Knowledge of display rules in prelingually deaf and hearing children.

Deaf children of elementary and secondary school age participated in a study designed to examine their understanding of display rules, the principles governing the expression and concealment of emotion in social situations. The results showed that deaf children's knowledge of display rules, as measured by their reported concealment of emotion, was comparable to that of hearing children of the same age. However, deaf children were less likely to report that they would conceal happiness and anger. They were also less likely to produce reasons for concealing emotion and a smaller proportion of their reasons were prosocial, that is, relating to the feelings of others. The results suggest that the understanding of display rules (which function to protect the feelings of other people) may develop more gradually in deaf children raised in a spoken language environment than it does in hearing children.

Committee proposals and restrictive rules.

I analyze a game-theoretic model of committee-legislature interaction in which a majority decision to adopt either an open or closed amendment rule occurs following the committee's proposal of a bill. I find that, in equilibrium, the closed rule is almost always chosen when the dimension of the policy space is >1. Furthermore, the difference between the equilibrium outcome and that which would have occurred under the open rule can be arbitrarily small.

The development of theory of mind in deaf children.

Deaf children aged 4 to 16 years were given a false-belief test of theory of mind. Although the children experienced difficulty with the test, relative to hearing children, confirming a report by Peterson and Siegal (1995), performance was age-related, with a significantly higher proportion of 13- to 16-year-olds passing the test. It was concluded that deaf children raised in a spoken language environment show a developmental delay in theory of mind acquisition. This delay is consistent with the assumption that their early opportunities for learning about mental states are relatively restricted and that the normal development of theory of mind is dependent upon such opportunities.

Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: an experimental approach.

We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include: scheduling job shops, airports, or supercomputers; zero-inventory planning; and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. Using experimental methods, we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65% efficiency in a seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate resources in these environments. We develop and analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from auctions used to allocate single-dimensional goods. These new mechanisms involve computer-assisted coordination made possible by the existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms significantly improve on the performance of administrative and market procedures.