Dissociations between data-driven and goal-driven effort reports: Performance, metacognition, and affect.

Measuring effort has long been a challenge and this seems particularly true in the case of subjective effort. Koriat et al. compared two types of effort frames, what they call data-driven effort, the amount of effort perceived to be required by a task, and goal-driven effort, the amount of effort one chooses to invest in a task. This study investigates whether self-reports of data- and goal-driven effort are differentially associated with test performance, metacognition, and affect in a complex learning task. Results demonstrate that data- and goal-driven effort have qualitatively different relations with many of these variables. For example, partial correlations revealed data-driven effort was negatively associated with prospective and retrospective performance estimates, but the opposite pattern emerged for goal-driven effort. These results demonstrate that how subjective measures of effort are framed (and interpreted by the respondent) can drastically influence how they relate to other variables of interest.

On the influence of evaluation context on judgments of effort.

Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our judgments of effort are limited. Recent work has suggested that our judgments of effort are sensitive to the context in which they are made (i.e., the judgment context). Using a cognitive task and stimulus set that has produced a reliable dissociation between judgments of effort and cognitive demand (as measured by performance and other indirect measures of demand), we examined whether evaluation context might be able to eliminate this dissociation (i.e., bring judgments of effort more in line with measures of cognitive demand). To address this question, we conducted four experiments manipulating a number of aspects of the judgment context including, principally, a manipulation of joint versus separate evaluation; whether the judgment was prospective, or retrospective; and whether prospective judgments were made with or without having experienced the cognitive task. Additionally, we collected objective demand measures and examined participants' self-reported reasons for their judgments of effort across the joint and separate evaluation contexts. Results demonstrated that evaluation context has a marked effect on judgments of effort; however, no judgment context appeared to yield a pattern more similar to what is found using measures of cognitive demand. Moreover, the reasons individuals cited for their judgments varied across evaluation contexts. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgments of effort are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Judgements of effort as a function of post-trial versus post-task elicitation.

Cognitive effort is a central construct in our lives, yet our understanding of the processes underlying our perception of effort is limited. Performance is typically used as one way to assess effort in cognitive tasks (e.g., tasks that take longer are generally thought to be more effortful); however, Dunn and Risko reported a recent case where such "objective" measures of effort were dissociated from judgements of effort (i.e., subjective effort). This dissociation occurred when participants either made their judgements of effort after the task (i.e., reading stimuli composed of rotated words) or without ever performing the task. This leaves open the possibility that if participants made their judgements of effort more proximal to the actual experience of performing the task (e.g., right after a given trial) that these judgements might better correspond to putatively "objective" measures of effort. To address this question, we conducted two experiments replicating Dunn and Risko with additional probes for post-trial judgements of effort (i.e., a judgement of effort made right after each trial). Results provided some support for the notion that judgements of effort more closely follow reading times when made post-trial as opposed to post-task. Implications of the present work for our understanding of judgements of effort are discussed.