Ecological Origins of Freedom: Pathogens, Heat Stress, and Frontier Topography Predict More Vertical but Less Horizontal Governmental Restriction.

What kinds of physical environments make for free societies? The present research investigates the effect of three different types of ecological stressors (climate stress, pathogen stress, and frontier topography) on two measurements of governmental restriction: Vertical restriction involves select persons imposing asymmetrical laws on others, while horizontal restriction involves laws that restrict most members of a society equally. Investigation 1 validates our measurements of vertical and horizontal restriction. Investigation 2 demonstrates that, across both U.S. states and a sample of nations, ecological stressors tend to cause more vertically restrictive societies but less horizontally restrictive societies. Investigation 3 demonstrates that assortative sociality partially mediates ecological stress→restriction relationships across nations, but not in U.S. states. Although some stressor-specific effects emerged (most notably, cold stress consistently showed effects in the opposite direction), these results in the main suggest that ecological stress simultaneously creates opposing pressures that push freedom in two different directions.

Two ways to be complex and why they matter: implications for attitude strength and lying.

Integrative complexity broadly measures the structural complexity of statements. This breadth, although beneficial in multiple ways, can potentially hamper the development of specific theories. In response, the authors developed a model of complex thinking, focusing on 2 different ways that people can be complex within the integrative complexity system and subsequently developed measurements of each of these 2 routes: Dialectical complexity focuses on a dialectical tension between 2 or more competing perspectives, whereas elaborative complexity focuses on complexly elaborating on 1 singular perspective. The authors posit that many variables have different effects on these 2 forms of complexity and subsequently test this idea in 2 different theoretical domains. In Studies 1a, 1b, and 2, the authors demonstrate that variables related to attitude strength (e.g., domain importance, extremism, domain accessibility) decrease dialectical complexity but increase elaborative complexity. In Study 3, the authors show that counterattitudinal lying decreases dialectical complexity but increases elaborative complexity, implicating a strategic (as opposed to a cognitive strain) view of the lying-complexity relationship. The authors argue that this dual demonstration across 2 different theoretical domains helps establish the utility of the new model and measurements as well as offer the potential to reconcile apparent conflicts in the area of cognitive complexity.