Responsibility is an adequate requirement for authorship: a reply to Levy.

Neil Levy argues in a recent JME 'Current controversy' paper that responsibility is not an adequate authorship requirement for human researchers, which makes it unjustified to require it from artificial intelligence contributing to research and scientific paper production, although he softens his stance towards the end and accepts that a limited responsibility requirement might after all be reasonable. The main argument provided by Levy against a more extensive responsibility requirement in science is that there are many cases where not all researchers listed as coauthors can assume responsibility for the entire paper or even the central research questions. In this reply, we argue that the more limited responsibility requirement is the ethically reasonable one to ask of all authors, considering the conditions for and value of collaboration, and that this should also have ramifications for the legal regulation of scientific misconduct.

How to Handle Co-authorship When Not Everyone's Research Contributions Make It into the Paper.

While much of the scholarly work on ethics relating to academic authorship examines the fair distribution of authorship credit, none has yet examined situations where a researcher contributes significantly to the project, but whose contributions do not make it into the final manuscript. Such a scenario is commonplace in collaborative research settings in many disciplines and may occur for a number of reasons, such as excluding research in order to provide the paper with a clearer focus, tell a particular story, or exclude negative results that do not fit the hypothesis. Our concern in this paper is less about the reasons for including or excluding data from a paper and more about distributing credit in this type of scenario. In particular, we argue that the notion 'substantial contribution', which is part of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) authorship criteria, is ambiguous and that we should ask whether it concerns what ends up in the paper or what is a substantial contribution to the research process leading up to the paper. We then argue, based on the principles of fairness, due credit, and ensuring transparency and accountability in research, that the latter interpretation is more plausible from a research ethics point of view. We conclude that the ICMJE and other organizations interested in authorship and publication ethics should consider including guidance on authorship attribution in situations where researchers contribute significantly to the research process leading up to a specific paper, but where their contribution is finally omitted.

Why unethical papers should be retracted.

The purpose of retracting published papers is to maintain the integrity of academic research. Recent work in research ethics has devoted important attention to how to improve the system of paper retraction. In this context, the focus has primarily been on how to handle fraudulent or flawed research papers and how to encourage the retraction of papers based on honest mistakes. Less attention has been paid to whether papers that report unethical research-for example, research performed without appropriate concern for the moral rights and interests of the research participants-should be retracted. The aim of this paper is to examine to what extent retraction policies of academic journals and publishers address retractions of unethical research and to discuss critically various policy options and the reasons for accepting them. The paper starts by reviewing retraction policies of academic publishers. The results show that many journals do not have explicit policies for how to handle unethical research. Against this background, we then discuss four normative arguments for why unethical research should be retracted. In conclusion, we suggest a retraction policy in light of our empirical and normative investigations.

Should the deceased be listed as authors?

Sometimes participants in research collaboration die before the paper is accepted for publication. The question we raise in this paper is how authorship should be handled in such situations. First, the outcome of a literature survey is presented. Taking this as our starting point, we then go on to discuss authorship of the dead in relation to the requirements of the Vancouver rules. We argue that in principle the deceased can meet the requirements laid down in these authorship guidelines. However, to include a deceased researcher as author requires a strong justification. The more the person has been involved in the research and writing process before he or she passes away, the stronger the justification for inclusion.

Criminalization of scientific misconduct.

This paper discusses the criminalization of scientific misconduct, as discussed and defended in the bioethics literature. In doing so it argues against the claim that fabrication, falsification and plagiarism (FFP) together identify the most serious forms of misconduct, which hence ought to be criminalized, whereas other forms of misconduct should not. Drawing the line strictly at FFP is problematic both in terms of what is included and what is excluded. It is also argued that the criminalization of scientific misconduct, despite its anticipated benefits, is at risk of giving the false impression that dubious practices falling outside the legal regulation "do not count". Some doubts are also raised concerning whether criminalization of the most serious forms of misconduct will lower the burdens for universities or successfully increase research integrity. Rather, with or without criminalization, other measures must be taken and are probably more important in order to foster a more healthy research environment.

Electronic monitoring of offenders: an ethical review.

This paper considers electronic monitoring (EM) a promising alternative to imprisonment as a criminal sanction for a series of criminal offenses. However, little has been said about EM from an ethical perspective. To evaluate EM from an ethical perspective, six initial ethical challenges are addressed and discussed. It is argued that since EM is developing as a technology and a punitive means, it is urgent to discuss its ethical implications and incorporate moral values into its design and development.