Which Kind of Body in "Mental" Pathologies? Phenomenological Insights on the Nature of the Disrupted Self.

Guided by a phenomenological perspective, this paper aims to account for the existence of a corporeal consciousness-something that clinicians should take into account, not merely in the case of physical pathologies but especially in the case of mental disorders. Firstly, I will highlight three cases: schizophrenia, depression, and autism spectrum disorder. Then, I will show how these cases correspond to three different kinds of bodily existence: disembodiment (in the case of schizophrenia), chrematization (in melancholic depression), and dyssynchrony (in the autism spectrum disorder). Finally, I will argue for the importance of an "expressive common environment" between the patient and the clinician, who are two distinct, embodied conscious subjects resonating with one another. In this view, the primary goal of the therapeutic process seems to develop a shared understanding of the patient's life-world, which finds its main expression through the disrupted body.

Absent Bodies: Psychotherapeutic Challenges during COVID-19.

INTRODUCTION: The paper's main aim is to analyze the theme of psychotherapy which, during the months of lockdown, has undergone a considerable transformation as it moved, in many cases, to the virtual modality. The scarce literature on this subject is divided between those who maintain that the screen establishes a relational distance between the patient and the therapist (disengagement theory) and those who instead consider it an element that stimulates and facilitates communication (stimulation theory). METHOD: Utilizing a qualitative and phenomenological interview, which allowed me to collect the testimonies of therapists and patients, I will try to understand if and how the fundamental components of psychotherapy and clinical encounter have changed. RESULTS: I will describe how the lack of bodily resonance affects psychotherapy and emphasize the centrality of often-underestimated elements such as the atmosphere and setting. CONCLUSION: I will finally argue that what is missing is indeed an embodied trust which, in my view, is necessary for a successful therapeutic relationship.

George Frankl: an undervalued voice in the history of autism.

This paper aims to propose that the psychiatrist George Frankl had more than a marginal role in the early history of autism. Frankl's conception of autism as characterized by a lack of affective language has influenced both Asperger and Kanner. First, this proposal is historically supported; second it is corroborated by Frankl's unpublished manuscript on Autism. We found that Frankl's perspective about autism was, and still can be, considered innovative for multiple reasons. Specifically, Frankl proposed that autism could cover a spectrum of conditions; that it is a state of mind that is not necessarily abnormal; and that it is a neurobiological condition, which primarily needs to be understood by others. Finally, Frankl's concepts of affective contact and affective language are reconsidered with reference to contemporary neuropsychology from which autism emerges not as a higher-order cognitive deficit, but as a result of an impairment of primordial ability to process low level sensory, motor and perceptual information gained through experiencing other persons.

Autism as a Disruption of Affective Contact: The Forgotten Role of George Frankl.

The simultaneous description of autism by Asperger in Vienna and Kanner in Baltimore is usually considered a strange coincidence. Here we propose that the Jewish psychiatrist Georg Frankl, who worked with both Asperger and Kanner, had more than a marginal role in the early history of autism. While Hans Asperger did not recognize the talent of his superior Georg Frankl, Leo Kanner immediately recognized his merits and acumen when Georg Frankl arrived at the Johns Hopkins as a refugee. This proposal is supported by the retrieval of an unpublished Frankl's manuscript on autism which is here analysed and that deserves credit for anticipating some of the contemporary visions of autism. The manuscript deepens the distinction between 'affective language' and 'word language' that George Frankl had already developed in his previous papers in 1933 and 1943. While in neurotypical subjects the everyday language is an integration of affective and word language, autistic children register a break between them and, according to Frankl, this break is at the core of autism and can have a wide range of expression and tentatives of compensation. It is also proposed that the centrality of disturbances in affective language can be in agreement with a vision of autism as a neurodevelopmental disorder that interferes with the current notions of intersubjectivity, intercorporeality and interaffectivity. Frankl's perspective about autism can still be considered innovative today for other reasons. He proposed that autism could cover a spectrum of conditions; that it is a state of mind that is not necessarily abnormal; that it is a neurobiological condition that needs to be understood by others before of being modified. Finally the conceptualization of autism as a disturbance of affective language is in agreement with the DSM-5 which has created a sociocommunicative domain that comprises only deficits in non-verbal communication (that is affective language), putting the verbal language (that is word language) as a specificator outside the diagnostic criteria.