RESUMO
Priority setting is inevitable to control expenditure on expensive medicines, but citizen support is often hampered by the workings of the 'identified victim effect', that is, the greater willingness to spend resources helping identified victims than helping statistical victims. In this paper we explore a possible cognitive debiasing strategy that is being employed in discussions on healthcare priority setting, which we call 'empathy counterbalancing' (EC). EC is the strategy of directing attention to, and eliciting empathy for, those who might be harmed as a result of one-sided empathy for the very ill who needs expensive treatment. We argue that governments have good reasons to attempt EC because the identified victim effect distorts priority setting in ways that undermine procedural fairness. We briefly outline three areas of application for EC and suggest some possible mechanisms that might explain how EC might work, if at all. We then discuss four potential ethical concerns with EC. First, EC might have the counterproductive effect of reducing overall citizen support for public funding of expensive medical treatments, thereby undermining solidarity. Second, EC may give rise to a 'competition in suffering', which may have unintended side effects for patients who feature in attempts at EC. Third, there may be doubts about whether EC is effective. Fourth, it may be objected that EC comes down to emotional manipulation, which governments should avoid. We conclude that insofar these concerns are valid they may be adequately addressed, and that EC seems a promising strategy that merits further investigation.
RESUMO
Asking pregnant women to (co)pay for non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) out of pocket leads to unequal access across socioeconomic strata. To avoid these social justice issues, first-trimester prenatal screening should be publicly funded in countries such as the Netherlands, with universal coverage healthcare systems that offer all other antenatal care services and screening programmes free of charge. In this reply, we offer three additional reasons for public funding of NIPT. First, NIPT may not primarily have medical utility for women and children, but rather offers relevant information and reproductive options, and thus serves important autonomy interests of women. Second, public funding of NIPT can be justified because it results in a reduction of collectively borne costs associated with care and support for children with chromosomal abnormalities. It is important to note that this is not an argument for individual women to take part in screening or to terminate an affected pregnancy. However, it is a legitimate argument in policy making regarding funding arrangements for screening programmes. Finally, public funding would help to amend current misunderstandings among pregnant women (eg, that they are not at risk), and thus to support informed consent for first-trimester prenatal screening.
