Proxies, heuristics, and goal alignment.

Decision-making heuristics rely on proxies so the elements of heuristics appear to map well to the elements of proxies identified by John et al. However, unlike proxy failure, heuristics do not fail because of feedback. This may be because for successful heuristics the goals of regulators and agents are aligned, but this is not the case for proxy failure.

Probability, measurement mismatches, and sacrificial moral decision-making.

Despite the importance of uncertainty in decision-making, few published studies have examined how individuals make moral judgments under uncertainty. Across four experiments (N = 445), we examined whether a relatively small shift in probability affected participants' judgments of both moral acceptability and choice. Overall, reading dilemmas where the characters were either certain or likely to die, the probability of the sacrificed individual and the group at risk dying both had independent effects on participants' responses. That is, participants were more accepting of sacrificing the individual if they were not certain to die, but less accepting if the group was only likely to die when the individual was not sacrificed. Furthermore, a number of participants made acceptability ratings that did not match the action they endorsed, either finding the sacrificial decision more acceptable but refusing to make it, or choosing the sacrificial decision while viewing it as less acceptable. Many participants also stated that this was because they recognised a crucial difference between what they viewed as morally acceptable in a dilemma and what they were actually willing to do. Such mismatches may reflect the sensitivity and complexity of the moral principles that individuals employ during their moral decision-making.

To kill or not to kill: A systematic literature review of high-stakes moral decision-making measures and their psychometric properties.

Introduction: The present systematic review investigates the psychological tools available for capturing high-stakes decisions involving life-death content and their psychometric properties. Valid measurement of these individual differences will provide crucial information in the personnel selection and training in fields where high-stakes moral issues exist (e.g., military, medicine). To our knowledge, this is the first systematic examination of such instruments. Methods: Systematic searches of 6 electronic databases were conducted according to the PRISMA guidelines. An appraisal tool evaluated the quality of identified measures. Twenty studies met pre-determined inclusion criteria. Moral decision-making was assessed with either a self-report scale (n = 3) or moral dilemmas (n = 17). Results: The findings identified two measures, the Defining Issues Test and the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale as psychometrically sound measures of moral decision-making. However, they are unlikely to be considered "gold standard" measures due to their theoretically specific, but limited, scope. Overall, the findings suggest that research in the area has been scattered. There is a lack of consensus on the definition of moral decision-making, and a lack of cross-validation on how different measures of moral decision-making relate to each other. This presents a gap between theory and empirical measurement in moral decision-making. Further work is needed for a unified conceptualization of moral decision-making to pave the way to both theory development and the development of well-validated measurement tools, and this review provides a critical foundation for both.

Exploring a core psychopathology in disordered eating: the feelings of fat scale.

BACKGROUND: Feelings of fat are common for people with eating disorders, but ways of measuring its intensity are needed. Therefore, our goal was to develop a self-report feelings of fat scale that asked participants to indicate how intensely they currently felt statements such as "I feel fat". With such a scale we can determine how strongly feelings of fat relate to evidence of disordered eating. METHODS: We conducted three studies of eating disorders with undergraduate women taking introductory psychology classes. The combined sample was 472 participants. A previous eating disorder diagnosis was self-reported by 33 participants and a current diagnosis by 11. All participants completed the EDE-Q and the seven (Study 1) or nine item (Studies 2 and 3) "State Feelings of Fat" (SFF) scales we developed. Each item asked them to rate the intensity with which they felt statements such "I feel fat" on a seven-point scale from "not at all" to "the most I have ever felt". RESULTS: Both the seven and nine item SFF scales were highly coherent (Cronbach's α were .94, .95 and .94), but factor analysis supported the seven-item version. We found high correlations between SFF and EDE-Q scores (Study 1: .816; Study 2: .808; Study 3: .841). SFF scores distinguished participants self-reporting no eating disorder diagnosis from those with a former diagnosis, t (361) = 2.33, p = .021, who in turn were distinguished from those with a current diagnosis, t (42) = 2.09, p = .043. Due to the high coherence of the scale, the single item "I feel fat" captured most of the variance in EDE-Q scores (r [472] = .793). CONCLUSIONS: We have constructed an eating disorders relevant feelings of fat scale. Given that the EDE-Q is considered a valid questionnaire for measuring severity of eating disorders, our findings suggests that feelings of fat are core to the psychopathology of eating disorders. To the extent that EDE-Q scores are stable it also suggests that feelings of fat are surprisingly stable. Furthermore, the single item "I feel fat" alone may capture most of what the EDE-Q measures.

