Discriminación inversa y asistencia sanitaria en las prisiones / No disponible

En este trabajo defiendo la legitimidad de las medidas de discriminación inversa (DI) en el ámbito de la asistencia sanitaria en las prisiones. Para ello, en primer lugar, hago una breve referencia a la evolución del concepto de igualdad como principio ordenador fundamental de las relaciones sociales. A continuación, expongo lo que se entiende por DI, prestando una atención especial al debate acerca de si resulta lícito o no adoptar ese tipo de medidas. En tercer lugar, observo algunas de las principales diferencias que se dan entre la asistencia sanitaria que reciben los reclusos y los individuos en libertad, para determinar si alguna de ellas puede considerarse DI. Concluyo justificando mi posición favorable a adoptar ciertas medidas de DI en el ámbito de la asistencia sanitaria penitenciaria (AU)

No disponible

[Autonomy and patient prisoners]. / Autonomía y pacientes reclusos.

The authors study a recent Spanish High Court decision declaring liability on the Administration's part for the death of an inmate in a prison hospital. We analyse the Court's decision using legal, ethical, medical and social perspectives. The conclusions are that: 1. the Administration has no legitimate right to force a prisoner to take medical treatment, except in circumstances in which there is a grave and definite risk to the patient's life, or when the patient lacks capacity or when there is the risk of harm to the health of third parties; 2. That in the case of health decision making that might affect a patient, the Court has mounted a frontal attack on the autonomy of patients in prison; 3. That from a medical point of view the decision is discriminatory since it does not apply the same standards of measurement to all chronic illnesses that might be found in the prison context; 4. That it is inapplicable in daily practice due to the fact that its strictness of application would seriously affect the already highly fragile ordered coexistence that exists in a prison.

Autonomía y pacientes reclusos / Autonomy and patient prisoners

Los autores estudian una reciente sentencia de la Sala 3ª del Tribunal Supremo en la que se declara la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración por la muerte de un paciente preso. Se analizan los argumentos de la Sala desde una perspectiva jurídica, ética, médica y social. Concluyen que: 1: la Administración no está legitimada para imponer tratamientos médicos a los reclusos, salvo que medie riesgo grave y cierto para su vida, incapacidad para decidir o riesgo para la salud de terceros; 2: que la sentencia supone un ataque frontal a la autonomía de los pacientes presos en la toma de decisiones sanitarias que les afecten; 3: que desde un punto de vista médico es discriminatoria, ya que no mide por el mismo rasero a todas las enfermedades crónicas que se pueden dar en prisión y 4: que resulta inasumible en la práctica diaria, porque su estricta aplicación alteraría considerablemente la ya de por sí frágil ordenada convivencia en un centro penitenciario

The authors study a recent Spanish High Court decision declaring liability on the Administration’s part for the death of an inmate in a prison hospital. We analyse the Court’s decision using legal, ethical, medical and social perspectives. The conclusions are that: 1. the Administration has no legitimate right to force a prisoner to take medical treatment, except in circumstances in which there is a grave and definite risk to the patient’s life, or when the patient lacks capacity or when there is the risk of harm to the health of third parties; 2. That in the case of health decision making that might affect a patient, the Court has mounted a frontal attack on the autonomy of patients in prison; 3. That from a medical point of view the decision is discriminatory since it does not apply the same standards of measurement to all chronic illnesses that might be found in the prison context; 4. That it is inapplicable in daily practice due to the fact that its strictness of application would seriously affect the already highly fragile ordered coexistence that exists in a prison

[Legal and philosophical considerations about cloning in human reproduction]. / Consideraciones filosófico jurídicas en torno a la clonación para la reproducción humana.

The birth of Dolly the sheep has served to rekindle the debate on the lawfulness of cloning for human reproduction. Although the normative response has been unanimous thus far in sanctioning such use, the matter of the limits to this is widely debated. In this article the author examines the reasons underpinning the limits imposed: is cloning for human reproduction unlawful in itself of does everything depend on the aim pursued? The issue is addressed from the standpoint of the apparent clash in law between the right to reproduce and freedom of research, on the one hand, and--on the other--the right to be conceived in a given manner. Particular attention is paid to the question of the lawfulness of two instances of human embryo division, namely, for in vitro fertilization and for preimplantation diagnosis.

[The Constitutional Court regarding Assisted Reproduction Techniques: a critical assessment]. / El Tribunal Constitucional ante la Ley sobre Técnicas de Reproducción Asistida: una valoración crítica.

Last June Spain's Constitutional Court ruled on the challenge lodged against Law 35/1988 on Assisted Reproduction Techniques (Ruling 116/1999). The ruling confirmed the provisions of the Law. However, in examining the Law in question the Court did not, in my opinion interpret correctly the Spanish Constitution. I argue that there are three main areas of disagreement: since the contents directly affect human dignity the Law should have taken the form of a higher (Organic) Law. Secondly, the Law's treatment of in vitro fertilised embryos in certain cases, falls short of the minimum required by the Constitution. Thirdly, paternity investigation is prevented contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and hence the constitutional notion of family is undermined.