All that glisters is not gold: Genetics and social science.

In their target article, Madole & Harden offer an account of "what it means for genes to be causes" of social outcomes to bolster their claim that genetics should be incorporated into social science with practical implications. Here I object to several key features of their arguments, their representation of the state of science, and claims about the utility of genetics for social science and society.

Polygenic scores for social science: Clarification, consensus, and controversy.

In this response, I focus on clarifying my arguments, highlighting consensus, and addressing competing views about the utility of polygenic scores (PGSs) for social science. I also discuss an assortment of expansions to my arguments and suggest alternative approaches. I conclude by reiterating the need for caution and appropriate scientific skepticism.

Irreducibly Social: Why Biocriminology's Ontoepistemology is Incompatible with the Social Reality of Crime.

Professing interactionist bio + social terminology, contemporary biocriminology asserts a break from its biologically essentialist past. Assurances notwithstanding, whether biocriminology has undergone a decisive paradigm shift rejecting notions of biological criminals and bad brains remains uncertain. Unfortunately, discussions of biocriminology's assumptions are mired in politics, obscuring important scientific issues. Motivated to clarify misunderstanding, I address the ontoepistemology of biocriminology from a scientific realist perspective. Drawing on familiar notions of crime as a social construction, I explain how and why biocriminology's ontoepistemology is inconsistent with the social reality of crime for scientific not ideological reasons. I explain that recognizing crime is a social construction does not imply that crime is not real or objective and cannot be studied scientifically. On the contrary, the irreducibly social nature of crime requires that scientific realists reject assumptions of 'biological crime' as well as the biologically reductionist epistemology on which biocriminology depends.

Cultural evolutionary theory is not enough: Ambiguous culture, neglect of structure, and the absence of theory in behavior genetics.

Uchiyama et al. propose a unified model linking cultural evolutionary theory to behavior genetics (BG) to enhance generalizability, enrich explanation, and predict how social factors shape heritability estimates. A consideration of culture evolution is beneficial but insufficient for purpose. I submit that their proposed model is underdeveloped and their emphasis on heritability estimates misguided. I discuss their ambiguous conception of culture, neglect of social structure, and the lack of a general theory in BG.

Challenging the utility of polygenic scores for social science: Environmental confounding, downward causation, and unknown biology.

The sociogenomics revolution is upon us, we are told. Whether revolutionary or not, sociogenomics is poised to flourish given the ease of incorporating polygenic scores (or PGSs) as "genetic propensities" for complex traits into social science research. Pointing to evidence of ubiquitous heritability and the accessibility of genetic data, scholars have argued that social scientists not only have an opportunity but a duty to add PGSs to social science research. Social science research that ignores genetics is, some proponents argue, at best partial and likely scientifically flawed, misleading, and wasteful. Here, I challenge arguments about the value of genetics for social science and with it the claimed necessity of incorporating PGSs into social science models as measures of genetic influences. In so doing, I discuss the impracticability of distinguishing genetic influences from environmental influences because of non-causal gene-environment correlations, especially population stratification, familial confounding, and downward causation. I explain how environmental effects masquerade as genetic influences in PGSs, which undermines their raison d'être as measures of genetic propensity, especially for complex socially contingent behaviors that are the subject of sociogenomics. Additionally, I draw attention to the partial, unknown biology, while highlighting the persistence of an implicit, unavoidable reductionist genes versus environments approach. Leaving sociopolitical and ethical concerns aside, I argue that the potential scientific rewards of adding PGSs to social science are few and greatly overstated and the scientific costs, which include obscuring structural disadvantages and cultural influences, outweigh these meager benefits for most social science applications.

Experimental studies of bias: Imperfect but neither useless nor unique.

Cesario provides a compelling critique of the use of experimental social psychology to explain real-world group disparities. We concur with his targeted critique and extend "the problem of missing information" to another common measures of bias. We disagree with Cesario's broader argument that the entire enterprise be abandoned, suggesting instead targeted utilization. Finally, we question whether the critique is appropriately directed at experimental social psychologists.

Self-Control and Crime: Beyond Gottfredson and Hirschi's Theory.

Over the past several decades, Gottfredson & Hirschi's (1990) SCT has dominated research on self-control and crime. In this review, I assess the current state of self-control knowledge and encourage the field to move beyond SCT, as its peculiar conceptualization of self-control and causal model presents challenges for integrative scholarship. Drawing heavily on scholarship outside criminology, I clarify the definition of self-control; describe the malleable nature of trait self-control; highlight its situational variability as state self-control; and consider the multiplicity of contextual, situational, and individual factors that affect its operation in relation to crime. This specification of contingencies and the interplay between impulse strength and control efforts in the process of self-control is intended as a springboard for research moving beyond SCT and its key premise that self-control ability is sufficient for explanation. Finally, I address what I see as important areas for further study in light of current knowledge.

INCORPORATING ROUTINE ACTIVITIES, ACTIVITY SPACES, AND SITUATIONAL DEFINITIONS INTO THE SOCIAL SCHEMATIC THEORY OF CRIME.

Simons and Burt's (2011) social schematic theory (SST) of crime posits that adverse social factors are associated with offending because they promote a set of social schemas (i.e., a criminogenic knowledge structure) that elevates the probability of situational definitions favorable to crime. This study extends the SST model by incorporating the role of contexts for action. Furthermore, the study advances tests of the SST by incorporating a measure of criminogenic situational definitions to assess whether such definitions mediate the effects of schemas and contexts on crime. Structural equation models using 10 years of panel data from 582 African American youth provided strong support for the expanded theory. The results suggest that childhood and adolescent social adversity fosters a criminogenic knowledge structure as well as selection into criminogenic activity spaces and risky activities, all of which increase the likelihood of offending largely through situational definitions. Additionally, evidence shows that the criminogenic knowledge structure interacts with settings to amplify the likelihood of situational definitions favorable to crime.