The science of culture and negotiation.

Recent negotiation research has produced a groundswell of insights about the effects of culture on negotiation. Yet, few frameworks exist to organize the findings. This review integrates recent research using a two-dimensional framework: The first dimension organizes the research into that which has taken: (1) a comparative intracultural approach, versus (2) an intercultural approach. The second dimension organizes the research by its emphasis on: (1) inputs into negotiation, (2) processes of negotiating, and (3) outcomes of negotiation. This framework helps to organize extant research and produces novel insights about the connections between disparate research streams, revealing both commonalities and culture-specificities in negotiation strategy and outcomes and suggesting that intercultural negotiations are difficult but not insurmountable. We conclude by discussing several areas in which more research on culture and negotiation is urgently needed in today's globalizing world.

Paying a price: culture, trust, and negotiation consequences.

Three studies contrasting Indian and American negotiators tested hypotheses derived from theory proposing why there are cultural differences in trust and how cultural differences in trust influence negotiation strategy. Study 1 (a survey) documented that Indian negotiators trust their counterparts less than American negotiators. Study 2 (a negotiation simulation) linked American and Indian negotiators' self-reported trust and strategy to their insight and joint gains. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 2 using independently coded negotiation strategy data, allowing for stronger causal inference. Overall, the strategy associated with Indian negotiators' reluctance to extend interpersonal (as opposed to institutional) trust produced relatively poor outcomes. Our data support an expanded theoretical model of negotiation, linking culture to trust, strategies, and outcomes.

How to manage your negotiating team.

You are leading a negotiating team for your company. When you sit down with the other party, someone on your side of the table blurts out: "Just tell us--what do we need to do to get more of your business?" And in that moment, you know you've lost the upper hand. Gaffes like this are more common than most businesspeople would care to admit, management professors Brett, Friedman, and Behfar have found in their research. Even though team members are all technically on the same side, they often have different priorities and imagine different ideal outcomes: Business development just wants to close the deal. Finance is most concerned about costs. Legal is focused on patents and intellectual property. The authors recommend taking four steps, either singly or in tandem, to align those goals: Map out each person's priorities, work out conflicts directly with departments, employ a mediator if that doesn't work, and use data to resolve differences. Once you are all on the same page, you can take steps to make sure everyone is coordinated during the negotiations themselves. Try simulating the negotiation beforehand, assigning roles to team members that take advantage of their strengths, and establishing the signals you will use to communicate with one another during the session. The payoff from working as a cohesive group is clear. With access to greater expertise and the ability to assign members to specialized roles, teams can implement more-complex strategies than a sole negotiator could ever pull off.

Conflicting social motives in negotiating groups.

Negotiators' social motives (cooperative vs. individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. In this study, the authors used multilevel modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators' social motives and the composition of the group influence group members' negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5-issue mixed-motive decision-making task were videotaped, and the tapes were transcribed and coded. Group composition included 2 homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and 3 heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators and 1 individualist, 2 cooperators and 2 individualists, 1 cooperator and 3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social-motive composition of the group, but individualistic negotiators did not. Results from analyses of strategy sequences showed that cooperators responded more systematically to others' behaviors than did individualists. They also redirected the negotiation depending on group composition.

Working 61 plus hours a week: why do managers do it?

The authors investigated why some managers work extreme hours, defined as 61 or more hours per week. The authors tested explanations drawn from theories including the work-leisure tradeoff, work as an emotional respite, social contagion, and work as its own reward. In a demographically homogeneous sample of male managers, the best explanations for why some worked 61 or more hours per week were the financial and psychological rewards they received from doing so. The hypothesis derived from A. Hochschild's (1997) research that managers who work long hours seek relief at work from pressures at home was not supported. Findings in a small sample of managerial women were consistent with the work-leisure trade-off hypothesis, the social contagion hypothesis, and the work as its own reward hypothesis.

Cognitions and behavior in asymmetric social dilemmas: a comparison of two cultures.

This study investigated whether cognitions and behavior in an asymmetric social dilemma can be predicted by national culture. Results indicated that, as predicted, groups of decision makers from Japan--a collectivist, hierarchical culture-were more cooperative, expected others to be more cooperative, and were more likely to adopt an equal allocation distribution rule to resolve the dilemma than were groups of decision makers from the United States-an individualist, egalitarian culture. An opportunity for communication had a greater impact on expectations of others' behavior in groups of U.S. decision makers than in groups of Japanese decision makers.

Managing Workplace Conflict in the United States and Hong Kong.

We propose that managers have norms (standards of appropriate behavior) for resolving conflict, that these norms are culturally based, and that they explain cultural differences in conflict management outcomes. We confirm that the traditionally American norms of discussing parties' interests and synthesizing multiple issues were exhibited more strongly by American managers than by their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts. In addition, we confirm that the traditionally Chinese norms of concern for collective interests and concern for authority appeared more strongly among Hong Kong Chinese managers than among their American counterparts. American managers were more likely than Hong Kong Chinese managers, to resolve a greater number of issues and reach more integrative outcomes, while Hong Kong Chinese managers were more likely to involve higher management in conflict resolution. Culture had a significant effect on whether parties selected an integrative outcome rather than an outcome that involved distribution, compromise, higher management, or no resolution at all. Conflict norms explained the cultural differences that existed between reaching an integrative outcome and reaching an outcome involving distribution, compromise, or higher management; however, conflict norms did not fully explain the cultural differences that existed between reaching an integrative outcome and reaching no resolution. Copyright 2001 Academic Press.