Building Resilient Health Systems Intelligence: Adapting Indicators of Compromise for the Cyber-Bionexus.

The health sector is an underutilized source of actionable health intelligence for responding to threats across the "cyber-bionexus," defined as the convergence of threats from the biological and cybersecurity domains to produce harms with widespread societal consequences. The escalation of concerns about such threats-related to misinformation and disinformation; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events; cyberattacks; natural disease outbreaks; and disasters of various kinds-places health system concerns squarely at the forefront of national critical systems and broader security imperatives. Events such as the COVID-19 pandemic have highlighted the dearth of systems available for generating real-time intelligence in relation to critical functions of health sector operations amidst an unfolding crisis. Drawing on principles from the field of cyberthreat intelligence, and building on existing scholarship in health security intelligence, we propose a model for applying health system indicators of compromise for cyberbio events. We further discuss the relevance of this approach within the broader landscape of the cyber-bionexus to signal new pathways for research, practice, and policy engagement.

Disinformation and Epidemics: Anticipating the Next Phase of Biowarfare.

While biological warfare has classically been considered a threat requiring the presence of a distinct biological agent, we argue that in light of the rise of state-sponsored online disinformation campaigns we are approaching a fifth phase of biowarfare with a "cyber-bio" framing. By examining the rise of measles cases following disinformation campaigns connected to the US 2016 presidential elections, the rise of disinformation in the current novel coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic, and the impact of misinformation on public health interventions during the 2014-2016 West Africa and 2019-2020 Democratic Republic of the Congo Ebola outbreaks, we ask whether the potential impact of these campaigns-which includes the undermining of sociopolitical systems, the delegitimization of public health and scientific bodies, and the diversion of the public health response-can be characterized as analogous to the impacts of more traditional conceptions of biowarfare. In this paper, we look at these different impacts and the norms related to the use of biological weapons and cyber campaigns. By doing so, we anticipate the advent of a combined cyber and biological warfare. The latter is not dependent on the existence of a manufactured biological weapon; it manages to undermine sociopolitical systems and public health through the weaponization of naturally occurring outbreaks.

COVID-19 and the Rise of Participatory SIGINT: An Examination of the Rise in Government Surveillance Through Mobile Applications.

The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a significant growth in government surveillance techniques globally, primarily through the use of cell phone applications. However, although these applications can have actionable effects on public health efforts to control pandemics, the participatory or voluntary nature of these measures is obscuring the relationship between health information and traditional government surveillance techniques, potentially preventing effective oversight. Public health measures have traditionally been resistant to the integration of government-led intelligence techniques, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT), because of ethical and legal issues arising from the nature of surveillance techniques.We explore this rise of participatory SIGINT and its nature as an extension of biosurveillance through 3 drivers: the rise of surveillance capitalism, the exploitation of a public health crisis to obscure state of exception politics with a moral imperative, and the historically enduring nature of emergency-implemented surveillance measures.We conclude that although mobile applications may indeed be useful in containing pandemics, they should be subject to similar oversight and regulation as other government intelligence collection techniques.

A Health Intelligence Framework for Pandemic Response: Lessons from the UK Experience of COVID-19.

The novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has exposed critical failures in global public policy preparedness and response. Despite over a decade of exposure to other epidemics and pandemics, many, if not most, nation states have failed to integrate lessons learned into their pandemic preparedness and response plans. The United Kingdom's response to COVID-19 is an archetype of how the pandemic has overwhelmed traditional public health-led approaches. In this paper, we explore the UK experience and propose that pandemics constitute multivector threats meriting attention within a health intelligence framework. They employ the processes of information management used by the intelligence sector to illustrate a procedural matrix for guiding public policy during complex health security events.

Intelligence and global health: assessing the role of open source and social media intelligence analysis in infectious disease outbreaks.

PURPOSE: Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the clandestine intelligence sector are being increasingly employed in infectious disease outbreaks. The purpose of this article is to explore how such tools might be employed in the detection, reporting, and control of outbreaks designated as a 'threat' by the global community. It is also intended to analyse previous use of such tools during the Ebola and SARS epidemics and to discuss key questions regarding the ethics and legality of initiatives that further blur the military and humanitarian spaces. METHODS: We undertake qualitative analysis of current discussions on OSINT and SIGINT and their intersection with global health. We also review current literature and describe the debates. We built on quantitative and qualitative research done into current health collection capabilities. RESULTS: This article presents an argument for the use of OSINT in the detection of infectious disease outbreaks and how this might occur. CONCLUSION: We conclude that there is a place for OSINT and SIGINT in the detection and reporting of outbreaks. However, such tools are not sufficient on their own and must be corroborated for the intelligence to be relevant and actionable. Finally, we conclude that further discussion on key ethical issues needs to take place before such research can continue. In particular, this involves questions of jurisdiction, data ownership, and ethical considerations.