RESUMO
In case of an accidental release of radioactivity and subsequent contamination of the food chain, many samples need to be collected and analysed, and this is far from being a simple issue. The determination of contamination levels requires accredited laboratories, approved and certified procedures and methods, transparency and above all prompt results, as stakeholders in general cannot afford waiting. Adequate decisions require fixed norms, stable in time, and accepted internationally. Moreover, an effective policy relies on traceability of products as well. There are huge requirements of harmonisation of procedures, traceability of data, database management, priority settings etc. Accredited laboratories tend to make use of reliable techniques but these have been optimised for low radiation levels and high accuracy for routine analyses, often in the framework of radiological surveillance of the territory, drinking waters or the food chain. It is obvious that such procedures, although very accurate and sensitive, are not suited for urgent decisions in crisis situations. Similarly, accredited analysis methodologies may start from large quantities of product in order to decrease limits of detection; however, this involves sometimes long times for drying or chemical treatment, introducing important delays. Furthermore, large quantities of samples would simply result in the saturation of the analytical capabilities of one country. Adequate actions and informed decisions during a nuclear accident will require an analytical infrastructure that individual countries do not have; hence there is a clear need to establish regional collaboration and co-operation. This paper includes an example of such collaborative work and mutual assistance, and also touches on how sharing tools for decision making, analytical resources, sample collection procedures and analysis would promote trust, reliablity in the results, a common approach toward minimizing the effects of a radiological disaster and above all unity. Last but not least, this paper also poses a challenge: Nuclear accident management implies that all responsible parties have to guarantee that decision support systems have access to data and information in the best available and consistent manner. This will not be achieved in an independent and isolated manner.
