Measles Outbreak Associated With International Travel, Indiana, 2011.

BACKGROUND: Endemic measles was declared eliminated in the United States in 2000, but imported measles cases continue to cause outbreaks. On June 20, 2011, 5 epidemiologically linked measles cases were reported to the Indiana State Department of Health. We investigated to identify additional cases and to prevent further spread. METHODS: Case findings and contact investigations during the June 3, 2011-August 13, 2011 outbreak identified measles cases, exposed persons, and exposure settings. Laboratory confirmation included measles serology and reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction. Control measures included evaluating measles immune status and providing post-exposure prophylaxis, isolation, and quarantine. RESULTS: Fourteen confirmed measles illnesses were identified (10 [71%] females; median age, 11.5 years [range, 15 months-27 years]). The source patient was an unvaccinated US resident who recently traveled from Indonesia. Twelve patients were unvaccinated members of the source patient's extended family. Two hospitalizations and no deaths were reported. Among 868 exposed persons identified through contact investigation, 644 (74%) had documented measles immunity, 153 (18%) were lost to follow-up, and 71 (8%) lacked evidence of immunity. CONCLUSIONS: Misdiagnosis of measles in an unvaccinated patient with recent travel history to a measles-endemic region resulted in the second largest measles outbreak in the United States during 2011. Clinicians should consider measles among patients presenting with febrile rash illness and history of recent travel, and clinicians should promptly report suspected illnesses. Early identification of infectious patients, rapid public health investigation, and maintenance of high vaccine coverage are critical for the prevention and control of measles outbreaks.

Spectrum of infection and risk factors for human monkeypox, United States, 2003.

For the 2003 monkeypox virus (MPXV) outbreak in the United States, interhuman transmission was not documented and all case-patients were near or handled MPXV-infected prairie dogs. We initiated a case-control study to evaluate risk factors for animal-to-human MPXV transmission. Participants completed a questionnaire requesting exposure, clinical, and demographic information. Serum samples were obtained for analysis of immunoglobulin G (IgG) and IgM to orthopoxvirus. When data were adjusted for smallpox vaccination, case-patients were more likely than controls to have had daily exposure to a sick animal (odds ratio [OR] 4.0, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.2-13.4), cleaned cages and bedding of a sick animal (OR 5.3, 95% CI 1.4-20.7), or touched a sick animal (OR 4.0, 95% CI 1.2-13.4). These findings demonstrate that human MPXV infection is associated with handling of MPXV-infected animals and suggest that exposure to excretions and secretions of infected animals can result in infection.