The Affordable Care Act Reduced Income Inequality In The US.

Income inequality estimates based on traditional poverty measures do not capture the effects of health care spending and health insurance. To explore the distributional effects of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) expansion of health benefits and the resulting income inequality, this study used alternative income measures that incorporate the value of the ACA's health insurance changes under the law. The study simulated the impact of the ACA on income inequality in 2019 compared with a scenario without the ACA. We found that the ACA reduced income inequality and that the decrease was much larger in states that expanded Medicaid than in states that did not. We also decomposed the effect of the ACA on inequality by race/ethnicity, age, and family educational attainment. The ACA reduced inequality both across groups and within these groups. With efforts to repeal the ACA-specifically, California v. Texas-having shifted from Congress to the courts, it remains important to consider the consequences of fully repealing the ACA, which would likely reverse reduced inequality observed under the law.

Medicaid/CHIP Participation Reached 93.7 Percent Among Eligible Children In 2016.

Children's participation in Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) rose by 5 percentage points between 2013 and 2016. As a result, 1.7 million fewer Medicaid/CHIP-eligible children were uninsured in 2016. Participation was lower among adults than among children, and nearly 6 million Medicaid-eligible adults were uninsured in 2016.

The availability and marginal costs of dependent employer-sponsored health insurance.

In this study, we examine differences by firm size in the availability of dependent coverage and the incremental cost of such coverage. We use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey - Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) to show that among employees eligible for single coverage, dependent coverage was almost always available for employees in large firms (100 or more employees) but not in smaller firms, particularly those with fewer than 10 employees. In addition, when dependent coverage was available, eligible employees in smaller firms were more likely than employees in large firms to face two situations that represented the extremes of the incremental cost distribution: (1) they paid nothing for single or family coverage or (2) they paid nothing for single coverage but faced a high contribution for family coverage. These results suggest that firm size may be an important factor in policy assessments, such as analyses of the financial implications for families excluded from subsidized Marketplace coverage due to affordable offers of single coverage or of potential rollbacks to public coverage for children.

Marketplace Subsidies: Changing The 'Family Glitch' Reduces Family Health Spending But Increases Government Costs.

Under the Affordable Care Act, if one family member has an employer offer of single coverage deemed to be affordable-that is, costing less than 9.66 percent of family income in 2016-then all family members are ineligible for tax credits for Marketplace coverage, even if the cost of providing coverage to the whole family is greater than 9.66 percent of income. More than six million people live in such families and as a result are ineligible for premium tax credits. These families face premiums that can amount to 15.8 percent of income, or 12.0 percent after the tax advantages of employer-sponsored health coverage are factored in. We modeled the potential impact of changing the affordability test to take into account the cost of family coverage. Doing so would reduce spending on premiums from 12.0 percent to 6.3 percent of income, significantly alleviating financial burdens, but would generate little additional coverage. We estimated the additional costs to the federal government for premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions to be between $3.7 billion and $6.5 billion in 2016.

Many families may face sharply higher costs if public health insurance for their children is rolled back.

Millions of US children could lose access to public health care coverage if Congress does not renew federal funding for the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), which is set to expire September 30, 2015­the end of the federal fiscal year. Additional cuts in public coverage for children in families with incomes above 133 percent of the federal poverty level are possible if the Affordable Care Act's "maintenance of effort" provisions regarding Medicaid and CHIP are allowed to expire as scheduled in 2019. The potential for a significant rollback of public coverage for children raises important policy questions regarding alternative pathways to affordable and high-quality coverage for low-income children. For many children at risk of losing eligibility for public coverage, the primary alternative pathway to coverage would be through their parents' employer-sponsored insurance, yet relatively little is known about the cost and quality of that coverage. Our estimates, based on data from the Insurance Component of the 2012 and 2013 Medical Expenditure Panel Surveys, show that many families would face sharply higher costs of covering their children. In many cases, the only employer-sponsored coverage available would be a high-deductible plan.

Small firm self-insurance under the Affordable Care Act.

The Affordable Care Act changes the small-group insurance market substan­tially beginning in 2014, but most changes do not apply to self-insured plans. This exemp­tion provides an opening for small employers with healthier workers to avoid broader sharing of health care risk, isolating higher-cost groups in the fully insured market. Private stop-loss or reinsurance plans can mediate the risk of self-insurance for small employ­ers, facilitating the decision to self-insure. We simulate small-employer coverage decisions under the law and find that low-risk stop-loss policies lead to higher premiums in the fully insured small-group market. Average single premiums would be up to 25 percent higher, if stop-loss insurance with no additional risk to employers than fully insuring is allowed--an option available in most states absent further government action. Regulation of stop-loss at the federal or state level can, however, prevent such adverse selection and increase stabil­ity in small-group insurance coverage.