Many people with eating disorders report feelings regarding fat. In this paper we developed a way to measure how intensely someone has such feelings and tested how strongly this was related to potentially having an eating disorder (as measured by the EDE-Q scale). Our questionnaire had seven items which asked how intensely a person felt statements such as "I feel fat". In three studies with a combined sample of 472 university women we found our scale to be reliable and that the association between our feelings of fat scale and EDE-Q scores was a .818 correlation. Thus, asking about the intensity of feelings of fat appears to be strongly associated with how likely someone is to have a potential eating disorder. This suggests that feelings of fat are an important element of eating disorders.

An exploratory study of creativity and eating disorders.

BACKGROUND: We examined whether cognitive rigidity associated with having an eating disorder generalized to creativity. METHOD: One hundred twelve participants from the participant pool of an Australian university were given a measure of disordered eating (EDE-Q), asked if they had ever had a diagnosis of an eating disorder (16 reported yes), and given 3 min to generate alternative uses for a paper-clip. The alternative uses task yielded measures of creative fluency, originality, elaboration and flexibility. RESULTS: A logistic regression found that only lower flexibility predicted a self-reported ED diagnosis. Across the spectrum of disordered eating behaviour there was no association between creativity measures and EDE-Q global scores. CONCLUSION: Our results were consistent with previous findings of an association between cognitive inflexibility and having an ED. However we found no evidence that cognitive inflexibility generalized to creativity more broadly. Our results may lend support to Cognitive Remediation Therapy, but further study is required.

The importance of understanding: Model space moderates goal specificity effects.

The three-space theory of problem solving predicts that the quality of a learner's model and the goal specificity of a task interact on knowledge acquisition. In Experiment 1 participants used a computer simulation of a lever system to learn about torques. They either had to test hypotheses (nonspecific goal), or to produce given values for variables (specific goal). In the good- but not in the poor-model condition they saw torque depicted as an area. Results revealed the predicted interaction. A nonspecific goal only resulted in better learning when a good model of torques was provided. In Experiment 2 participants learned to manipulate the inputs of a system to control its outputs. A nonspecific goal to explore the system helped performance when compared to a specific goal to reach certain values when participants were given a good model, but not when given a poor model that suggested the wrong hypothesis space. Our findings support the three-space theory. They emphasize the importance of understanding for problem solving and stress the need to study underlying processes.

Expertise in complex decision making: the role of search in chess 70 years after de Groot.

One of the most influential studies in all expertise research is de Groot's (1946) study of chess players, which suggested that pattern recognition, rather than search, was the key determinant of expertise. Many changes have occurred in the chess world since de Groot's study, leading some authors to argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise have also changed. We decided to replicate de Groot's study to empirically test these claims and to examine whether the trends in the data have changed over time. Six Grandmasters, five International Masters, six Experts, and five Class A players completed the think-aloud procedure for two chess positions. Findings indicate that Grandmasters and International Masters search more quickly than Experts and Class A players, and that both groups today search substantially faster than players in previous studies. The findings, however, support de Groot's overall conclusions and are consistent with predictions made by pattern recognition models.

Incentives improve performance on both incremental and insight problem solving.

An increasing number of studies are showing a connection between emotion and motivation and cognitive processes. Most of these studies, however, have been correlational in nature, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn. We directly manipulated motivation through the use of an incentive and investigated its effects on insight and incremental problem solving. In four experiments we found that an incentive (the opportunity to leave the experiment early) increased problem-solving performance for all problems presented, regardless of problem type. Additionally, we found evidence that the incentive increased recall memory, indicating more thorough processing for participants in the incentive condition. This study provides evidence that incentives influence problem solving and implies that motivation should not be ignored when investigating cognitive processes.

The collider principle in causal reasoning: why the Monty Hall dilemma is so hard.

