Dynamic neural reconfiguration for distinct strategies during competitive social interactions.

Information exchange between brain regions is key to understanding information processing for social decision-making, but most analyses ignore its dynamic nature. New insights on this dynamic might help us to uncover the neural correlates of social cognition in the healthy population and also to understand the malfunctioning neural computations underlying dysfunctional social behavior in patients with mental disorders. In this work, we used a multi-round bargaining game to detect switches between distinct bargaining strategies in a cohort of 76 healthy participants. These switches were uncovered by dynamic behavioral modeling using the hidden Markov model. Proposing a novel model of dynamic effective connectivity to estimate the information flow between key brain regions, we found a stronger interaction between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) and the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) for the strategic deception compared with the social heuristic strategies. The level of deception was associated with the information flow from the Brodmann area 10 to the rTPJ, and this association was modulated by the rTPJ-to-rDLPFC information flow. These findings suggest that dynamic bargaining strategy is supported by dynamic reconfiguration of the rDLPFC-and-rTPJ interaction during competitive social interactions.

The Functional Architecture of the Brain Underlies Strategic Deception in Impression Management.

Impression management, as one of the most essential skills of social function, impacts one's survival and success in human societies. However, the neural architecture underpinning this social skill remains poorly understood. By employing a two-person bargaining game, we exposed three strategies involving distinct cognitive processes for social impression management with different levels of strategic deception. We utilized a novel adaptation of Granger causality accounting for signal-dependent noise (SDN), which captured the directional connectivity underlying the impression management during the bargaining game. We found that the sophisticated strategists engaged stronger directional connectivity from both dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and retrosplenial cortex to rostral prefrontal cortex, and the strengths of these directional influences were associated with higher level of deception during the game. Using the directional connectivity as a neural signature, we identified the strategic deception with 80% accuracy by a machine-learning classifier. These results suggest that different social strategies are supported by distinct patterns of directional connectivity among key brain regions for social cognition.

Distinct contributions of the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus to suspicion in a repeated bargaining game.

Humans assess the credibility of information gained from others on a daily basis; this ongoing assessment is especially crucial for avoiding exploitation by others. We used a repeated, two-person bargaining game and a cognitive hierarchy model to test how subjects judge the information sent asymmetrically from one player to the other. The weight that they give to this information is the result of two distinct factors: their baseline suspicion given the situation and the suspicion generated by the other person's behavior. We hypothesized that human brains maintain an ongoing estimate of the credibility of the other player and sought to uncover neural correlates of this process. In the game, sellers were forced to infer the value of an object based on signals sent from a prospective buyer. We found that amygdala activity correlated with baseline suspicion, whereas activations in bilateral parahippocampus correlated with trial-by-trial uncertainty induced by the buyer's sequence of suggestions. In addition, the less credible buyers that appeared, the more sensitive parahippocampal activation was to trial-by-trial uncertainty. Although both of these neural structures have previously been implicated in trustworthiness judgments, these results suggest that they have distinct and separable roles that correspond to their theorized roles in learning and memory.

Neural signatures of strategic types in a two-person bargaining game.

The management and manipulation of our own social image in the minds of others requires difficult and poorly understood computations. One computation useful in social image management is strategic deception: our ability and willingness to manipulate other people's beliefs about ourselves for gain. We used an interpersonal bargaining game to probe the capacity of players to manage their partner's beliefs about them. This probe parsed the group of subjects into three behavioral types according to their revealed level of strategic deception; these types were also distinguished by neural data measured during the game. The most deceptive subjects emitted behavioral signals that mimicked a more benign behavioral type, and their brains showed differential activation in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left Brodmann area 10 at the time of this deception. In addition, strategic types showed a significant correlation between activation in the right temporoparietal junction and expected payoff that was absent in the other groups. The neurobehavioral types identified by the game raise the possibility of identifying quantitative biomarkers for the capacity to manipulate and maintain a social image in another person's mind.