Why employers will continue to provide health insurance: the impact of the Affordable Care Act.

The Congressional Budget Office, the Rand Corporation, and the Urban Institute have estimated that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) will leave employer-sponsored coverage largely intact; in contrast, some economists and benefit consultants argue that the ACA encourages employers to drop coverage, thereby making both their workers and their firms better off (a "win-win" situation). This analysis shows that no such "win-win" situation exists and that employer-sponsored insurance will remain the primary source of coverage for most workers. Analysis of three issues-the terms of the ACA, worker characteristics, and the fundamental economics of competitive markets-supports this conclusion.

The Affordable Care Act's coverage expansions will reduce differences in uninsurance rates by race and ethnicity.

There are large differences in US health insurance coverage by racial and ethnic groups, yet there have been no estimates to date on how implementation of the Affordable Care Act will affect the distribution of coverage by race and ethnicity. We used a microsimulation model to show that racial and ethnic differentials in coverage could be greatly reduced, potentially cutting the eight-percentage-point black-white differential in uninsurance rates by more than half and the nineteen-percentage-point Hispanic-white differential by just under one-quarter. However, blacks and Hispanics are still projected to remain more likely to be uninsured than whites. Achieving low uninsurance under the Affordable Care Act will depend on effective state policies to attain high enrollment in Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program and the new insurance exchanges. Coverage gains among Hispanics will probably depend on adoption of strategies that address language and related barriers to enrollment and retention in California and Texas, where almost half of Hispanics live. If uninsurance is reduced to the extent projected in this analysis, sizable reductions in long-standing racial and ethnic differentials in access to health care and health status are likely to follow.

How choices in exchange design for states could affect insurance premiums and levels of coverage.

The Affordable Care Act gives states the option to create health insurance exchanges from which individuals and small employers can purchase health insurance. States have considerable flexibility in how they design and implement these exchanges. We analyze several key design options being considered, using the Urban Institute's Health Insurance Policy Simulation Model: creating separate versus merged small-group and nongroup markets, eliminating age rating in these markets, removing the small-employer credit, and setting the maximum number of employees for firms in the small-group market at 50 versus 100 workers. Among our findings are that merging the small-group and nongroup markets would result in 1.7 million more people nationwide participating in the exchanges and, because of greater affordability of nongroup coverage, approximately 1.0 million more people being insured than if the risk pools were not merged. The various options generate relatively small differences in overall coverage and cost, although some, such as reducing age rating bands, would result in higher costs for some people while lowering costs for others. These cost effects would be most apparent among people who purchase coverage without federal subsidies. On the whole, we conclude that states can make these design choices based on local support and preferences without dramatic repercussions for overall coverage and cost outcomes.

Improving coverage for children under health reform will require maintaining current eligibility standards for Medicaid and CHIP.

When the Affordable Care Act of 2010 is fully implemented, it will extend health insurance coverage to many adult Americans who currently lack it. It is not known, however, how the health reform legislation will affect children and parents who would otherwise be uninsured. Based on our analysis, the Affordable Care Act has the potential to cut the number of uninsured children by about 40 percent, from 7.4 million to 4.2 million, and the number of uninsured parents by almost 50 percent, from 12.7 million to 6.6 million. However, the actual impact will depend on increasing the share of children and parents who are enrolled in public coverage and on other implementation outcomes. Most strikingly, if the requirement that states continue their Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) coverage is rescinded and if Congress does not continue funding CHIP, the uninsurance rate of children could more than double, increasing from 4.2 million to 7.9-9.1 million children. In that case, the uninsurance rate among children would be higher than if the Affordable Care Act had not been adopted.

Toward universal coverage in Massachusetts.

This paper presents several options designed to help the Commonwealth of Massachusetts move to universal health insurance coverage. The alternatives all build upon a common base that includes an expansion of the Medicaid program, income-related tax credits, a purchasing pool, and government-sponsored reinsurance. These measures in themselves would not yield universal coverage, nor would an employer mandate by itself. We show that an individual mandate, and an employer mandate combined with an individual mandate, both would yield universal coverage with a relatively small increase in government costs relative to state gross domestic product and current health spending. The cost of an employer mandate--with a "pay or play" design--is sensitive to the payroll tax rate and base, the number and kind of exemptions, and whether workers whose employers "pay" receive discounts when they purchase health insurance. The development of these alternatives and their analyses contributed to the eventual health care compromise that emerged in Massachusetts in April 2006.