Alternative Systems: The Interplay Between Criminal Groups' Influence and Political Trust on Civic Honesty in the Global Context.

Individuals' endorsement of standards of civic honesty is necessary for democracies to flourish. A critical driver of civic honesty is the relationship of trust between individuals and institutions. Research has yet to systematically assess the contextual factors that may moderate this relationship. In this study, we examined the societal influence of organized criminal groups. Criminal groups operate as alternative systems of authority that erode the reliability of institutions' moral standards. We employed a new indicator that quantifies their societal influence to test the hypothesis that the association between individuals' political trust and civic honesty would weaken in countries more strongly affected by criminal groups. Multilevel evidence across 83 representative national samples (N = 128,839) supported this hypothesis. Moreover, the association between political trust and civic honesty was negative in contexts where criminal groups' influence was more extreme. We discuss the implications of the findings and future research directions.

The experience of trust in everyday life.

In this contribution, we review current research on daily-life experiences of trust in diverse and naturally occurring social interactions ranging from close relationships to complete strangers. Experience-sampling methodology allows the joint examination of situational, relational, dispositional, motivational, and behavioral variables in their relation to trust. Thereby, these recent studies advance our understanding of how trust is shaped by important features of the social situation such as perceived conflict of interest. They elucidate how trust fluctuates in accordance with stable traits, and how these traits interact with situational variables (e.g., social closeness to the target). Furthermore, trust connects social perceptions of trustees with trustors' prosocial tendencies.

The cartesian folk theater: People conceptualize consciousness as a spatio-temporally localized process in the human brain.

The present research (total N = 2,057) tested whether people's folk conception of consciousness aligns with the notion of a "Cartesian Theater" (Dennett, 1991). More precisely, we tested the hypotheses that people believe that consciousness happens in a single, confined area (vs. multiple dispersed areas) in the human brain, and that it (partly) happens after the brain finished analyzing all available information. Further, we investigated how these beliefs are related to participants' neuroscientific knowledge as well as their reliance on intuition, and which rationale they use to explain their responses. Using a computer-administered drawing task, we found that participants located consciousness, but not unrelated neurological processes (Studies 1a and 1b) or unconscious thinking (Study 2) in a single, confined area in the prefrontal cortex, and that they considered most of the brain not involved in consciousness. Participants mostly relied on their intuitions when responding, and they were not affected by prior knowledge about the brain. Additionally, they considered the conscious experience of sensory stimuli to happen in a spatially more confined area than the corresponding computational analysis of these stimuli (Study 3). Furthermore, participants' explicit beliefs about spatial and temporal localization of consciousness (i.e., consciousness happening after the computational analysis of sensory information is completed) are independent, yet positively correlated beliefs (Study 4). Using a more elaborate measure for temporal localization of conscious experience, our final study confirmed that people believe consciousness to partly happen even after information processing is done (Study 5). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Moralizing mental states: The role of trait self-control and control perceptions.

Which attributes of a person contribute to their tendency to moralize others' thoughts? Adopting an individual-difference approach to moral cognition, eight studies (N = 2,033) investigated how people's ability for self-control shapes their moral reactions to others' mental states. Specifically, Studies 1a-2b found positive predictive effects of trait self-control (TSC) on the moralization (e.g., blaming) of another person's fantasies about different immoral behaviors. While ruling out alternative explanations, they furthermore supported the mediating role of ascribing targets control over their mental states. Studies 3a-3b provided correlational evidence of the perceived ability to control one's own mental states as a mechanism in the relationship between TSC and ascriptions of control to others. Studies 4a-4b followed a causal-chain experimental approach: A manipulation of participants' self-perceived ability to control their emotions impacted their control ascriptions to others over their immoral mental states (Study 4a), and targets perceived as high (vs. low) in control over their immoral mental states elicited stronger moralizing reactions. Taken together, the present studies elucidate why people moralize others' purely mental states, even in the absence of overt behavior. More broadly, they advance our knowledge about the role of individual differences, particularly in self-control, in moral cognition.

Trust in everyday life.

Although trust plays a pivotal role in many aspects of life, very little is known about the manifestation of trust and distrust in everyday life. In this work, we integrated several prior approaches to trust and investigated the prevalence and key determinants of trust (vs. distrust) in people's natural environments, using preregistered experience-sampling methodology. Across more than 4,500 social interactions from a heterogeneous sample of 427 participants, results showed high average levels of trust, but also considerable variability in trust across contexts. This variability was attributable to aspects of trustee perception, social distance, as well as 3 key dimensions of situational interdependence: conflict of interests, information (un)certainty, and power imbalance. At the dispositional level, average everyday trust was shaped by general trust, moral identity, and zero-sum beliefs. The social scope of most trust-related traits, however, was moderated by social distance: Whereas moral identity buffered against distrusting distant targets, high general distrust and low social value orientation amplified trust differences between close vs. distant others. Furthermore, a laboratory-based trust game predicted everyday trust only with regard to more distant but not close interaction partners. Finally, everyday trust was linked to self-disclosure and to cooperation, particularly in situations of high conflict between interaction partners' interests. We conclude that trust can be conceptualized as a relational hub that interconnects the social perception of the trustee, the relational closeness between trustor and trustee, key structural features of situational interdependence, and behavioral response options such as self-disclosure. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Surprise me! On the impact of unexpected benefits on other-praising gratitude expressions.