The authors tested the thesis that people find the Monty Hall dilemma (MHD) hard because they fail to understand the implications of its causal structure, a collider structure in which 2 independent causal factors influence a single outcome. In 4 experiments, participants performed better in versions of the MHD involving competition, which emphasizes causality. This manipulation resulted in more correct responses to questions about the process in the MHD and a counterfactual that changed its causal structure. Correct responses to these questions were associated with solving the MHD regardless of condition. In addition, training on the collider principle transferred to a standard version of the MHD. The MHD taps a deeper question: When is knowing about one thing informative about another?

The effects of speed on skilled chess performance.

Two types of mechanisms may underlie chess skill: fast mechanisms, such as recognition, and slow mechanisms, such as search through the space of possible moves and responses. Speed distinguishes these mechanisms, so I examined archival data on blitz chess (5 min for the whole game), in which the opportunities for search are greatly reduced. If variation in fast processes accounts for substantial variation in chess skill, performance in blitz chess should correlate highly with a player's overall skill. In addition, restricting search processes should tend to equalize skill difference between players, but this effect should decrease as overall skill level increases. Analyses of three samples of blitz chess tournaments supported both hypotheses. Search is undoubtedly important, but up to 81% of variance in chess skill (measured by rating) was accounted for by how players performed with less than 5% of the normal time available.

Randomness and inductions from streaks: "gambler's fallacy" versus "hot hand".

Sometimes people believe that a run of similar independent events will be broken (belief in the gambler's fallacy) but, other times, that such a run will continue (belief in the hot hand). Both of these opposite inductions have been explained as being due to belief in a law of small numbers. We argue that one factor that distinguishes these phenomena is people's beliefs about the randomness of the underlying process generating the events. We gave participants information about a streak of events but varied the scenarios in such a way that the mechanism generating the events should vary in how random the participants would judge it to be. A manipulation check confirmed our assumptions about the scenarios. We found that with less random scenarios, the participants were more likely to continue a streak.

Heuristics as beliefs and as behaviors: the adaptiveness of the "hot hand".

and analyzed reasoning by asking: what are the reasoner's goals? This emphasizes the adaptiveness of behavior rather than whether a belief is normative. Belief in the "hot hand" in basketball suggests that players experiencing streaks should be given more shots, but this has been seen as a fallacy due to failure to find dependencies between players' shots. Based on their findings, I demonstrate by Markov modeling and simulation that streaks are valid allocation cues for deciding who to give shots to, because this behavior achieves the team goal of scoring more. Empirically I show that this adaptive heuristic is supported by the fallacious belief in dependency, more so as skill level increases. I extend the theoretical analysis to identify general conditions under which following streaks should be beneficial. Overall, this approach illustrates the advantages of analyzing reasoning in terms of adaptiveness.

Goal specificity and learning with a hypermedia program.

Problem solving research has found that a nonspecific goal (NSG) leads to better learning than a specific goal (SG). This effect can be understood in terms of dual-space search theories of problem solving. To apply the theory, we studied goal specificity effects with a hypermedia program in which participants had to learn about the outbreak of World War 1, either with the goal to find twenty dates (i.e., SG) or with the goal to explain the reasons for the war (i.e., NSG). As expected, compared to the SG-group, the NSG-group correctly answered more factual questions about the text during the task, spent more time on average per page, and more often looked for extra information. In a final questionnaire with factual and inferential questions, the NSG-group still performed better than the SG-group. The NSG-group may also show better transfer of what they had learnt to a new situation.

Goal specificity effects on hypothesis testing in problem solving.

Previous research has found that having a nonspecific goal (NSG) leads to better problem solving and transfer than having a specific goal (SG). To distinguish between the various explanations of this effect requires direct evidence showing how a NSG affects a participant's behaviour. Therefore we collected verbal protocols from participants learning to control a linear system consisting of 3 outputs by manipulating 3 inputs. This system was simpler than the one we had used previously, so in Exp. 1 we generalized our earlier goal specificity findings to this system. In Exp. 2 protocol analysis confirmed our prediction (based on dual-space theories of problem solving) that NSG participants focused on hypothesis testing whereas SG participants focused on the goal. However, this difference only emerged over time. We also replicated the goal specificity effect on performance and showed that giving participants a hypothesis to test improved performance.