Can statistical learning bootstrap the integers?

This paper examines Piantadosi, Tenenbaum, and Goodman's (2012) model for how children learn the relation between number words ("one" through "ten") and cardinalities (sizes of sets with one through ten elements). This model shows how statistical learning can induce this relation, reorganizing its procedures as it does so in roughly the way children do. We question, however, Piantadosi et al.'s claim that the model performs "Quinian bootstrapping," in the sense of Carey (2009). Unlike bootstrapping, the concept it learns is not discontinuous with the concepts it starts with. Instead, the model learns by recombining its primitives into hypotheses and confirming them statistically. As such, it accords better with earlier claims (Fodor, 1975, 1981) that learning does not increase expressive power. We also question the relevance of the simulation for children's learning. The model starts with a preselected set of15 primitives, and the procedure it learns differs from children's method. Finally, the partial knowledge of the positive integers that the model attains is consistent with an infinite number of nonstandard meanings-for example, that the integers stop after ten or loop from ten back to one.

From numerical concepts to concepts of number.

Many experiments with infants suggest that they possess quantitative abilities, and many experimentalists believe that these abilities set the stage for later mathematics: natural numbers and arithmetic. However, the connection between these early and later skills is far from obvious. We evaluate two possible routes to mathematics and argue that neither is sufficient: (1) We first sketch what we think is the most likely model for infant abilities in this domain, and we examine proposals for extrapolating the natural number concept from these beginnings. Proposals for arriving at natural number by (empirical) induction presuppose the mathematical concepts they seek to explain. Moreover, standard experimental tests for children's understanding of number terms do not necessarily tap these concepts. (2) True concepts of number do appear, however, when children are able to understand generalizations over all numbers; for example, the principle of additive commutativity (a+b=b+a). Theories of how children learn such principles usually rely on a process of mapping from physical object groupings. But both experimental results and theoretical considerations imply that direct mapping is insufficient for acquiring these principles. We suggest instead that children may arrive at natural numbers and arithmetic in a more top-down way, by constructing mathematical schemas.

Explaining outcome type interactions with frame: aspiration level and the value function.

Research on framing effects has revealed cases where the type of outcome at risk (e.g., human lives vs. animal lives) affects the magnitude of the framing effect. Some authors have appealed to the shape of the value function as predicting when framing effects will occur: The more valuable the outcome type, the more nonlinear its value function, and the larger the resulting framing effect (Levin & Chapman, 1990). However, having a more or less nonlinear value function cannot explain situations in which participants strongly prefer the same option in both frames. Another factor that may be at work in these types of outcome effects is an aspiration level (AL; Lopes, 1987; Schneider, 1992), which determines how acceptable the options are and combines (or competes) with the risk attitude encouraged by frame. The results described here indicate that differences in the shape of the value function between outcome types are evident but are inconsistent between framed losses and gains, though nonlinearity in the value function can be increased with a manipulation that also encourages framing effects. The results also demonstrate that an AL can lead to the same predominant risk preference in the positive and negative frame. These findings indicate that the shape of the value function and the AL each play a role in outcome type interactions with frame, and in some cases, a combination of the two factors may be at work.

Do children learn the integers by induction?

According to one theory about how children learn the meaning of the words for the positive integers, they first learn that "one," "two," and "three" stand for appropriately sized sets. They then conclude by inductive inference that the next numeral in the count sequence denotes the size of sets containing one more object than the size denoted by the preceding numeral. We have previously argued, however, that the conclusion of this Induction does not distinguish the standard meaning of the integers from nonstandard meanings in which, for example, "ten" could mean set sizes of 10, 20, 30,... elements. Margolis and Laurence [Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (2008). How to learn the natural numbers: Inductive inference and the acquisition of number concepts. Cognition, 106, 924-939] believe that our argument depends on attributing to children "radically indeterminate" concepts. We show, first, that our conclusion is compatible with perfectly determinate meanings for "one" through "three." Second, although the inductive inference is indeed indeterminate - which is why it is consistent with nonstandard meanings - making it determinate presupposes the constraints that the inference is supposed to produce.

Group size and the framing effect: threats to human beings and animals.

Past research provides conflicting evidence for the role of value in the appearance of framing effects. In this study, the effects of frame and group size were examined using scenarios about less valuable and more valuable groups (animal vs. human). In addition, two picture manipulations, intended to increase the value of the group, were presented. Choice patterns differed for the human and animal groups, with participants exhibiting greater risk seeking overall for the human scenario and showing a framing effect for humans but not animals when no pictures were presented. A small group size increased the proportion of risky choices for both the animal and human scenarios. Presenting pictures with names did lead to framing effects for animals, but providing pictures or pictures and names eliminated framing effects for the human scenario. These findings suggest that the relationship between value and framing effects is a matter of degree.

Giving the boot to the bootstrap: how not to learn the natural numbers.

According to one theory about how children learn the concept of natural numbers, they first determine that "one", "two", and "three" denote the size of sets containing the relevant number of items. They then make the following inductive inference (the Bootstrap): The next number word in the counting series denotes the size of the sets you get by adding one more object to the sets denoted by the previous number word. For example, if "three" refers to the size of sets containing three items, then "four" (the next word after "three") must refer to the size of sets containing three plus one items. We argue, however, that the Bootstrap cannot pick out the natural number sequence from other nonequivalent sequences and thus cannot convey to children the concept of the natural numbers. This is not just a result of the usual difficulties with induction but is specific to the Bootstrap. In order to work properly, the Bootstrap must somehow restrict the concept of "next number" in a way that conforms to the structure of the natural numbers. But with these restrictions, the Bootstrap is unnecessary.