Gratitude reinforces social bonds. This relationship-regulating function depends on whether and how it is expressed. People can express gratitude in different ways: Beneficiaries may emphasise how they profited from a benefit (self-benefiting) or focus on the benefactor's actions and characteristics related to it (other-praising). What underlies these expressive styles remains unclear. Based on findings that other-praising gratitude expressions have unique positive effects on interpersonal relationships, four studies (N = 1,188) investigated a novel antecedent of these expressions: unexpectedness of the benefit. In Study 1, we content-coded participants' thank-you notes for an actual Christmas present. Path modelling revealed that unexpectedness of the benefit predicted other-praising, whereas happiness with the present predicted self-benefiting. These results were robust to relevant covariates and mirrored by participants' self-reported self-benefiting and other-praising intentions. Studies 2-4 (preregistered) investigated samples from two different populations and experimentally manipulated (un)expectedness of recalled or imagined benefits. Given mixed experimental results, we conducted an internal meta-analysis. Across experimental studies, unexpected benefits increased other-praising, albeit weakly so, but not self-benefiting. In addition, the effect of unexpectedness on other-praising was significantly different from that on self-benefiting. We discuss potential processes and moderators of the effect of unexpected benefits on gratitude expressions.

Ideas are cheap: When and why adults value labor over ideas.

What do people value about a creation: the idea behind it or the labor needed for its implementation? Recent developmental research suggests that children by the age of 6 begin to value ideas over labor. Yet, much less is known about whether adults similarly attribute a higher value to ideas and idea givers than to labor and idea executors. In seven studies (N = 1,463), we explored the relative valuation of ideas versus labor in adults, its mechanisms and boundary conditions. Participants learned about an idea giver and a laborer who collaborated to create a product and indicated who deserves ownership and monetary compensation for the product. Contrary to what has been reported for children, Studies 1a-1c found that participants valued the contribution of the laborer more than the contribution of the idea giver. This labor-valuation effect emerged even when participants themselves were idea givers (Study 1b), and it was replicated across different populations (including legal professionals, Study 1c) and contexts (e.g., art works and businesses, Study 2). Studies 3a and 3b established perceived effort as a central psychological process behind the labor-valuation effect. Finally, Study 4 extended the effect to the realm of praise and blame judgments, showing that laborers receive more praise for positive outcomes, but less blame for negative outcomes, relative to idea givers. The current findings may provide a useful framework for understanding the role of effort in lay people's valuation of ideas and labor, thereby bridging research on creativity, effort, and valuation judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

A free will needs a free mind: Belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism differentially predict belief in free will and determinism.

In this article, we show that lay people's beliefs about how minds relate to bodies are more complex than past research suggests, and that treating them as a multidimensional construct helps explain inconclusive findings from the literature regarding their relation to beliefs about whether humans possess a free will. In two studies, we found that items previously used to assess a unidimensional belief in how minds relate to bodies indeed capture two distinguishable constructs (belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism) that differently predict belief in free will and two types of determinism (Studies 1 and 2). Additionally, we found that two fundamental personality traits pertaining to people's preference for experiential versus rational information processing predict those metaphysical beliefs that were theorized to be based on subjective phenomenological experience and rational deliberation, respectively (Study 2). In sum, beliefs about mind-body relations are a multidimensional construct with unique predictive abilities.

Two-Faced Morality: Distrust Promotes Divergent Moral Standards for the Self Versus Others.

People do not trust hypocrites, because they preach water, but drink wine. The current research shows that, ironically, when we distrust, we become moral hypocrites ourselves. We argue that experiencing distrust alerts us to the possibility that others may intent to exploit us, and that such looming exploitation differentially affects moral standards for the self versus others. Four studies ( N = 1,225) examined this possibility and its underlying motivational dynamic. Study 1 established a relationship between dispositional distrust and flexible, self-serving moral cognition. In Studies 2 and 3, participants experiencing distrust (vs. trust) endorsed more lenient moral standards for themselves than for others. Study 4 explored the role of the motivation to avoid exploitation in these effects. Specifically, participants' dispositional victim sensitivity moderated the effect of distrust on hypocrisy. Together, these findings suggest that individuals who distrust and fear to be exploited show self-serving, and hence untrustworthy, moral cognition themselves.

