work with probability manipulations, where both feature and spatial probability are known to affect detection accuracy and reaction times. However, little has been done by way of comparing these effects. Are probability manipulations on space and features distinct? In a series of five experiments, we systematically varied spatial probability and feature probability along two dimensions (orientation or color). In addition, we decomposed response times into initiation and movement components. Targets appearing at the probable location were reported more quickly and more accurately regardless of whether the report was based on orientation or color. On the other hand, when either color probability or orientation probability was manipulated, response time and accuracy improvements were specific for that probable feature dimension. Decomposition of the response time benefits demonstrated that spatial probability only affected initiation times, whereas manipulations of feature probability affected both initiation and movement times. As detection was made more difficult, the two effects further diverged, with spatial probability disproportionally affecting initiation times and feature probability disproportionately affecting accuracy. In conclusion, all manipulations of probability, whether spatial or featural, affect detection. However, only feature probability affects perceptual precision, and precision effects are specific to the probable attribute.

Tuned by experience: How orientation probability modulates early perceptual processing.

Probable stimuli are more often and more quickly detected. While stimulus probability is known to affect decision-making, it can also be explained as a perceptual phenomenon. Using spatial gratings, we have previously shown that probable orientations are also more precisely estimated, even while participants remained naive to the manipulation. We conducted an electrophysiological study to investigate the effect that probability has on perception and visual-evoked potentials. In line with previous studies on oddballs and stimulus prevalence, low-probability orientations were associated with a greater late positive 'P300' component which might be related to either surprise or decision-making. However, the early 'C1' component, thought to reflect V1 processing, was dampened for high-probability orientations while later P1 and N1 components were unaffected. Exploratory analyses revealed a participant-level correlation between C1 and P300 amplitudes, suggesting a link between perceptual processing and decision-making. We discuss how these probability effects could be indicative of sharpening of neurons preferring the probable orientations, due either to perceptual learning, or to feature-based attention.

Orientation Probability and Spatial Exogenous Cuing Improve Perceptual Precision and Response Speed by Different Mechanisms.

We are faster and more accurate at detecting frequently occurring objects than infrequent ones, just as we are faster and more accurate at detecting objects that have been spatially cued. Does this behavioral similarity reflect similar processes? To evaluate this question we manipulated orientation probability and exogenous spatial cuing within a single perceptual estimation task. Both increased target probability and spatial cuing led to shorter response initiation times and more precise perceptual reports, but these effects were additive. Further, target probability changed the shape of the distribution of errors while spatial cuing did not. Different routes and independent mechanisms could lead to changes in behavioral measures that look similar to each other and to 'attentional' effects.

Not all probabilities are equivalent: Evidence from orientation versus spatial probability learning.

Frequently targets are detected faster, probable locations searched earlier, and likely orientations estimated more precisely. Are these all consequences of a single, domain-general "attentional" effect? To examine this issue, participants were shown brief instances of spatial gratings, and were tasked to draw their location and orientation. Unknown to participants, either the location or orientation probability of these gratings were manipulated. While orientation probability affected the precision of orientation reports, spatial probability did not. Further, utilising lowered stimulus contrast (via a staircase procedure) and a combination of behavioral precision and confidence self-report, we clustered trials with perceived stimuli from trials where the target was not detected: Spatial probability only modulated the likelihood of stimulus detection, but not did not modulate perceptual precision. Even when no physical attentional cues are present, acquired probabilistic information on space versus orientation leads to separable 'attention-like' effects on behaviour. We discuss how this could be linked to distinct underlying neural mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record

Adapting to change: The role of the right hemisphere in mental model building and updating.

