Do uncontrolled processes contribute to evaluative learning? Insights from a new two-US process dissociation procedure and ambivalence measures.

The contribution of uncontrolled processes to evaluative learning has been examined in evaluative conditioning procedures by comparing evaluations of conditioned stimuli between tasks or within tasks but between learning instruction conditions. In the present research, we introduced a new procedure that keeps both tasks and instructions constant. In addition, we introduced ambivalence measures to address this uncontrollability question. The new procedure involves forming an impression of conditioned stimuli based on their pairing with one unconditioned stimulus while attending but discarding the influence of another unconditioned stimulus holding the same (congruent trials) versus a different (incongruent trials) valence. When the to-be-used and to-be-discarded unconditioned stimuli share the same (vs. a different) valence, controlled and uncontrolled processes should support the same (vs. opposite) responses. We used this approach in two preregistered experiments (Ntotal = 467) using dichotomous evaluative classifications (Experiments 1 and 2), evaluative ratings, and two measures of attitudinal ambivalence: mouse trajectories and felt ambivalence (Experiment 2). While we failed to find evidence for uncontrolled processes in evaluative classification frequencies separately in Experiments 1 and 2, analyses of aggregated classification frequencies across Experiments 1 and 2 suggested a small contribution of uncontrolled processes. In addition, we found larger felt ambivalence for incongruent than congruent trials. Overall, the present findings are mixed but support the possibility of a contribution of uncontrolled processes to evaluative learning, even when control is applied to a focal stimulus and additional influences come from a to-be-disregarded stimulus.

A conditional judgment procedure for probing evaluative conditioning effects in the absence of feelings of remembering.

Attitude research has capitalized on evaluative conditioning procedures to gain insight into how evaluations are formed and may be changed. In evaluative conditioning, a conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., an unfamiliar soda brand) is paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US) of affective value (e.g., a pleasant picture). Following this pairing, a change in CS liking may be observed (e.g., the soda brand is liked better). A question with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications is whether the change in CS liking is found when participants feel they do not remember the CS-US pairings at the time an evaluation is produced about the CS. Here, we introduce a new conditional judgment procedure-the two-button-sets (TBS) task-for probing evaluative conditioning effects without feelings of remembering about the valence of the US paired with the CS. In three experiments, the TBS is (1) is successfully validated; it is also used to (2) provide preliminary information on the feeling of remembering question, and (3) to examine an affect-consistent bias in memory judgments for CS-US pairings. Results do not support evaluative effects in the absence of feelings of remembering, and they oppose the view that affect-consistent bias is limited to memory uncertainty. We discuss these findings in light of previous evidence and of dual-learning models of attitudes. We also discuss limitations and research avenues related to the new procedure.

People underestimate the influence of repetition on truth judgments (and more so for themselves than for others).

People judge repeated statements as more truthful than new statements: a truth effect. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 463), we examined whether people expect repetition to influence truth judgments more for others than for themselves: a bias blind spot in the truth effect. In Experiments 1 and 2, using moderately plausible and implausible statements, respectively, the test for the bias blind spot did not pass the significance threshold set for a two-step sequential analysis. Experiment 3 considered moderately plausible statements but with a larger sample of participants. Additionally, it compared actual performance after a two-day delay with participants' predictions for themselves and others. This time, we found clear evidence for a bias blind spot in the truth effect. Experiment 3 also showed that participants underestimated the magnitude of the truth effect, especially so for themselves, and that predictions and actual truth effect scores were not significantly related. Finally, an integrative analysis focusing on a more conservative between-participant approach found clear frequentist and Bayesian evidence for a bias blind spot. Overall, the results indicate that people (1) hold beliefs about the effect of repetition on truth judgments, (2) believe that this effect is larger for others than for themselves, (3) and underestimate the effect's magnitude, and (4) particularly so for themselves.

Repetition could increase the perceived truth of conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy theories can be encountered repeatedly, which raises the issue of the effect of their repeated exposure on beliefs. Earlier studies found that repetition increases truth judgments of factual statements, whether they are uncertain, highly implausible, or fake news, for instance. Would this "truth effect" be observed with conspiracy statements? If so, is the effect size smaller than the typical truth effect, and is it associated with individual differences such as cognitive style and conspiracy mentality? In the present preregistered study, we addressed these three issues. We asked participants to provide binary truth judgments to conspiracy and factual statements already displayed in an exposure phase (an interest judgment task) or that were new (displayed only in the truth judgment task). We measured participants' cognitive style with the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and conspiracy mentality with the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ). Importantly, we found that repetition increased truth judgments of conspiracy theories, unmoderated by cognitive style and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we found that the truth effect was smaller with conspiracy theories than with uncertain factual statements, and suggest explanations for this difference. The results suggest that repetition may be a simple way to increase belief in conspiracy theories. Whether repetition increases conspiracy beliefs in natural settings and how it contributes to conspiracism compared to other factors are important questions for future research.

Does co-occurrence information influence evaluations beyond relational meaning? An investigation using self-reported and mouse-tracking measures of attitudinal ambivalence.

People occasionally encounter information of which the structure bears divergent evaluative implications. For instance, when reading that a sunscreen protects against skin cancer, the relational meaning of the information (i.e., "protects against skin cancer") has positive evaluative implications for the sunscreen, whereas the co-occurrence (of "sunscreen" with "skin cancer") is negative. An important theoretical (and practical) issue is whether the co-occurrence information influences people's evaluations beyond the relational meaning of the information. This question has been recently investigated using task comparison procedures (comparing evaluative outcomes on different tasks) and process dissociation procedures (estimating relational and co-occurrence parameters within a given task). In this article, we report four experiments that examined this question by reducing interpretational ambiguities inherent in the two preceding approaches. This was achieved by using self-reported and mouse-tracking measures of ambivalence. We reasoned that when co-occurrence and relational information have divergent (rather than convergent) evaluative implications, more ambivalence should be found. We tested this prediction in experiential (Experiments 1 to 3) and instructed (Experiment 4) procedures. Higher self-reported ambivalence was found in divergent compared to convergent conditions in all experiments. Ambivalence, as estimated with mouse-tracking measures, was higher in divergent than in convergent conditions in the experiential experiments but not in the instructed experiment. Results are discussed with reference to single-process (propositional and episodic) and dual-process attitude learning models. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Is Earth a perfect square? Repetition increases the perceived truth of highly implausible statements.

A single exposure to statements is typically enough to increase their perceived truth. This Truth-by-Repetition (TBR) effect has long been assumed to occur only with statements whose truth value is unknown to participants. Contrary to this hypothesis, recent research has found that statements contradicting participants' prior knowledge (as established from a first sample of participants) show a TBR effect following their repetition (in a second, independent sample of participants). As for now, however, attempts at finding a TBR effect for blatantly false (i.e., highly implausible) statements have failed. Here, we reasoned that highly implausible statements such as Elephants run faster than cheetahs may show repetition effects, provided a sensitive truth measure is used and statements are repeated more than just once. In a preregistered experiment, participants judged on a 100-point scale the truth of highly implausible statements that were either new to them or had been presented five times before judgment. We observed an effect of repetition: repeated statements were judged more true than new ones, although all judgments were judged below the scale midpoint. Exploratory analyses additionally show that about half the participants showed no or even a reversed effect of repetition. The results provide the first empirical evidence that repetition can increase perceived truth even for highly implausible statements, although not equally so for all participants and not to the point of making the statements look true.