RESUMO
The paper investigates the existence and the nature of quantum indeterminacy in a particular realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is, the Modal Hamiltonian Interpretation (MHI)-together with an ontology of properties for quantum systems. In doing so, it serves a twofold purpose. First, it advances the debate on quantum ontology by showing precisely how and why indeterminacy arises in a quantum world-as described by the MHI. Second, it offers a naturalistic example of genuine metaphysical indeterminacy, an example coming from our best physics.
RESUMO
Super-substantivalism (of the type we'll consider) roughly comprises two core tenets: (1) the physical properties which we attribute to matter (e.g. charge or mass) can be attributed to spacetime directly, with no need for matter as an extraneous carrier "on top of" spacetime; (2) spacetime is more fundamental than (ontologically prior to) matter. In the present paper, we revisit a recent argument in favour of super-substantivalism, based on General Relativity. A critique is offered that highlights the difference between (various accounts of) fundamentality and (various forms of) ontological dependence. This affords a metaphysically more perspicuous view of what super-substantivalism's tenets actually assert, and how it may be defended. We tentatively propose a re-formulation of the original argument that not only seems to apply to all classical physics, but also chimes with a standard interpretation of spacetime theories in the philosophy of physics.