We recently proposed that the right hemisphere plays a crucial role in the processes underlying mental model building and updating. Here, we review the evidence we and others have garnered to support this novel account of right hemisphere function. We begin by presenting evidence from patient work that suggests a critical role for the right hemisphere in the ability to learn from the statistics in the environment (model building) and adapt to environmental change (model updating). We then provide a review of neuroimaging research that highlights a network of brain regions involved in mental model updating. Next, we outline specific roles for particular regions within the network such that the anterior insula is purported to maintain the current model of the environment, the medial prefrontal cortex determines when to explore new or alternative models, and the inferior parietal lobule represents salient and surprising information with respect to the current model. We conclude by proposing some future directions that address some of the outstanding questions in the field of mental model building and updating. (PsycINFO Database Record

Attentional Effects on Phenomenological Appearance: How They Change with Task Instructions and Measurement Methods.

It has been reported that exogenous cues accentuate contrast appearance. The empirical finding is controversial because non-veridical perception challenges the idea that attention prioritizes processing resources to make perception better, and because philosophers have used the finding to challenge representational accounts of mental experience. The present experiments confirm that when evaluated with comparison paradigms exogenous cues increase the apparent contrast. In addition, contrast appearance was also changed by simply changing the purpose of a secondary task. When comparison and discrimination reports were combined in a single experiment there was a behavioral disassociation: contrast enhanced for comparison responses, but did not change for discrimination judgments, even when participants made both types of judgment for a single stimulus. That a single object can have multiple simultaneous appearances leads inescapably to the conclusion that our unitary mental experience is illusory.

Attentional effects on orientation judgements are dependent on memory consolidation processes.

Are the effects of memory and attention on perception synergistic, antagonistic, or independent? Tested separately, memory and attention have been shown to affect the accuracy of orientation judgements. When multiple stimuli are presented sequentially versus simultaneously, error variance is reduced. When a target is validly cued, precision is increased. What if they are manipulated together? We combined memory and attention manipulations in an orientation judgement task to answer this question. Two circular gratings were presented sequentially or simultaneously. On some trials a brief luminance cue preceded the stimuli. Participants were cued to report the orientation of one of the two gratings by rotating a response grating. We replicated the finding that error variance is reduced on sequential trials. Critically, we found interacting effects of memory and attention. Valid cueing reduced the median, absolute error only when two stimuli appeared together and improved it to the level of performance on uncued sequential trials, whereas invalid cueing always increased error. This effect was not mediated by cue predictiveness; however, predictive cues reduced the standard deviation of the error distribution, whereas nonpredictive cues reduced "guessing". Our results suggest that, when the demand on memory is greater than a single stimulus, attention is a bottom-up process that prioritizes stimuli for consolidation. Thus attention and memory are synergistic.

Assessing perceptual change with an ambiguous figures task: Normative data for 40 standard picture sets.

In many research domains, researchers have employed gradually morphing pictures to study perception under ambiguity. Despite their inherent utility, only a limited number of stimulus sets are available, and those sets vary substantially in quality and perceptual complexity. Here we present normative data for 40 morphing picture series. In all sets, line drawings of pictures of common objects are morphed over 15 iterations into a completely different object. Objects are either morphed from an animate to an inanimate object (or vice versa) or morphed within the animate and inanimate object categories. These pictures, together with the normative naming data presented here, will be of value for research on a diverse range of questions, from perceptual processing to decision making.

A cortical network that marks the moment when conscious representations are updated.

In order to survive in a complex, noisy and constantly changing environment we need to categorize the world (e.g., Is this food edible or poisonous?) and we need to update our interpretations when things change. How does our brain update when object categories change from one to the next? We investigated the neural correlates associated with this updating process. We used event-related fMRI while people viewed a sequence of images that morphed from one object (e.g., a plane) to another (e.g., a shark). All participants were naïve as to the identity of the second object. The point at which participants 'saw' the second object was unpredictable and uncontaminated by any dramatic or salient change to the images themselves. The moment when subjective perceptual representations changed activated a circumscribed network including the anterior insula, medial and inferior frontal regions and inferior parietal cortex. In a setting where neither the timing nor nature of the visual transition was predictable, this restricted cortical network signals the time of updating a perceptual representation. The anterior insula and mid-frontal regions (including the ACC) were activated not only at the actual time when change was reported, but also immediately before, suggesting that these areas are also involved in processing alternative options after a mismatch has been detected.