Psychology and the fall of Communism: The special case of (East) Germany.

The fall of Communism is now universally agreed to be what the philosopher Hegel called a world historical event-one that few predicted but nearly everyone saw as inevitable after it happened. In the aftermath many lives-and worldviews-changed, not only, but also in the human sciences. These remarks attempt to address in a preliminary way both the impact of the fall of Communism on psychology in former East Germany (including changes in personnel and approach) and the ways in which these sciences were employed as resources for reflection on the Communist past as well as the transition to new social and political regimes.

Review of Max Wertheimer, Productive thinking.

Reviews the book, Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking by Viktor Sarris (2020). This volume contains a reproduction of the original edition of Max Wertheimer's study of productive thinking, published posthumously in 1945, with a brief preface and a more extensive introduction by Viktor Sarris, Professor Emeritus of General Psychology and former holder of the Max Wertheimer Chair at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main. In his introduction, Sarris briefly summarizes the 1920 study, and then provides a chapter by chapter account of the 1945 volume's content, summarizing the results in a section called "Wertheimer's Credo." The original edition of Productive Thinking has been out of print for some time, as has a second edition, with an additional article by Wertheimer, published in 1959 by his son Michael Wertheimer, himself a professor of psychology. An expanded edition was published in 1982, but is now also out of print. This republication of the original text offers an opportunity to libraries as well as students of teachers of psychology to acquaint themselves with a classical study, which is infused with the lively spirit of inquiry characteristic of its author, but is more often cited than read. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Wissenschaftsgeschichte und Wissenschaftsphilosophie - Einführende Bemerkungen.

History of Science and Philosophy of Science. Introductory Remarks. This article introduces two special issues of the journal History of Science Reports (Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte) with contributions on the relationships of history and philosophy of science since the seventeenth century. The introduction begins with a brief reminder of Thomas Kuhn's provocative discussion of the relationship in the 1970s, placing it in the context of the debate of the period over whether the foundation of university departments for History and Philosophy of Science in the United States had led to a mere "marriage of convenience" or something more. Following this the paper briefly outlines the transformative impact of the "practical turn" in both philosophy and history of science since the 1990s, and contends that the relationship of history and philosophy of science has nonetheless become increasingly distant over time. This is due in large part to the professionalisation of history of science and to the recent turn to cultural approaches in that field; both trends have led to the adoption of strictly historicist rather than analytical perspectives on knowledge. General historians, too, are paying more attention to the increasing impact of science and technology, but have at most instrumental use for philosophical perspectives. Thus, the distinct possibility arises that the debate between historical and analytical approaches in philosophy of science is becoming a conversation within one discipline rather than a dialogue between two disciplines: what was once a "marriage of convenience"︁ could end in respectful separation or amicable divorce. The article concludes with brief summaries of the articles published in the two special issues, indicating their relations to specific aspects of the broader topic at hand.

[Science and music. Introductory remarks]. / Wissenschaft und Musik--Einführende Bemerkungen.

The article presents a brief introduction to "Science and Music", theme of the 44th symposium of the "Society for History of Sciences" held in Munich in May 2007. The text begins with a brief reference to the numerous biographical connections between the two fields, but focuses primarily on topics that reveal music and the sciences to be results of shared cultural practices. Examples include: (1) shared objects in the material sense, meaning the use of particular instruments in both music and the sciences; (2) shared semantics, metaphors, and concepts, for example the use of the concepts like clang or tone color in acoustics and the psychology of audition, or talk of 'mood' and 'harmony' in both music and in literature; (3) direct interactions between mathematics, physics and music, for example in the electronic music of the twentieth century.

Psychological thought and practice in German-speaking Europe, 1900-1960.

Psychology has become a protean "multi-discipline" that occupies a peculiar place among the sciences, suspended between methodological orientations derived from the physical and biological sciences and a subject matter extending into the social and human sciences. At the same time, modern societies have become permeated--some would say saturated--with psychological thinking and practices, much of which relates tenuously at best to what goes on in the discipline. In these remarks, both of these developments are placed in historical context, focusing particularly on Germany and Austria. Particular emphasis is placed on the roles of politics, society, and culture in the formation and reception of psychological thought and research, as well as in the creation and uses of psychological knowledge in practical contexts.

Roles of instruments in psychological research.

What roles have instruments played in psychology and related disciplines? How have instruments affected the dynamics of psychological research, with what possibilities and limits? What is the psychological instrument? This article provides a conceptual foundation for specific case studies concerning such questions. The discussion begins by challenging widely accepted assumptions about the subject and analyzing the general relations between scientific experimentation and the uses of instruments in psychology. Building on this analysis, a deliberately inclusive definition of what constitutes a psychological instrument is proposed. The discussion then takes up the relation between instrumentation and theories and differentiates in greater detail the roles instruments have had over the course of psychology's history. Finally, the authors offer an approach to evaluating the possibilities and limitations of instruments in psychology.