Explaining outcome type interactions with frame: aspiration level and the value function.

Research on framing effects has revealed cases where the type of outcome at risk (e.g., human lives vs. animal lives) affects the magnitude of the framing effect. Some authors have appealed to the shape of the value function as predicting when framing effects will occur: The more valuable the outcome type, the more nonlinear its value function, and the larger the resulting framing effect (Levin & Chapman, 1990). However, having a more or less nonlinear value function cannot explain situations in which participants strongly prefer the same option in both frames. Another factor that may be at work in these types of outcome effects is an aspiration level (AL; Lopes, 1987; Schneider, 1992), which determines how acceptable the options are and combines (or competes) with the risk attitude encouraged by frame. The results described here indicate that differences in the shape of the value function between outcome types are evident but are inconsistent between framed losses and gains, though nonlinearity in the value function can be increased with a manipulation that also encourages framing effects. The results also demonstrate that an AL can lead to the same predominant risk preference in the positive and negative frame. These findings indicate that the shape of the value function and the AL each play a role in outcome type interactions with frame, and in some cases, a combination of the two factors may be at work.

Group size and the framing effect: threats to human beings and animals.

Past research provides conflicting evidence for the role of value in the appearance of framing effects. In this study, the effects of frame and group size were examined using scenarios about less valuable and more valuable groups (animal vs. human). In addition, two picture manipulations, intended to increase the value of the group, were presented. Choice patterns differed for the human and animal groups, with participants exhibiting greater risk seeking overall for the human scenario and showing a framing effect for humans but not animals when no pictures were presented. A small group size increased the proportion of risky choices for both the animal and human scenarios. Presenting pictures with names did lead to framing effects for animals, but providing pictures or pictures and names eliminated framing effects for the human scenario. These findings suggest that the relationship between value and framing effects is a matter of degree.