Assessing The Effectiveness Of Peer Comparisons As A Way To Improve Health Care Quality.

Policy makers are increasingly using performance feedback that compares physicians to their peers as part of payment policy reforms. However, it is not known whether peer comparisons can improve broad outcomes, beyond changing specific individual behaviors such as reducing inappropriate prescribing of antibiotics. We conducted a cluster-randomized controlled trial with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Hawaii to examine the impact of providing peer comparisons feedback on the quality of care to primary care providers in the setting of a shift from fee-for-service to population-based payment. Over 74,000 patients and eighty-eight primary care providers across sixty-three sites were included over a period of nine months in 2016. Patients in the peer comparisons intervention group experienced a 3.1-percentage-point increase in quality scores compared to the control group-whose members received individual feedback only. This result underscores the effectiveness of peer comparisons as a way to improve health care quality, and it supports Medicare's decisions to provide comparative feedback as part of recently implemented primary care and specialty payment reform programs.

Designing a commercial medical bundle for cancer care: Hawaii Medical Service Association's Cancer Episode Model.

BACKGROUND: Oncology care is expensive and exhibits substantial variation in cost and quality across clinicians and patients. Unlike many conditions with established bundled payment programs, cancer care includes a mix of inpatient and outpatient care that precludes hospital-based designs. In 2018, we worked with Hawaii Medical Service Association (HMSA), the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Hawaii, to design a novel commercial bundle for cancer care, the Cancer Episode Model. METHODS: Descriptive analysis of HMSA's Cancer Episode Model, including its inclusion criteria, episode definitions, suite of enhanced services, shared savings model, and incentivized quality metrics. We also compare HMSA's Cancer Episode Model to Medicare's Oncology Care Model and three major commercial oncologic alternative payment models offered by Anthem, UnitedHealthcare, and Aetna. RESULTS: HMSA's Cancer Episode Model builds upon the successes and limitations of Medicare's Oncology Care Model and existing commercial alternative payment models. Compared to Medicare's Oncology Care Model, HMSA's Cancer Episode Model has stricter inclusion criteria, fewer incentivized quality metrics, a higher proportion of regional pricing, a different risk-adjustment model, and first-dollar shared savings. Compared to the majority of existing commercial models, HMSA's Cancer Episode Model includes total cost of care and a different risk-adjustment model. CONCLUSIONS: Reviewing features of the Cancer Episode Model in comparison to other programs is intended to provide guidance to health plans and health policymakers in the design of programs and policies aimed at improving cancer care value. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level IV.

Effect of Financial Bonus Size, Loss Aversion, and Increased Social Pressure on Physician Pay-for-Performance: A Randomized Clinical Trial and Cohort Study.

Importance: Despite limited effectiveness of pay-for-performance (P4P), payers continue to expand P4P nationally. Objective: To test whether increasing bonus size or adding the behavioral economic principles of increased social pressure (ISP) or loss aversion (LA) improves the effectiveness of P4P. Design, Setting, and Participants: Parallel studies conducted from January 1 to December 31, 2016, consisted of a randomized clinical trial with patients cluster-randomized by practice site to an active control group (larger bonus size [LBS] only) or to groups with 1 of 2 behavioral economic interventions added and a cohort study comparing changes in outcomes among patients of physicians receiving an LBS with outcomes in propensity-matched physicians not receiving an LBS. A total of 8118 patients attributed to 66 physicians with 1 of 5 chronic conditions were treated at Advocate HealthCare, an integrated health system in Illinois. Data were analyzed using intention to treat and multiple imputation from February 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. Interventions: Physician participants received an LBS increased by a mean of $3355 per physician (LBS-only group); prefunded incentives to elicit LA and an LBS; or increasing proportion of a P4P bonus determined by group performance from 30% to 50% (ISP) and an LBS. Main Outcomes and Measures: The proportion of 20 evidence-based quality measures achieved at the patient level. Results: A total of 86 physicians were eligible for the randomized trial. Of these, 32 were excluded because they did not have unique attributed patients. Fifty-four physicians were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups, and 33 physicians (54.5% male; mean [SD] age, 57 [10] years) and 3747 patients (63.6% female; mean [SD] age, 64 [18] years) were included in the final analysis. Nine physicians and 864 patients were randomized to the LBS-only group, 13 physicians and 1496 patients to the LBS plus ISP group, and 11 physicians and 1387 patients to the LBS plus LA group. Physician characteristics did not differ significantly by arm, such as mean (SD) physician age ranging from 56 (9) to 59 (9) years, and sex (6 [46.2%] to 6 [66.7%] male). No differences were found between the LBS-only and the intervention groups (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] for LBS plus LA vs LBS-only, 0.86 [95% CI, 0.65-1.15; P = .31]; aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS-only, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.64-1.42; P = .81]; and aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS plus LA, 1.10 [95% CI, 0.75-1.61; P = .62]). Increased bonus size was associated with a greater increase in evidence-based care relative to the comparison group (risk-standardized absolute difference-in-differences, 3.2 percentage points; 95% CI, 1.9-4.5 percentage points; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: Increased bonus size was associated with significantly improved quality of care relative to a comparison group. Adding ISP and opportunities for LA did not improve quality. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02634879.