Modelling individual aesthetic judgements over time.

Listening to music, watching a sunset-many sensory experiences are valuable to us, to a degree that differs significantly between individuals, and within an individual over time. We have theorized (Brielmann & Dayan 2022 Psychol. Rev. 129, 1319-1337 (doi:10.1037/rev0000337))) that these idiosyncratic values derive from the task of using experiences to tune the sensory-cognitive system to current and likely future input. We tested the theory using participants' (n = 59) ratings of a set of dog images (n = 55) created using the NeuralCrossbreed morphing algorithm. A full realization of our model that uses feature representations extracted from image-recognizing deep neural nets (e.g. VGG-16) is able to capture liking judgements on a trial-by-trial basis (median r = 0.65), outperforming predictions based on population averages (median r = 0.01). Furthermore, the model's learning component allows it to explain image sequence dependent rating changes, capturing on average 17% more variance in the ratings for the true trial order than for simulated random trial orders. This validation of our theory is the first step towards a comprehensive treatment of individual differences in evaluation. This article is part of the theme issue 'Art, aesthetics and predictive processing: theoretical and empirical perspectives'.

Framing cognitive offloading in terms of gains or losses: achieving a more optimal use of reminders.

Nowadays individuals can readily set reminders to offload intentions onto external resources, such as smartphone alerts, rather than using internal memory. Individuals tend to be biased, setting more reminders than would be optimal. We address the question whether the reminder bias depends on offloading scenarios being framed as either gains or losses, both between-participants (Experiment 1) and within-participants (Experiment 2). In both experiments, framing of reminders in terms of gains resulted in participants employing a risk-averse strategy and using more reminders than would be optimal. Importantly, however, participants used reminders more optimally and were more willing to choose the risk-seeking option of remembering internally when reminders implied a loss. Based on metacognitive measures in Experiment 2, the reminder bias increased the more underconfident participants were about their memory abilities in both framing scenarios. Framing did not alter this relationship between erroneous metacognitive underconfidence and reminder bias but provides an additional influence. We conclude that emphasizing the losses (costs) associated with external reminders helps in achieving more optimal decisions in offloading situations, and that in addition to cognitive effort and metacognitive judgments, framing needs to be considered in improving individuals' offloading behavior.