The mind of the market: Lay beliefs about the economy as a willful, goal-oriented agent.

We propose an extension to Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) framework for folk-economic beliefs, suggesting that certain evolutionarily acquired cognitive inference systems can cause modern humans to perceive abstract systems such as the economy as willful, goal-oriented agents. Such an anthropomorphized view, we argue, can have meaningful effects on people's moral evaluations of these agents, as well as on their political and economic behavior.

Anxious and egocentric: how specific emotions influence perspective taking.

People frequently feel anxious. Although prior research has extensively studied how feeling anxious shapes intrapsychic aspects of cognition, much less is known about how anxiety affects interpersonal aspects of cognition. Here, we examine the influence of incidental experiences of anxiety on perceptual and conceptual forms of perspective taking. Compared with participants experiencing other negative, high-arousal emotions (i.e., anger or disgust) or neutral feelings, anxious participants displayed greater egocentrism in their mental-state reasoning: They were more likely to describe an object using their own spatial perspective, had more difficulty resisting egocentric interference when identifying an object from others' spatial perspectives, and relied more heavily on privileged knowledge when inferring others' beliefs. Using both experimental-causal-chain and measurement-of-mediation approaches, we found that these effects were explained, in part, by uncertainty appraisal tendencies. Further supporting the role of uncertainty, a positive emotion associated with uncertainty (i.e., surprise) produced increases in egocentrism that were similar to anxiety. Collectively, the results suggest that incidentally experiencing emotions associated with uncertainty increase reliance on one's own egocentric perspective when reasoning about the mental states of others.

Adults are intuitive mind-body dualists.

In the present research, we tested the hypotheses that (a) adults are intuitive mind-body dualists, (b) that this belief can be considered a default, and (c) that it is partially explained by essentialistic reasoning about the nature of the mind. Over 8 studies, using various thought experiment paradigms, participants reliably ascribed to a physically duplicated being a greater retention of physical than of mental properties. This difference was unrelated to whether or not this being was given a proper name (Study 1b) and was only found for entities that were considered to actually possess a mind (Study 1c). Further, we found that an intuitive belief in mind-body dualism may in fact be considered a default: Taxing participants' cognitive resources (Study 2) or priming them with an intuitive (vs. analytical) thinking style (Studies 3a and 3b) both increased dualistic beliefs. In a last set of studies, we found that beliefs in mind-body dualism are indeed related to essentialistic reasoning about the mind. When a living being was reassembled from its original molecules rather than recreated from new molecules, dualistic beliefs were significantly reduced (Studies 4a and 4b). Thus, results of the present research indicate that, despite any acquired scientific knowledge about the neurological origins of mental life, most adults remain "essentialistic mind-body dualists" at heart.

Perspective taking and automatic intergroup evaluation change: testing an associative self-anchoring account.

The current research adopted a multipronged mediational approach to test an associative self-anchoring account of automatic intergroup evaluation change following perspective taking. We contend that actively contemplating outgroup members' perspectives strengthens associative links between that outgroup and the self, enabling a transfer of positive automatic self-evaluations to the group. A first set of experiments, using both measurement-of-mediation and experimental-causal-chain designs, supported a model in which strengthened self-outgroup associations underlie perspective taking's positive effects on automatic intergroup evaluations. Additional experiments, using a moderation-of-process design, found that the benefits of perspective taking were attenuated when measured or manipulated automatic self-evaluations were relatively negative, preventing positive associative transfer. A final experiment uncovered a practical downstream implication of our causal model, as perspective-taking-induced changes in automatic intergroup evaluations were still evident 1 day later. Overall, these findings supported our associative self-anchoring account; additional analyses found no support for an alternative, empathy-based account.

"The mind is willing, but the flesh is weak": the effects of mind-body dualism on health behavior.

Beliefs in mind-body dualism--that is, perceiving one's mind and body as two distinct entities--are evident in virtually all human cultures. Despite their prevalence, surprisingly little is known about the psychological implications of holding such beliefs. In the research reported here, we investigated the relationship between dualistic beliefs and health behaviors. We theorized that holding dualistic beliefs leads people to perceive their body as a mere "shell" and, thus, to neglect it. Supporting this hypothesis, our results showed that participants who were primed with dualism reported less engagement in healthy behaviors and less positive attitudes toward such behaviors than did participants primed with physicalism. Additionally, we investigated the bidirectionality of this link. Activating health-related concepts affected participants' subsequently reported metaphysical beliefs in mind-body dualism. A final set of studies demonstrated that participants primed with dualism make real-life decisions that may ultimately compromise their physical health (e.g., consuming unhealthy food). These findings have potential implications for health interventions.